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research and teaching assistant, he was the most reliable partner that one could hope
for - be it pertaining to research, in particular in terms of data and IT-infrastructure
support, or teaching, sharing best practices and taking care of my induction, he
mentored and supported me exceptionally any way possible.
I further thank Dr. Claudia Wendels. She supported me with her expertise
on historical issues regarding socio-demographics; witnessing her recalling abundant
facts and primary sources quasi out of the blue is fairly and squarely stunning. Also
i
ii Acknowdledgements
did she had an open ear for my issues and concerns, encouraging me to hang on.
My thanks also go to several research, teaching, and student assistants I worked
and work among at the University of Cologne, in particular at the Department of Fi-
nance, Corporate Finance, and Bank Management. Especially, I thank Dr. Florian
Sonnenburg, who not only lived up to his name but also provided valuable sup-
port and guidance, as well as Claudia Peitzmeier, Simon Lesmeister, Luca Conrads,
William Liu, Simon Wolf, Arndt-Gerrit Kund, and Florian Neitzert, for valuable
discussions, suggestions, and their helpfulness.
I am also indebted to Edith Diekmann, who assisted me in administrative tasks
and always would caringly listen and hand out advice.
Moreover, I thank the participants and discussants at several seminars and con-
ferences as well as anonymous referees for their helpful comments and discussions.
I also thank the Centre for Financial Research (CFR) for financial support and
access to a valuable professional network.
Particularly cordial thanks go to my parents, who always were there for me and
supported me pursuing my dearest desire. I am deeply grateful for their care - I
cannot express how much I love you.
Contents
Acknowledgments i
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
1 Introduction 1
2 The Impact of Labor Mobility Restrictions on Managerial Actions:
Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry1 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Identification, Data, and Empirical Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 Identification Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 Sample Construction and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Do NCCs Matter in the Fund Industry? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 The Impact of NCCs on Fund Managers’ Performance . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.1 Main Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 Robustness Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.2.1 Single-State Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.2.2 Switching Fund Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.2.3 Propensity Score Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.3 Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1This chapter is based on Cici, Hendriock, and Kempf (2020b).
iii
iv Contents
2.4.4 Cross-Sectional Differences in the Behavior of Fund Managers 35
2.4.4.1 Low- versus High-Skilled Managers . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4.4.2 Managers in Families with Large versus Small Inter-
nal Labor Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5 Other Actions of Fund Managers in Response to NCCs . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.1 The Impact of NCCs on Window Dressing . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.2 The Impact of NCCs on Risk Taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3 Finding your calling: Skill matching in the mutual fund industry2
49
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.3 Sample Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 An Anatomy of Learning-by-Trying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 Performance after Discovery of Style Match . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.1 Main Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.2 Parallel Trends Assessment and Persistence of Performance
Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4.3 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.3.1 Learning-by-Doing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.3.2 Managerial Preferences and Organizational Power . . 70
3.5 How do Families Respond to Optimal Style Discovery? . . . . . . . . 70
3.5.1 Do Families Promote Managers Who Reach Their Style Match? 71
3.5.2 Do Families Further Scale Up the New Information? . . . . . . 72
3.5.3 Implications for the Hiring Decisions of Fund Families . . . . . 75
3.6 How do Managers Respond to Style Match Discovery? . . . . . . . . 77
3.6.1 Investment Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2This chapter is based on Cici, Hendriock, and Kempf (2020a).
Contents v
3.6.2 Managerial Fund Ownership Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4 Implied Cost of Capital and Mutual Fund Performance3 83
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.1 Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.2 ICC and Expected Earnings Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 ICC and Fund Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3.1 Portfolio Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3.2 Regression Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.3.3 Fund Trades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.4 Determinants of ICC Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.4.1 Trading Efficiency and ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.4.2 Fund Manager Skill and ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.5 Implications of ICCs’ Correlation with Fund Performance . . . . . . . 124
4.5.1 ICCs’ Impact on Managerial Tournament Incentives . . . . . . 124
4.5.2 Investors’ Response to Funds’ ICCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Appendix to Chapter 2 131




3This chapter is based on Hendriock (2020).
vi Contents
List of Tables
2.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability on Departure Rates . . . . 24
2.3 Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability on Performance . . . . . . 27
2.4 Assessment of Parallel Trends in the Pre-Treatment Period . . . . . . 28
2.5 Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability for each Treatment Group
separately . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.6 Constant Manager-Fund Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7 Propensity Score Match . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.8 Extreme Bets of Fund Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.9 Manager Skill and NCC Impact on Fund Performance . . . . . . . . . 37
2.10 Size of the Internal Labor Market and NCC Impact on Fund Perfor-
mance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.11 Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability on Window Dressing . . . 41
2.12 Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability on Risk Taking . . . . . . . 43
3.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Managers that Reach Style Match . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Determinants of Style Match Discovery Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4 Performance after Discovery of Style Match . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5 Parallel Trends Assessment and Persistence of Performance . . . . . . 66
3.6 Matched Sample Analysis of Performance after Discovery of Style Match 69
3.7 Managerial Preferences and Organizational Power . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.8 Promotion of Managers that Reached their Style Match . . . . . . . . 72
3.9 Utilization of Trade Ideas by Affiliated Managers . . . . . . . . . . . 74
vii
viii List of Tables
3.10 Implications for the Hiring Decisions of Fund Families . . . . . . . . . 76
3.11 Investment Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.12 Managerial Fund Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2 ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Portfolio Sorts . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3 ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Panel Regressions . . . . . . . . 108
4.4 ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Subsumption Test . . . . . . . . 112
4.5 ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.6 Directional Trades and Fund Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.7 Trading Efficiency and ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.8 Fund Manager SAT Score and ICC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.9 ICC and Tournament Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.10 ICC and Mutual Fund Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
List of Figures
3.1 Parallel Trends Assessment and Persistence of Performance . . . . . . 67
4.1 Illustration of Cross-Sectional Earnings Estimation Procedure . . . . 95
4.2 Cumulative Fund Returns of ICC-Percentile-Portfolios. . . . . . . . . 98
4.3 Average Monthly Performance of ICC-Percentile-Portfolios. . . . . . . 105
ix
x List of Figures
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays on asset management. In particular, I focus
on institutional investors in the form of active mutual funds and their ability to
fulfill their mandate as delegated portfolio managers, which is to deliver the best
risk-reward-trade-off, i.e., “performance”, possible.
With 17.7 trillion U.S. dollars by the end of 2018, corresponding to a growth by a
factor of 22 over the last three decades alone, the mutual fund industry in the United
States witnessed substantial increases in assets under management. Active funds,
with 64%, manage the largest part. Simultaneously, 45% of households are invested
into mutual funds and 2⁄3 allocate more than half of their financial wealth to them,
leaving 89% of the 17.7 trillion U.S. dollars on private investors’ accounts.1 These
individuals rely on their mutual fund investments to meet long-term personal finan-
cial objectives, such as saving for education and retirement, purchasing real estate,
and preparing for emergencies.2 In consequence, large parts of economic prosperity
depend on the weal and woe of the mutual fund industry, in particular, whether
asset managers are able to deliver performance above their designated benchmark.
This question of fund manager skill has drawn the attention of both the public as
well as research. One strand of literature on mutual fund managers’ ability evolved
with the focus on the identification of skill. Initially having examined fund returns,
in an effort to increase the power of tests, it shifted the analysis to fund security
1Confer Investment Company Institute (2019).
2Confer Doellman, Huseynov, Nasser, and Sardarli (2020).
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holdings and fund trades as well as more specialized tests intended to separate
skill from luck.3 Accepting that a subset of mutual funds appears to have skill,
another strand of literature has turned to understanding which attributes of the
three main parties involved in a mutual fund’s production function - the fund itself,
its managers, and the asset management company4 - and their interrelations are
associated with better performance.5 The three essays of this thesis add to the
latter strand of literature.
The first essay considers the contractual relationship between fund managers and
their employer, the asset management company. With the design of the employment
contract a company can shape the incentives of its workforce, which in turn impact
its output. In the mutual fund industry, remuneration is characterized by distinctive
explicit incentives, with managers receiving large parts of their compensation as a
fraction of assets under management respectively in form of boni depending on
their performance relative to their benchmark.6 Besides, implicit incentives in form
of general “career concerns” empirically have been shown to impact managers’ risk
taking.7 While economic theory furthermore predicts that they also influence the
first moment of labor output,8 empirical studies, however, are scarce. In the first
essay, we provide evidence consistent with theory.
Specifically, Cici, Hendriock, and Kempf (2020b) address the question, how la-
bor mobility restrictions through non-compete clauses (NCCs) impact managerial
3Confer, e.g., Jensen (1968), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Wermers (1999),
Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), Wermers (2000), Kothari and Warner (2001), Pinnuck
(2003), Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010), Fama and French (2010), and Wermers (2020).
4In the following, this term is used interchangeably with the expression “fund family”.
5As characteristics at the fund-level, e.g., Carhart (1997) studies the impact of expenses, whereas
Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2011) examine the impact of the management structure. Concerning
manager characteristics, e.g., Golec (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), and Bai, Ma, Mullally,
and Solomon (2019) study the impact of age, Costa and Porter (2003), Kempf, Manconi, and
Spalt (2017), and Cici, Gehde-Trapp, Göricke, and Kempf (2018) that of experience, Gottesman
and Morey (2006, 2019) and Andreu and Puetz (2017) the influence of education, and Atkinson,
Baird, and Frye (2003), Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008), and Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019)
the effect of gender. With respect to the influence of the asset management company, confer, e.g.,
Massa (2003), Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), Berk, van Binsbergen,
and Liu (2017), and Evans, Prado, and Zambrana (2020). For a review, confer Elton and Gruber
(2011) and Jones and Wermers (2011).
6Confer, e.g., Hu, Hall, and Harvey (2000), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003), and Ma, Tang,
and Gómez (2019).
7Confer, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) and Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009).
8Confer, e.g., Fama (1980) and Andersson (2002).
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actions.9 NCCs prohibit a separating employee from competing with her former
employer, either by working for a competing firm or by establishing one on her own,
during a limited period of time and in a certain geographical area. As such, they not
only impact career concerns in the most fundamental way possible but also enable
companies to explicitly contract on them. How NCCs affect employees’ incentives,
however, neither is obvious ex-ante nor has it been investigated by research. There
are at least two opposing effects. On the one hand, there potentially is a disciplining
effect: NCCs impose costs on employees when they are fired because they have to
stay unemployed for a certain period of time; this threat possibly incentivizes them
to increase their effort and consequently their output to avoid termination. On the
other hand, NCCs reduce outside options of managers in the external labor market,
making it harder for them to exploit external promotion opportunities. This might
reduce their incentives to signal their quality and consequently make them reduce
their effort. Ultimately, it is an open empirical question which effect dominates.
Our identification strategy for measuring the impact of NCCs exploits exoge-
nous shocks in form of legal amendments to the enforceability of NCCs.10 Results
from corresponding difference-in-differences regressions provide strong evidence of
a positive association between increased NCC enforceability and fund performance.
The evidence remains strong in robustness tests, where we, i.a., consider increases
and decreases in NCC-enforceability separately to document exactly opposing ef-
fects, vary the size of the event window, and use a matched control group. Thus,
the effort-increasing effect induced by a desire to avoid higher costs associated with
being fired seems to be more important for fund managers than the effort-reducing
effect arising from more-limited outside options.
To substantiate the effort channel by means of which increased NCC-enforceability
leads to higher performance, we take into account differences in the relative impor-
9There is a growing literature that studies the impact of NCCs on economic activity at the state-
and firm-level, in particular, on the innovation process, entrepreneurship, employee mobility, firm-
sponsored versus employee-paid training, wages, firms’ output, as well as firms’ financial reporting
choices. Bishara, Martin, and Thomas (2015), Bishara and Starr (2016), and Prescott, Bishara,
and Starr (2016) provide a review of that literature.
10Scrutinized by legal researchers, they have frequently been employed in literature, confer, e.g.,
Conti (2014), Lou, Wang, and Zhou (2017), Yin, Hasan, Kobeissi, and Wang (2017), Aobdia
(2018), Chen, Zhang, and Zhou (2018), He and Wintoki (2018), He (2018), and Ali, Li, and Zhang
(2019).
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tance of its effects (higher costs associated with termination versus more limited
outside options) across fund managers. First, managers who consider themselves to
be of low skill are likely to be more concerned about termination risk than about
limited outside options relative to fund managers who consider themselves to be
skilled; this would give larger importance to NCCs’ threatening effect, resulting into
even stronger increases in performance. Second, we hypothesize that concerns re-
lated to limited outside options are less relevant for fund managers employed by fund
families with a larger internal labor market; as they offer more internal promotion
opportunities, the effort-decreasing effect of NCCs is less important. Again, this
would imply higher performance increases. Our results support both hypotheses.
In order to shed light on how managers achieve the increase in performance, we
propose and test for a particular mechanism. Consistent with managers redirecting
their effort to investments for which they are likely to have an information advantage,
we find that the performance improvement is driven by stocks that treated managers
overweight relative to their peers.
Finally, we focus on other actions fund managers might take in response to in-
creased NCC enforceability. First, we look at actions of fund managers intended to
make themselves useful to the organization in a way unrelated to fund performance,
providing evidence that they increase window dressing in order to attract new in-
vestor flows; these increase the asset base of the family and consequently fee income
for the fund company. Second, we find that stricter NCCs discipline managers’ risk
taking, as shown by noticeable reductions in their portfolio risk, portfolio deviations
from their peers, and engagement in fund tournaments.
The findings from the first essay suggest restricting labor mobility, by means of
the threat-induced discipline it elicits, has a positive effect on performance. This
aspect, however, is just one of many facets labor mobility impacts employees’ perfor-
mance. In particular, from another perspective, restricting labor mobility confines
the employee in her ability to test out different deployment areas in order to find
that one whose demand profile best resonates with her skill set. According to occu-
pational match theory,11 however, this forms the essential basis to optimally employ
11Mortensen (1978, 1986), Jovanovic (1979), Diamond (1981), and Miller (1984) constituted oc-
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labor and hence maximize its output.
In the second essay, which is based on Cici, Hendriock, and Kempf (2020a),
we apply this idea to the mutual fund industry: to best utilize their labor, fund
families need to match their portfolio managers’ skills with the job requirements of
different funds; thereby, uncovering the match necessitates managers testing different
funds in a learning-by-trying-process. While previous studies show that personnel
decisions by fund families on average create value,12 we still lack an understanding
of how families generate information about their managers’ best deployment in the
first place; our study tries to shed light on this question. Furthermore, whereas
the effect of occupational matching on output is well described in theory, empirical
research is confined to indirect tests.13 In contrast, our study directly documents
the productivity gains accruing to occupational match finding.
Thereby, the concept of different occupations is readily operationalized within
the framework of the mutual fund industry. Funds typically are mandated to follow
clearly delineated investment styles.14 Fund managers operate within the boundaries
of these styles and typically are viewed as being experts in a particular one. In
order to identify the point in time when managers find their best match, we study
the sequence of managerial moves to different styles during a manager’s career.
Occupational match theory predicts that a manager will move to a new style as long
as she and her family consider another style to be a better fit than the current one;
eventually, the manager would settle into a style where she achieves her optimal
level of productivity. In this vein, we use the point in time when a fund manager
returns to one of her previously-tried styles to identify the end point of the search
process, i.e., when the match is found.15
cupational match theory. Recent work by Ortega (2001), Papageorgiou (2014, 2018), and Addison,
Chen, and Ozturk (2018) developed the subject further.
12Confer, e.g., Cheng, Massa, Spiegel, and Zhang (2013), Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (2017),
and Zambrana and Zapatero (2017).
13Relying on the premise of an underlying equilibrium model, it uses tenure to proxy for the
likelihood that an employee has been matched and primarily examines its effects on turnover
or wage; confer, e.g., McCall (1990), Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990), Eriksson and Ortega (2006),
Kambourov and Manovskii (2008, 2009a,b), and Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii (2015).
14Confer Section 35d-1 of the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940.
15Indeed, when managers return to a style, which happens on average at the midst of their career,
in almost all (94%) cases, they never change styles again until they retire from the industry.
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To test for the hypothesis that managers generate better performance after they
found their style match, we compare the performance of a fund manager before and
after she found her match, again employing a difference-in-differences framework.
To control for possible self-selection issues of more-skilled managers towards fund
families with higher resources,16 we measure performance-effects following the man-
ager’s style match within the same family. Consistent with our hypothesis, annual
performance of fund managers increases by about one percentage point after their
style match is found. We aim to rule out the alternative explanation that mere
task-specific experience through learning-by-doing drives the result via a matched-
sample analysis; restricting the control group to only managers who have the same
experience in each style as managers who found their match leads to the same con-
clusion. Yet another alternative explanation for our results poses managers just
using their organizational power to return to their preferred style and divert more
resources to their fund afterwards; such, the documented rise in performance were
attributable to increases in resources instead of match finding. However, contradict-
ing this hypotheses, performance does not improve more for managers with longer
family tenure, which we use as a proxy for organizational power.
While returns to match finding constitute the back bone of our analysis, we
continue to flesh out the whole anatomy of the match finding process. Examining
the period before the match is found, we document that those managers find their
match faster: who have more leeway in trying things out, because their employer
offers more styles respectively they are not confined by NCCs; who have previous
work experience outside the financial industry and hence an informational advantage
for some sectors, which limits the numbers of styles required to try out; and who
attended institutions with higher matriculate SAT scores, consistent with innate
ability and networks established visiting university fostering match finding. Con-
cerning the period after the match is found, managers exhibit a higher degree of
conviction, both in their fund portfolios, as they deviate more from their peers, and
personal portfolios, which to a larger extent are concentrated in their own funds.
16For literature on models of assortative matching, confer, e.g., Mayer (1960), Sattinger (1975,
1993), Rosen (1982), Gabaix and Landier (2008), and Terviö (2008).
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Finally, we illustrate the implications of match finding for fund families. We
document that they appear to utilize the higher productivity levels of their matched
managers at a larger asset base, mirroring previous research of personnel decisions
by fund families creating value. For instance, they delegate more responsibilities
to managers after they have found their match by increasing the amount of assets
under their management. Further, fund families exploit the investment ideas of these
managers in other funds: ideas of a fund manager are followed more by affiliated
managers after their colleague has reached her best style match. Moreover, fund
families hiring practices reflect their ability to make the match discovery possible:
whereas families with many style offerings also hire managers who have not yet found
their match, families with only a few styles rather hire managers whose match is
already known.
The first two essays consider how the organizational framework within which
managers operate impacts their ability to deliver the best performance possible,
which is their designated task and this thesis’ research objective. Given this frame-
work, the question arises, though, what a manager, to reach this goal, should actually
consider as best practices for her core, day-to-day business; that is, what should a
manager take into account when contemplating her investment strategy.
The third essay addresses this question, providing evidence that successful man-
agers employ strategies based on the implied cost of capital (ICC) of their portfolio
firms. Theoretically, ICC have been shown to be particularly apt to proxy for time-
varying expected returns and there is ample evidence in empirical research for their
capabilities predicting both returns as well as other measures for “performance” at
the stock–level.17 However, Esterer and Schröder (2014) conclude that transaction
costs necessary to turn these paper gains into actual profits appear to be too high.
Yet, with respect to transaction costs, active mutual fund managers, as institutional
investors specialized on conducting financial transactions, arguably are in a prefer-
ential position. An issue yet unexplored is whether investors into funds, by means
17Confer, e.g., Claus and Thomas (2001), Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Easton (2007), Pástor,
Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008), Botosan, Plumlee, and Wen (2011), Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang
(2012), Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013), Li and Mohanram (2014), Esterer and Schröder (2014),
Schröder (2018), and Bielstein and Hanauer (2019). The literature on ICC in general as well as its
applications in research is extensive; Richardson, Tuna, and Wysocki (2010) provide a review.
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of their reported holdings and respective ICCs, can turn the performance potential
inherent to ICC-based strategies into actual profits.
Results in Hendriock (2020) suggest they can. Both portfolio sorts, excluding
fund share classes with loads, resulting into a time series of returns entirely net of
transactions costs, as well as panel regressions, allowing to control for confound-
ing factors at the time-, investment style-, and fund-level, corroborate the notion
that ICCs derived from a fund’s stock holdings allow for a meaningful ex-ante clas-
sification of future under- and out-performers. The top ten percent of funds in
terms of current ICC exhibit significant positive performance going forward and
are the best among their peers; this also implies that investors would not need
to short funds to profit from an ICC-based investment rule, which is practically
obligatory with respect to investments into mutual funds, as they cannot be sold
short. Panel regressions with, i.a., fund-by-manager fixed effects, controlling for un-
observed, time-constant heterogeneity at the fund-, manager-, and fund-manager-
match-level, corroborate the notion that a high-ICC strategy in itself constitutes
a promising endeavor for fund managers to pursuit; this is additionally supported
by analyses based on ICC-motivated trades. Further, ICC seem indicative for the
fate of funds over a longer horizon, exhibiting associations with performance up to
two years in the future. This potentially accommodates investors, as this spares
them data-intensive computation of ICC each and every quarter anew and lowers
turnover.
To learn about what determines whether mutual funds employ a high-ICC strat-
egy, first, along the lines of transaction costs impeding the exploitation of per-
formance potential inherent to ICC-based strategies, I consider the impact of the
efficiency of a fund’s trading desk. Results suggest that with higher efficiency and
hence arguably lower transaction costs, funds indeed are more inclined to employ a
high-ICC strategy. Second, regarding investments resting upon ICC reflecting skill,
average matriculate SAT scores of the institutions managers received their bache-
lor’s degrees from, again meant to proxy for innate ability, positively correlate with
funds’ ICC.
Finally, this essay investigates if market participants are aware of the positive
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association between current ICC and future fund performance and whether this
association triggers corresponding responses. First, I document that managers who
trail behind their peers in the middle of the year substantially temper risk shifting
if they follow a high ICC-strategy. That is, they refrain from a behavior they in
general were to engage in to catch up with their competitors. This is consistent with
managers being both aware of the merits of a high-ICC strategy and indeed relying
on it. Second, with regard to investors’ awareness, however, only more sophisticated
institutional ones seem to recognize and trade on the positive association between
current ICC and future fund performance, as opposed to retail investors; while
there is a positive association between current ICC and future fund flows among
institutional funds, this association is absent from retail funds, consistent with retail
investors’ lack of “resources” necessary to gather relevant data and compute ICC.
Overall, the three essays reveal determinants of the extent to which active mutual
funds can accomplish their task of delivering the best risk-reward trade-off possi-
ble. For example, by contracting on higher unemployment costs via NCCs, asset
management companies potentially can elicit higher discipline from their managers,
while by having them try out different styles, they can probe their optimal match
to eventually exploit their labor input’s full potential. Throughout, portfolio firms’
ICC can viably be incorporated as one investment criterion into managers’ strate-
gies, as asset management companies offer the resources necessary to trade on the
performance signal ICC imply.
Finally, I end the introduction to my thesis with a description of the input I
provided to the three essays. For the first, the basic research idea was brought up
by my coauthors. I reviewed the literature to refine the research idea and develop
testable hypotheses; I also gathered and prepared the necessary data and run the
empirical tests. The first draft of the paper was mainly written by my coauthors. We
jointly revised the paper in several iterations according to the feedback we received
from various conferences (among others from the Annual Meeting of the American
Finance Association) and seminars.
The research idea of the second essay emerged from discussions we had together.
In the process, we jointly developed research questions and derived hypotheses. I
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again reviewed the literature, collected and prepared the data, as well as designed
and implemented the empirical analyses. This included finding an econometric iden-
tification strategy for the effect we had in mind. I wrote the first draft of the paper.
The various revisions of the paper were jointly done by all three of us.
The third paper is solo-authored. I developed the research idea and the hypothe-
ses on my own; I also did all the empirical work and the writing of the paper.
Chapter 2
The Impact of Labor Mobility
Restrictions on Managerial
Actions: Evidence from the
Mutual Fund Industry*
2.1 Introduction
In the last few years, there has been an intense debate in the U.S. surrounding
labor mobility restrictions and their impact on economic activity [e.g., White House
(2016) and U.S. Department of the Treasury (2016)]. A supporting argument is that
by preventing employees from transferring intellectual property and skills acquired
on-the-job to rival firms, such restrictions protect trade secrets and thus encourage
innovation and investment in employee training. A counter argument, however, is
that labor mobility restrictions limit the labor market pool from which companies
can hire, which can result in suboptimal matching of talent with available jobs;
*This chapter is based on Cici, Hendriock, and Kempf (2020b). For helpful comments and
discussions we thank Alice Davison, Massimo Guidolin, Stefan Jaspersen, Peter Limbach, Gunter
Loeffler, Daniel Metzger, Dirk Sliwka, Florian Sonnenburg, Tom Zimmermann, Eric Zitzewitz,
seminar participants at the University of Arkansas, University of Basel, the University of Cologne,
University of Glasgow, and the Technical University Munich, as well as participants at the AFA
2019 Annual Meeting, the 2019 EFMA Annual Conference, and the 25th Annual Meeting of the
German Finance Association.
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prevent employees from founding new companies; and stifle innovation by reducing
the diffusion of knowledge and ideas among companies, all of which can potentially
hinder economic growth.
Firms typically restrict labor mobility through non-compete clauses (NCCs) in
employment contracts. Such clauses are heavily used in knowledge intensive indus-
tries [e.g., Starr, Prescott, and Bishara (2019)] and for highly skilled and highly paid
employees [e.g., Bishara, Martin, and Thomas (2015)]. They prohibit a separating
employee from competing with her former employer, either by working for a com-
peting firm or by establishing one on her own during a limited period of time and
in a certain geographical area. For example, Bishara, Martin, and Thomas (2015)
document that 80% of CEOs are bound by NCCs, often with a broad geographic
scope, that generally last from one to two years.
While the literature is advancing in its understanding of the impact that NCCs
have on economic growth, innovation, and investments at the regional and firm
level, the analysis has typically abstracted away from the economic agents whose
actions are directly targeted by these labor restrictions.1 The objective of our study
is to fill this gap. In particular, we study how NCCs affect the behavior of labor
force participants and their output. Theory suggests that employees respond to
implicit incentives in addition to explicit incentives resulting from the compensation
contract. For example, Fama (1980) argues that labor market forces can solve agency
problems and efficiently discipline managers to a higher effort level, even in the
absence of explicit incentive contracts, while Holmstrom (1982, 1999) incorporates
and enlarges upon this intuition in a formalized setting. Along these lines, building
on the framework of Holmstrom (1999), Andersson (2002) shows that managers
increase their effort when career concerns are present (relative to when they are
absent) even if their compensation contract provides them with effort-based explicit
incentives. The reason is that career concerns create incentives that are not captured
in compensation contracts.
How NCCs affect the incentives and behavior of employees is not obvious ex-ante.
1See, e.g., Bishara, Martin, and Thomas (2015), Bishara and Starr (2016), and Prescott,
Bishara, and Starr (2016) for recent reviews of the literature that looks at NCCs at the state
and firm level.
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Since NCCs are typically enforced not only when an employee leaves the company
voluntarily but also when that employee is fired, there are two opposing effects.2 On
the one hand, there is a disciplining effect: NCCs impose costs on the employees
when they are fired because they have to stay unemployed for a certain period of
time. This incentivizes them to increase their effort and consequently their output
to avoid termination. In addition, fund families could use their increased bargaining
power following increased NCC enforceability to renegotiate their managers’ con-
tracts towards more performance sensitive compensation. This could also lead to
an increased effort of fund managers. On the other hand, NCCs reduce the outside
options of employees in the external labor market, which makes it hard for them
to exploit external promotion opportunities. This reduces their incentives to signal
their quality to the external labor market and consequently makes them reduce their
effort. Ultimately, it is an open empirical question which effect dominates.
We use the mutual fund industry as a testing laboratory to examine the effect
that NCCs have on the behavior of mutual fund managers and the output they
deliver. The mutual fund industry represents an ideal setting for our investigation for
several reasons. First, since this industry is knowledge-intensive and fund managers
fit the income and industry profile of employees that are typically subject to such
restrictions, we expect NCCs to be widely spread among mutual fund managers.3
This is indeed supported by empirical evidence presented later in the paper showing
that changes in enforceability of NCCs affect labor mobility among mutual fund
managers as expected. Second, Barber, Scherbina, and Schlusche (2018) show that
the fraction of fund managers who leave the mutual fund industry is really small,
which makes the two opposing effects described above even more relevant. Third, for
mutual fund managers, data availability allows us to directly observe their actions,
i.e., their trades, as well as their production output, i.e., the performance of the funds
that they manage. Fourth, given the relatively small number of players involved in
the management of a mutual fund, we can more easily attribute production output
2During our sample period, NCCs were enforceable in the U.S. even when an employee was
fired in all but the following six states [see, e.g., Garmaise (2011)]: Arkansas, District of Columbia,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, and New Mexico. Thus, for all the treated states in our analysis,
NCCs were enforceable when an employee was fired.
3See Appendix to Chapter 2 for a discussion of the use of NCCs in the mutual fund industry.
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to the actions of a mutual fund manager. The same cannot be said for corporations,
where the output usually is the result of a complex network of interactions between
a large set of production factors and economic agents. Finally, the granularity of
information from fund trades and holdings allows us to analyze the different ways
in which fund managers respond to changes in NCC enforceability.
Our identification strategy for measuring the impact of NCCs exploits well-
documented exogenous shocks to the enforceability of NCCs that occurred in three
states: Texas, Florida, and Louisiana. Based on the NCC survey of Malsberger
(2004), these three cases were first identified and employed in Garmaise (2011) and
are used in a large number of recent studies [e.g., Conti (2014), Lou, Wang, and
Zhou (2017), Yin, Hasan, Kobeissi, and Wang (2017), Aobdia (2018), Chen, Zhang,
and Zhou (2018), He and Wintoki (2018), He (2018), and Ali, Li, and Zhang (2019)].
This setting helps us handle endogeneity concerns because these changes were in-
troduced by state governments or Supreme Court rulings and were thus unlikely to
be caused by fund or manager characteristics.
Our first set of results unambiguously shows that increased enforceability of
NCCs leads to better fund performance. This result holds regardless of whether we
use different ways of measuring fund performance and employ control variables or
not. The result is also economically significant, with increased NCC enforceability
giving rise to performance improvement of affected mutual funds of 84 basis points
per year (based on DGTW returns). This result remains robust in a battery of
robustness tests. Thus, the effort-increasing effect induced by a desire to avoid higher
costs associated with being fired seems to be more important for fund managers than
the effort-reducing effect arising from more-limited outside options.
We propose and examine a particular mechanism for the documented perfor-
mance improvement related to changes in NCC enforceability. The idea behind this
mechanism is that fund managers respond to increased NCC enforceability by focus-
ing their increased effort towards stocks where they have an information advantage.
Stocks in which mutual funds have an information advantage are likely to be those
that they overweight [e.g., van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009)]. Consistent
with this effort-redirecting mechanism, we find that the performance improvement
2. The Impact of Labor Mobility Restrictions on Managerial Actions 15
we document comes from stocks that treated mutual funds overweight, in which
they are likely to have an information advantage.
After having established our main result, we dig deeper by taking into account
differences in the relative importance of the two effects (higher costs associated with
termination vs. more limited outside options) across fund managers. For example, a
fund manager who considers herself to be of low skill is likely to be more concerned
about termination risk than about limited outside options relative to a fund manager
who considers herself to be skilled. Therefore, we hypothesize that an increase
in NCC enforceability increases the fund performance of the less-skilled manager
more. Our empirical tests support this hypothesis. Furthermore, we hypothesize
that concerns related to limited outside options are less important for fund managers
employed by fund families with a larger internal labor market. The rationale is that
families with a larger internal labor market offer fund managers more opportunities
for promotion within the family, which should weaken the effort-reducing effect of
limited outside options. Thus, we would expect an increase in NCC enforceability to
improve the performance of funds more if they belong to families with large internal
labor markets. Again, our results support the hypothesis.
Finally, we focus on other actions fund managers might take in response to in-
creased NCC enforceability. First, we look at actions of fund managers intended
to make themselves useful to the organization in a way that is unrelated to fund
performance. In particular, we test whether fund managers engage in more window
dressing - which helps attract new customers and thus generates additional fee in-
come for the fund family - when NCCs become stricter. The rationale is that this
can mitigate the concerns that arise from stricter NCCs for a number of reasons.
First, the higher fee income reduces the fund managers’ risk of being fired, which
helps avoid the higher termination costs associated with stricter NCCs. Second,
the larger asset base potentially increases the fund managers’ compensation, and
finally, by contributing more to the revenue of the fund family, managers increase
the chances of being promoted in the internal labor market, both of which are im-
portant considerations in the face of limited outside options due to stricter NCCs.
Our findings support the hypothesis developed above by showing that fund man-
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agers increase the amount of portfolio window dressing after an increase in NCC
enforceability.
Furthermore, we hypothesize that stricter NCC enforceability causes fund man-
agers to play it safe because they benefit less from taking risk when NCCs are
stricter. If the risk taken leads to poor performance (in absolute terms or relative
to their peers), fund managers might be fired and the costs associated with termi-
nation are higher in case of stricter NCC enforceability. At the same time, fund
managers benefit less from risk taking even if it leads to great performance because
they have limited outside options. Therefore, we hypothesize that in the face of in-
creased NCC enforceability fund managers (i) reduce portfolio risk, (ii) engage less
in tournament behavior, and (iii) herd more. We find evidence supporting all three
hypotheses. Managers investing much more like their peers appears surprising at
first and incompatible with the fact that a manager needs to deviate from her peers
to outperform them. However, these results when combined with the documented
effort-redirecting mechanism suggest a rational response by mutual fund managers:
they direct more effort towards stocks where they are more likely to have an infor-
mation advantage, i.e., their overweight positions, while herding with the rest of the
portfolio stocks. This redirection of efforts towards parts of the stock universe where
they have an advantage and away from stocks where they don’t is what generates
the performance improvement.
Our paper is related to a growing literature that studies the impact of NCCs
on economic activity at the state and firm level. This literature looks at the ef-
fect of NCCs on the innovation process [e.g., Gilson (1999), Fallick, Fleischman,
and Rebitzer (2006), Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009), Samila and Sorenson
(2011), Marx, Singh, and Fleming (2015), and Barnett and Sichelman (2016)], en-
trepreneurship [e.g., Stuart and Sorenson (2003a,b), Samila and Sorenson (2011),
and Starr, Balasubramanian, and Sakakibara (2017)], employee mobility [e.g., Fal-
lick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer (2006), Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009), and
Jeffers (2019)], firm-sponsored versus employee-paid training [e.g., Garmaise (2011),
Starr, Ganco, and Campbell (2018), Starr (2019), and Starr, Prescott, and Bishara
(2019)], wages [e.g., Mukherjee and Vasconcelos (2011), Starr (2019), and Balasub-
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ramanian, Chang, Sakakibara, and Starr (2020)], firms’ output [e.g., Bishara (2011),
Bishara and Orozco (2012), Amir and Lobel (2013), and Anand, Hasan, Sharma,
and Wang (2018)], as well as on the firms’ financial reporting choices [e.g., Chen,
Zhang, and Zhou (2018)]. Our paper contributes to this literature by furthering
our understanding of how participants of the labor force respond to NCCs. We
find that, in response to increased NCC enforceability, managers not only increase
their contribution to their employers’ revenue by delivering better performance and
window-dressing their portfolios, but also temper their risk-taking behavior. This
represents a novel finding suggesting that NCCs have a disciplining impact, which
contributes a new insight to the ongoing debate regarding the effect of NCCs on the
economy.
Beyond the NCC literature, our paper also contributes to the literature on ca-
reer concerns of fund managers. NCCs restrict labor mobility, limit outside labor
market options, and increase unemployment costs, thus affecting career concerns.
So far, the literature has focused on the impact of career concerns on risk-taking.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) document that managers with stronger termination
sensitivity to performance play it safe by reducing portfolio risk and herding more.
Extending the Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) framework, Kempf, Ruenzi, and
Thiele (2009) document that fund managers engage less in tournaments when the
expected costs of unemployment are higher. In the context of this literature, our
paper is the first to study how career concerns due to NCCs affect the performance
of mutual fund managers. In particular, we document that stricter NCCs lead to
better performance. An additional contribution of our paper is that we use an
“exogenous shock” approach that allows us to draw causal inferences rather than
inferences based on association.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe our data and
methodology. In Section 2.3 we document that NCCs matter in the fund industry
by showing that fund manager departure rates go down significantly when NCC
enforceability becomes stricter. Section 2.4 presents the main result of our paper
that an increase in NCC enforceability increases the performance fund managers
deliver and shows for which fund managers this effect is particularly strong. Section
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2.5 documents that fund managers also respond to increased NCC enforceability by
doing more window dressing and taking less risk. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Identification, Data, and Empirical Specifica-
tion
2.2.1 Identification Strategy
Our identification strategy exploits well-documented shocks to examine the causal
effect of changes of NCC enforceability on our variables of interest. These changes
took place in Texas, Florida, and Louisiana. They were introduced by state gov-
ernments or Supreme Court rulings and were thus unlikely to be caused by fund
or manager characteristics. In all these states, NCCs apply to both cases, when an
employee leaves the company voluntarily and also when the employee is fired.
In June 1994, Texas Supreme Courts redefined the legal standards for NCCs,
making it more difficult to enforce NCCs.4 For a NCC to be valid, the employment
contract needed to explicitly mention the compensation the employee gets for signing
the NCC. In late May 1996, Florida state legislature introduced a new law strength-
ening the employer’s position enforcing NCCs. There were three major changes:
First, there is a reversal of the burden of proof: the employee now has to prove that
the NCC is not violated whereas before 1996 the employer had to prove the violation
of the NCC. Second, courts must no longer consider “any individualized economic
or other hardship that might be caused to the person against whom enforcement is
sought”.5 Finally, in a move from a “red pencil” to “blue-pencil” doctrine, even if
the NCC specifies an overbroad time period or geographic range, the contract is no
longer considered illegal but is applied in a modified version deemed as reasonable.
Louisiana experienced two opposing changes. In June 2001, Louisiana Supreme
Court effectively banned NCCs largely by voiding all agreements not pertaining to
4Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d, 664-45 (Tex. 1994), https://www.
courtlistener.com/opinion/1525150/light-v-centel-cellular-co-of-texas/.
5Florida State Law §542.335(g)(1), http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?
App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0500-0599/0542/Sections/0542.335.html.
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the case where the former employee seeks to establish a new business by herself.6
However, in 2003 the former status quo was reestablished.7
A useful feature is that these changes have opposite effects on the enforceability
of NCCs, i.e., increased enforceability for Florida and decreased enforceability for
Texas. This way we can test the impact of an increase and a decrease of NCC
enforceability separately, in effect using these opposite effects to check the construct
validity of our main variable.
2.2.2 Sample Construction and Data Sources
Our sample period starts in 1992 and ends in 2004. The main reason for this
choice is that, as described above, during this period three states faced substantial
amendments to their legal standards related to enforcement of NCCs, while NCC
enforceability stayed constant in all the other states.8 In addition, a key variable that
we collect from NSAR reports, advisors’ “state of headquarter” (further discussed
below) is not available before 1992 through the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis,
and Retrieval (EDGAR) system maintained by the SEC.
Our sample incorporates several data sets. From the Center for Research on
Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database we get fund
names, family names, monthly net returns, total nets assets under management,
investment objectives, and further fund specific information such as expense and
turnover ratios. For mutual funds with different share classes, we aggregate all
6SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 808 So. 2d 294 (La. 2001), http://caselaw.
findlaw.com/la-supreme-court/1085030.html.
7See, e.g., Terrell (2004) and Ecker (2015).
8A study by Ewens and Marx (2018) uses 14 more recent instances of NCC enforceability
changes in a number of states. Two other studies by Jeffers (2019) and Kini, Williams, and Yin
(2019) also use more recent changes. We considered using these more recent changes, but decided
against doing so for the following reasons: (1) There is little agreement among these three studies
as to what constitutes a valid NCC enforceability change. Specifically, all three papers fully agree
only on the Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra. (2009) case, which changed the NCC regime in Wisconsin.
They also agree that NCC regimes changed in Colorado, Texas, and Illinois. However, in each of
these three states several consecutive changes happened and the authors agree only on a subset of
those changes that happened around the recent financial crisis. (2) For all the changes where the
three papers are in full or partial agreement, we found that the parallel trends assumption does
not hold. Thus, we decided to use our three cases detailed in Section 2.2.1, which have been used
and vetted by a larger number of studies. Doing so also avoids potentially confounding effects that
might have arisen during the recent financial crisis.
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observations at the fund-level based on the asset value of the share classes. We
limit the universe to include only diversified, domestic U.S. equity funds, thereby
excluding index, balanced, bond, money market, and sector funds. The portfolio
holdings data come from the Thomson Financial Mutual Fund Holdings database,
which we merge with the CRSP mutual fund data using the MFLINKS database
and with the CRSP stock data using stock CUSIPS. Portfolio holdings for each fund
are either of quarterly or semi-annual frequency.
NCC enforceability is governed by state law and changes in NCC enforceability
take place at the state level. To determine the relevant state, we rely on N-SAR
filings by mutual funds, which we retrieve through EDGAR. We download all N-
SAR A and B filings and match them manually to our CRSP sample funds by name.
The fund managers conducting the actual asset management are employees of the
fund’s “advisor” (item #8), and the advisor’s “state of headquarter” (item #8.D),
as opposed to the state of incorporation, is the relevant state, the laws of which
govern the pertinent NCC law applicable to the fund managers.9 Each fund with
one unique advisor state is assigned one distinct NCC jurisdiction; we exclude all
other funds without a unique advisor state from the sample.10
2.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample from 1992 to 2004 includes 2,063 funds from 616 families managed by
3,396 distinct managers. Out of the sample funds, 110 (5.3%) are from one of the
treated states (Texas = 73 funds, Florida = 34 funds, Louisiana = 3 funds). Simi-
larly, out of the 3,396 sample managers, 198 (5.9%) come from a state experiencing
a change in NCC enforceability (Texas = 146 managers, Florida = 48 managers,
Louisiana = 4 managers).
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the total sample as well as the treated
and untreated subsamples separately. The average fund has almost $1 billion in as-
9This was most recently confirmed in Ascension Insurance Holdings, LLC v. Underwood et al.
(January 28, 2015), whereby the Delaware Court of Chancery concluded that California law must
be applied with respect to a non-compete agreement signed by a California-based employee despite
a Delaware choice-of-law provision contained in the non-compete agreement.
10If a fund is subadvised, we assign the fund to the NCC jurisdiction which applies to the
subadvisor.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for fund and family characteristics. Means are provided for the total sample;
the group of treated funds, comprising funds where the fund adviser is headquartered in either Texas, Florida, or
Louisiana; and the control group, comprising all remaining funds. The last two columns provide the difference
between the mean value for the treated and for the control group and the corresponding t-statistic. Fund Size
is given by the total net assets under management (AUM) in $ million. Expense Ratio is the annual expense
ratio in percent. Turnover Ratio is the annual portfolio turnover ratio in percent. Fund Age is the age in years.
Family Size [$million] measures the total net assets under management aggregated over the fund family in $
millions. Family Size [#managers] is the number of managers employed be the fund family. Family Size [#funds]
is the total number of funds run by the family.
Total Sample Treated Group Control Group Difference t-stat
Fund Size [$ million] 977.92 902.94 981.90 −78.96 −0.69
Expense Ratio [%/year] 1.40 1.56 1.40 0.16 5.98∗∗∗
Turnover Ratio [%/year] 95.53 89.24 95.87 −6.63 −1.96∗
Fund Age [years] 11.84 13.75 11.73 2.02 3.29∗∗∗
Family Size [$ million] 23, 685.56 15, 487.75 24, 123.30 −8, 635.55 −6.49∗∗∗
Family Size [#managers] 15.63 15.23 15.65 −0.43 −0.51
Family Size [#funds] 14.27 11.81 14.41 −2.60 −4.20∗∗∗
sets, has an annual expense ratio of 1.4%, and turns over its portfolio approximately
once per year (mean turnover ratio of 96%). On average, sample funds are 12 years
old. The average sample family has about $24 billion in assets, manages 14 funds,
and employs roughly 16 managers. In terms of assets, funds from the control and
treated group are largely comparable. Treated funds exhibit slightly lower turnover
than the control group (89% versus 96%). They are also two years older and charge
16 basis points higher in fees. Consistent with states in the control group housing
large financial centers (e.g., New York, California, and Pennsylvania), which host
disproportionately more large families, families from treated states are significantly
smaller both in terms of totals assets and number of funds managed but not in
terms of number of managers employed. Besides these differences, there are no
other discernible differences between the subsamples.
2.2.4 Methodology
To test the hypotheses developed in the introduction, we estimate a general-
ized difference-in-differences regression model that resembles the one employed
by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) to examine the effects of anti-takeover law
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changes:
yi,s,t = β0 + β1 · Treatedi,s,t · Postt + Controls+ FE + εi,s,t, (2.1)
where yi,s,t is the variable of interest for fund i from state s in period t. Following
Garmaise (2011), we use the changes in the legal environment detailed above to
generate our main independent variable, Treatedi,s,t·Postt, and assume that the legal
changes affect managerial behavior starting in the year following their occurrence.
Accordingly, this variable is set to -1 for funds in Texas from 1995 to 2004, +1
for funds in Florida from 1997 to 2004, and -1 for funds in Louisiana in 2002 and
2003, and is set to 0 otherwise. Controls denotes fund-level control variables.11
In particular, we include: Expense Ratio, fund’s expense ratio; Turnover Ratio,
fund’s portfolio turnover ratio; Flow, fund’s net flow computed as the change in
fund assets not attributable to performance; Log(Age), the natural logarithm of
fund’s age; and Log(TNA), the natural logarithm of total net assets. We use fund
fixed effects (FE) to control for time-invariant differences between treated and non-
treated funds, time fixed effects to account for common time variant factors, and
style fixed effects to control for commonalities within investment styles. εi,s,t denotes
the error term. We cluster standard errors at the state level in all specifications.12
2.3 Do NCCs Matter in the Fund Industry?
NCCs are very common in knowledge-intensive industries [e.g., Starr, Prescott, and
Bishara (2019)].13 Since mutual fund families almost exclusively consist of human
11We also calculate results without control variables to address the potential concern that the
change in NCC enforceability might have an impact on the time-varying controls and lead to
inconsistent estimates of the treatment effect. However, the results clearly show that this is not
the case. The treatment effect is essentially the same with and without control variables.
12Although this choice follows the literature and guideline in Angrist and Pischke (2009), we test
the robustness of our specification. As fund fixed effects potentially bias the coefficient estimates of
fund size [see Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015)], besides running the analysis without control
variables, we repeat it with state fixed effects instead. Our results are also unaffected when we use
style-by-time fixed effects. Further, we additionally cluster by state and time. Results essentially
remain the same.
13The reach of NCCs has moved beyond high skill, high paying occupations, however, in recent
years. Dougherty (2017) reports that in the last few years there has been a significant increase both
in the use of NCCs by companies (to cover even non-technical workers such as sandwich makers
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capital [e.g., Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (2017)], there is a strong rationale for the
use of NCCs in the fund industry. They are intended to help with talent retention
and keep fund managers from disseminating any trade secrets related to investment
processes, investment strategies, and trading algorithms to competitors. In addi-
tion, another rationale for investment firms to use NCCs is to keep their portfolio
managers from taking the firms’ clients with them when they join a competitor or
start their own firm.
There are no requirements for investment firms such as mutual fund families and
affiliated entities to report information on the use and details of NCCs for their fund
managers, thus detailed data on their use is unavailable. However, we can provide
evidence on the use of NCCs in the mutual fund industry by documenting that
labor mobility declines when NCC enforceability increases. To do so, we calculate
the departure rate of fund managers from a given family in year t as the number of
fund manager departures in that year scaled by the number of fund managers in that
family. We apply the generalized difference-in-differences approach (2.1) and use the
departure rate as the dependent variable. The control variables are as described in
Section 2.2.4, but aggregated at the family level.
Table 2.2 clearly shows that the departure rate drops when NCCs enforceability
becomes stricter. This holds, independent of whether we estimate the model with
or without control variables. In both cases, the drop in departure rates due to in-
creased NCC enforceability is about 6 percentage points, which is highly significant
in statistical and economical terms. It constitutes 30% of the cross-sectional stan-
dard deviation of departure rates. The finding that NCCs affect the mobility of
mutual fund managers suggests that NCCs are indeed used considerably by mutual
fund families. However, since we are unable to observe the employment contracts
of the fund managers, we cannot rule out that some fund managers in the treated
states have no NCCs in their contract and therefore are unaffected by changes in
NCC enforceability. This would create an attenuation bias in our analysis, which
would make it more difficult to find significant effects on our variables of interest
due to changes in NCC enforceability.
and hairstylists) and the number of NCC lawsuits brought by companies.
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Table 2.2: Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability on Departure Rates
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate average annual departure rates with changes
in NCC enforceability at the state level. The analysis is done at the fund family and year level. We calculate the
departure rate of fund managers from a given company in year t as the number of fund manager departures in that
year scaled by the number of fund managers in that family. Our main independent variable is Treated ·Post, which
equals 1 for firms in Florida in 1997-2004, -1 for firms in Texas in 1995-2004 and for firms in Louisiana in 2002-03,
and 0 otherwise. Family control variables are: Expense Ratio, expense ratio averaged across all family funds;
Turnover Ratio, portfolio turnover ratio value-weighted across all family funds; Flow, fund’s net flow computed
as the change in fund assets not attributable to performance and value-weighted across all family funds; Log(Age),
the natural logarithm of the fund’s age value-weighted across all funds in the family; and Log(TNA), the natural
logarithm of the sum of total net assets of all family funds. Regressions are run with family and calendar year fixed
effects. T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and















Within R2 0.001 0.004
2.4 The Impact of NCCs on Fund Managers’ Per-
formance
In this section, we analyze how changes in NCCs affect the performance of fund
managers. As outlined in the introduction, there are two opposing effects. On the
one hand, NCCs incur costs to employees when they are fired, thus incentivizing
them to work harder and deliver better performance in order to avoid termination.
On the other hand, NCCs limit the outside options of fund managers in the external
labor market and thus reduce their incentives to work hard in order to achieve very
good performance and make themselves marketable in the external job market. In
Section 2.4.1 we show that the disciplining effect dominates and that an increase
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in NCC enforceability makes fund managers deliver better performance. In Section
2.4.2, we run various additional tests to provide further support for this finding and
rule out alternative explanations. Section 2.4.3 examines a particular mechanism by
means of which managers achieve the increase in performance. Finally, in Section
2.4.4 we analyze whether the relative importance of the two effects described above
depends on characteristics of the fund manager and the fund family.
2.4.1 Main Result
To test how changes in NCC enforceability affect the performance of fund managers,
we use model (2.1), but now with monthly fund performance as the dependent
variable. We employ four measures of fund performance: raw return (Return);
style-adjusted return (Style − adj. Return); risk-adjusted return (Carhart); and
characteristic-adjusted return (DGTW ). To measure style-adjusted returns, we
subtract from the return of a given fund the mean return of all funds belonging to
the same investment category. We calculate risk-adjusted returns using the Carhart
(1997) approach as the difference between the actual return and the expected return,
estimated using factor loadings computed from a regression of the preceding 36
monthly excess returns on the respective four factor-mimicking portfolios.14 There
are two potential concerns with the Carhart alpha even though it is a commonly used
performance measure. First, it assumes that the risk factor model is linear, which
has been shown to perform worse in explaining the cross section of stock returns than
the nonlinear characteristic-based model of Daniel and Titman (1997) and Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). Second, the Carhart model (and also the
Fama-French model) has been documented to produce biased alphas, as shown by
the economically and statistically significant non-zero alphas it produces for passive
benchmark indices [e.g., Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2013)].
To avoid the possibility that our inferences are affected by the issues highlighted
above, we also employ characteristic-adjusted returns following Daniel and Titman
(1997) and Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), which we calculate as
14Returns for the factor mimicking portfolios and the proxy for the risk-free rate are available
via http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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follows. First, we determine a portfolio stock’s characteristic-adjusted return in a
given month by subtracting from its return the return of the benchmark portfolio,
to which that particular stock belongs.15 Each stock’s benchmark portfolio is a
value-weighted portfolio that includes all stocks that are part of the same size,
book-to-market, and one-year past return quintile. Then, we calculate a fund-level
DGTW measure as the value weighted sum of stock-level characteristic-adjusted
returns.
Table 2.3 reports regression results with our four performance measures as de-
pendent variables. The results provide strong evidence that increased enforceability
leads to improved performance. This finding is consistent with Andersson (2002),
who shows that managers increase their effort when career concerns increase even if
their compensation contract provides them with effort-based explicit incentives, as is
common in the mutual fund industry [e.g., Ma, Tang, and Gómez (2019)]. For each
performance measure, the coefficient of Treatedi,s,t · Postt is statistically significant
at the 1% level and its magnitude implies a significant economic impact.16 For ex-
ample, results based on DGTW indicate that a change toward stricter enforcement
of NCCs leads to an increase of 7 basis points per month, which corresponds to an 84
basis points improvement on an annual basis. To provide some context for the eco-
nomic significance of these results, we compare them against the magnitude of the
changes in NCC enforceability for our treated states. We rely on Garmaise’s (2011)
NCC enforceability index constructed for each state based on Malsberger’s (2004)
methodology. The values of this index range from 0 to 12 and its cross-sectional
standard deviation is 2. The magnitude of the changes in the enforceability index
ranges between 2 and 4 for our treated states.17 This is at least as large as the
cross-sectional standard deviation and suggests that the economic significance for
the performance improvements we document is caused by economically large changes
in NCC enforceability in our treated states.
In sum, the results from Table 2.3 suggest that an increase in NCC enforceability
15The DGTW benchmarks are available via http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~wermers/
ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm.
16Coefficients continue to be statistically significant when we omit the control variables.
17The NCC enforceability index changes from 5 to 3 for Texas, 7 to 9 for Florida, and 4 to 0
and back for Louisiana.
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Table 2.3: Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability on Performance
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate performance measures with changes in NCC
enforceability at the state level. The analysis is done at the fund and month level. Our performance measures
include: The raw return (Return), style-adjusted return (Style − adj.Return), Carhart 4-factor alpha (Carhart),
and DGTW-adjusted return (DGTW ). Style adjusted return is computed by subtracting from the raw return of a
fund the mean raw return of funds with the same investment objective. Carhart 4-factor alpha is computed for a
given fund each month as the difference between the actual return minus the expected return, estimated using factor
loadings computed from a regression of the preceding 36 monthly excess returns on the four and five risk factors,
respectively. DGTW-adjusted return is estimated as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), where a
stock’s characteristic-adjusted return in a given month is computed by subtracting from its return the return of
the benchmark portfolio to which that particular stock belongs. These adjusted returns are then value-weighted at
the fund portfolio level. Our main independent variable is Treated · Post, which equals 1 for firms in Florida in
1997-2004, -1 for firms in Texas in 1995-2004 and for firms in Louisiana in 2002-03, and 0 otherwise. Fund control
variables are: Expense Ratio, fund’s expense ratio; Turnover Ratio, fund’s portfolio turnover ratio; Flow, fund’s
net flow computed as the change in fund assets not attributable to performance; Log(Age), the natural logarithm of
fund’s age; and Log(TNA), the natural logarithm of total net assets. Control variables are aggregated at the fund
level. Regressions are run with fund, calendar month, and investment objective fixed effects. T-statistics, based on
standard errors clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Treated·Post 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
(2.81) (2.81) (3.46) (2.87)
Expense Ratio −0.0007 0.0066 0.0059 0.0601∗
(−0.02) (0.16) (0.09) (1.77)
Turnover Ratio
0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
(1.35) (1.33) (0.56) (0.40)
Flow 0.0022∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.0024∗∗∗
(2.54) (2.76) (1.22) (3.83)
Log(Age) 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0009 0.0028∗∗∗
(3.96) (2.76) (−1.21) (5.95)
Log(TNA) −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0046∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗
(−13.49) (−13.10) (−8.63) (−14.52)
Observations 104,043 104,043 70,656 95,011
Within R2 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.002
makes fund managers deliver a better performance. This is consistent with the
view that the effort-increasing effect of higher costs associated with being fired is
more important for fund managers than the effort-reducing effect of limited outside
options.
The reliability of causal inferences obtained from our difference-in-differences es-
timation hinges on the assumption that, in the absence of changes in NCC enforce-
ability, changes in our variables of interest are the same for the treated and control
group, i.e., these variables exhibit trends that are parallel between the treated and
control groups before the treatment. To check the validity of this assumption, we
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Table 2.4: Assessment of Parallel Trends in the Pre-Treatment Period
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions utilized in Table 2.3 that have been augmented with
additional variables to examine performance effects prior to the change in NCC enforceability. Specifically, we
augment the regression with terms that interact an indicator variable for the first (second) year prior to the change
in NCC enforceability, Pre1 (Pre2), with the treatment indicator. Fund controls are as in Table 2.3. Regressions
are run with fund, calendar month, and investment objective fixed effects. T-statistics, based on standard errors
clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% significance level, respectively.
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Treated·Pre2 −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0007 −0.0007
(−0.40) (−0.54) (−0.85) (−0.94)
Treated·Pre1 −0.0012 −0.0016 −0.0011 −0.0000
(−0.73) (−0.99) (−1.16) (−0.01)
Treated·Post 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0007∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
(4.00) (1.98) (6.67) (3.52)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 104,043 104,043 70,656 95,011
Within R2 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.001
augment model (2.1) with two terms that interact indicator variables for each of
the two years prior to the change in NCC enforceability (Pre2t and Pre1t) with the
treatment dummy. Given that the treatment for Texas funds starts in 1995 and our
sample starts in 1992, we are able to look at two years prior to the treatment so
that our benchmark period covers at least one year.
Results of corresponding regressions are presented in Table 2.4. They show that
for none of the performance measures the interaction terms, Treatedi,s,t · Pre2t
and Treatedi,s,t · Pre1t, are economically or statistically significant. This evidence
supports the assumption that treated and control group exhibited parallel trends
prior to changes in the NCC enforceability.
2.4.2 Robustness Tests
To provide further support for our main finding in Table 2.3 and to rule out alter-
native explanations, we run various additional tests.
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2.4.2.1 Single-State Analysis
Model (2.1) staggers changes in NCC enforceability in both directions, that is, it
includes both increases and decreases in NCC enforceability. However, our data
allow us to discern how fund managers react to opposite changes in NCC enforce-
ability by looking separately at the effects of increased enforceability and decreased
enforceability. Therefore, in our first robustness test, we re-estimate our main result
separately for Florida (where NCC enforceability increased) and Texas (where NCC
enforceability decreased).18
To run this test, we replace the variable Treatedi,s,t · Postt in model (2.1) with
Increasedi,s,t · Postt, which equals +1 for funds from Florida during 1997-2004 and
0 otherwise. When focusing on Texas, we replace the variable Treatedi,s,t · Postt
with Decreasedi,s,t ·Postt, which equals +1 for funds with advisors headquartered in
Texas from 1995-2004 and 0 otherwise. We hypothesize that increased or decreased
enforceability of NCCs leads to effects on the left-hand side variable that have op-
posite signs. Table 2.5 presents results. In the interest of brevity, we report only
the main coefficients of interest.
Table 2.5 clearly documents the robustness of our main result. All relevant
coefficients have the hypothesized signs. For Florida, where NCC enforceability in-
creased, we find that fund managers deliver better performance. In contrast, for
Texas, where NCC enforceability decreased, we find the opposite effect. Regarding
statistical and economic significance, the results are on par with the results of the
aggregated analysis. This is sensible since the magnitude of the change in enforce-
ability, as shown by Garmaise (2011), is the same in absolute terms for both states.
Thus, our main finding does not only hold when we jointly look at all changes in
NCC enforceability but also for each change in NCC enforceability separately. This
increases the confidence that the effect we document indeed results from changes in
NCC enforceability.
18We are unable to conduct a similar analysis for Louisiana given that there are only three






















Table 2.5: Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability for each Treatment Group separately
In this table, we repeat our main analysis of changes in NCC enforceability for each treatment group separately. The construction of dependent variables and control variables is
described in Table 2.3. Our main independent variables are Increased · Post, which equals +1 for funds in Florida in 1997–2004 and 0 otherwise as well as Decreased · Post, which
equals +1 for funds in Texas in 1995–2004 and 0 otherwise. Regressions are run with fund, calendar month, and investment objective fixed effects. T-statistics, based on standard
errors clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Florida Texas Florida Texas Florida Texas Florida Texas
Increased /
Decreased · Post
0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗ −0.0008∗∗∗
(2.90) (−5.61) (3.49) (−7.06) (3.84) (−5.93) (2.09) (−3.45)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 104,043 104,043 104,043 104,043 70,656 70,656 95,011 95,011
Within R2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002
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2.4.2.2 Switching Fund Managers
Manager turnover is another alternative explanation for our main result. Some
managers might self-select to join or leave fund families that are affected by changes
in NCC enforceability. To rule out this alternative explanation, we re-run our main
test using only the subsample where the same fund manager was responsible for the
fund before and after the change in NCC enforceability.
The results presented in Panel A of Table 2.6 rule out the alternative explanation
that fund manager changes caused by self-selection drive our results. Using only
constant manager-fund combinations, our result remains qualitatively unchanged.
The performance improvement we document might not only result from the
increased effort in response to potentially higher termination costs but also from
changes in compensation contracts after the increase in NCC enforceability. Fund
families might have used their higher bargaining power due to higher NCC en-
forceability to change their managers’ contracts towards more performance sensitive
compensation. The unobservability of employment contracts makes it impossible for
us to check whether and how the contracts actually change and, thus, to separate
the two channels. Nonetheless, contract adjustments - in contrast to changes in
NCC enforceability - might arguably not be instantaneous given the discussions and
negotiations expected to take place between the parties involved. For this reason,
contract changes should be less relevant when we look at shorter post-treatment
periods, a consideration which leads us to use post-treatment periods ranging from
three years to one year, respectively, in Panels B - D of Table 2.6. Evidence from
these panels shows that the performance improvement gets indeed smaller when we
look at shorter post-treatment periods. For example, based on DGTW , the perfor-
mance improvement drops from 0.0027 for the three-year post treatment period to
0.0017 for the one-year post treatment period. This is consistent with the view that
part of the performance improvement we document results from contract renegoti-
ations due to NCC changes but the major part reflects an increased effort of fund
managers in response to potentially higher termination costs.
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Table 2.6: Constant Manager-Fund Pairs
In this table, we repeat our main analysis of changes in NCC enforceability using a subsample where the same
fund manager was responsible for the fund before and after the change in NCC enforceability. The construction of
dependent variables and control variables is described in Table 2.3. Our main independent variable is Treated ·Post,
which equals 1 for firms in Florida in 1997-2004, -1 for firms in Texas in 1995-2004 and for firms in Louisiana in
2002-03, and 0 otherwise. In Panel A, we utilize the complete sample period. In Panels B, C, and D, we repeat the
analysis of Panel A, restricting the period to three, two, and one years around the change, respectively. Regressions
are run with fund, calendar month, and investment objective fixed effects. T-statistics, based on standard errors
clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% significance level, respectively.
Panel A: Complete Sample Period
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Treated·Post 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗
(3.08) (2.80) (2.70) (2.13)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 101,255 101,255 68,954 92,336
Within R2 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.002
Panel B: Three years around the change
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Treated·Post 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗
(4.59) (5.87) (3.05) (3.04)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 100,256 100,256 68,123 91,483
Within R2 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.002
Panel C: Two years around the change
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Treated·Post 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗
(4.81) (4.34) (1.97) (8.04)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 99,906 99,906 67,905 91,161
Within R2 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.002
Panel D: One year around the change
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Treated·Post 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0011 0.0017∗∗
(5.16) (6.57) (1.20) (2.07)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 99,615 99,615 67,676 90,891
Within R2 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.002
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2.4.2.3 Propensity Score Matching
So far, we consider all untreated funds as the control group and take differences
between treated and untreated funds (as documented in Table 2.1) into account
by employing fund characteristics as control variables in our regressions. However,
it could be that the results might reflect differences in fund characteristics that
the linear model does not properly control for. To address this concern, we use
a matching approach that selects the control group to consist of only non-treated
funds that are matched to the treated funds. More specifically, following Agarwal,
Mullally, Tang, and Yang (2015) and Agarwal, Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam
(2018), in the last period before treatment we run three separate logistic regressions
- one for each treated state - relating the probability of a fund being treated to
the characteristics used as control variables in equation (2.1). Using the propensity
scores from these regressions, we determine the nearest untreated neighbor for each
treated fund. We then re-run our main test using only the treated and the matched
untreated funds.
The results of Table 2.7 rule out the possibility that the way we control for
differences in fund characteristics is responsible for our main result. When we use a
propensity score matching approach, our main result remains unchanged.
Table 2.7: Propensity Score Match
In this table, we repeat our main analysis of changes in NCC enforceability using a subsample of treated and
matched untreated funds. To construct the sample of matched untreated funds, we run a logistic regression that
relates the probability of a fund being treated to fund characteristics. Using the propensity score from this regression,
we determine the nearest untreated neighbor for each treated fund. The construction of dependent variables and
control variables is described in Table 2.3. Our main independent variable is Treated · Post, which equals 1 for
firms in Florida in 1997-2004, -1 for firms in Texas in 1995-2004 and for firms in Louisiana in 2002-03, and 0
otherwise. Regressions are run with fund, calendar month, and investment objective fixed effects. T-statistics,
based on standard errors clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Treated·Post 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗
(6.20) (9.97) (4.82) (3.10)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,977 3,977 3,065 3,714
Within R2 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.010
In summary, the findings of Section 2.4.2 provide further support for our main
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result and help rule out various alternative explanations for it.19
2.4.3 Mechanism
In this section, we propose and test for a particular mechanism that drives the per-
formance effect arising due to changes in NCC enforceability. The mechanism entails
fund managers responding to the abrupt increase in NCC enforceability and the asso-
ciated looming higher costs of termination by focusing their increased effort towards
stocks where they have an information advantage. Based on van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2009), stocks in which mutual fund managers have an information ad-
vantage are more likely to be the ones that they overweight. If this effort-redirecting
mechanism is present, we would expect a bigger performance improvement in the
subportfolio of stocks that represent large bets. We consider a stock to be over-
weighted in a given manager’s portfolio if its portfolio weight belongs to the top
quartile (Q1) of the peer managers’ weights in the same stock. For comparison,
we also identify stocks that fund managers underweight by looking for stocks with
weights in the bottom quartile (Q4) of the peer manager weights.20 These are the
stocks for which they likely have no information advantage.
Table 2.8 reports results from regressions that relate the average performance of
fund positions that separately fall in Q1 and Q4 to the change in NCC enforceability.
Performance of the aggregated extreme positions is measured on a quarterly basis.
Since the unit of analysis is a subset of the fund portfolio, we employ holdings-
based raw returns and DGTW-adjusted returns as measures of performance. If
fund managers direct more effort in stock picking towards their larger bets after NCC
enforceability increases, we expect a positive effect of Treatedi,s,t ·Postt on the stocks
managers overweight by a lot relative to their peers. This is indeed what Table 2.8
documents: the portfolio performance of the stocks in the extreme overweight bucket
Q1 increases significantly more for treated funds. The DGTW-adjusted return of
the sub-portfolio consisting of these stocks increases by 1.61 percentage points per
19In unreported analysis, we also find that our results are unaffected by whether the treated
funds are managed by single managers or teams of managers.
20The results remain qualitatively unchanged when we use other cuts to classify extreme bets;
they become even stronger when we use more extreme cuts, e.g., top decile and bottom decile.
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Table 2.8: Extreme Bets of Fund Managers
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions relating the performance of subportfolios of fund holdings
that capture extreme bets with changes in NCC enforceability at the state level. The analysis is done at the fund
and quarterly level. We consider a stock to be overweighted in a given manager’s portfolio if its portfolio weight
belongs to the top quartile (Q1) of the peer managers weights in the same stock. Similarly, we consider a stock
to be underweighted in a given manager’s portfolio if its portfolio weight belongs to the bottom quartile (Q4) of
the peer managers weights in the same stock. Return Q1 (Q4) denotes the value-weighted return of stocks in the
respective subportfolios formed at the end of the previous quarter. DGTW Q4 (Q1) denotes the value-weighted
DGTW-adjusted return of stocks in the respective subportfolios formed at the end of the previous quarter. Fund
controls are as in Table 2.3. Our main independent variable is Treated ·Post, which equals 1 for firms in Florida in
1997-2004, -1 for firms in Texas in 1995-2004 and for firms in Louisiana in 2002-03, and 0 otherwise. Regressions
are run with fund, calendar quarter, and investment objective fixed effects. T-statistics, based on standard errors
clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% significance level, respectively.
Return Q1 Return Q4 DGTW Q1 DGTW Q4
Treated·Post 0.0112∗∗∗ −0.0010 0.0041∗∗ −0.0001
(3.01) (−0.93) (2.04) (−0.14)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,106 25,106 24,693 24,647
Within R2 0.013 0.001 0.005 0.000
year. Compared to the overall annual performance effect of 0.84 percentage points
(see fourth column of Table 2.3), this suggests that the increase in performance due
to increased NCC enforceability is particularly strong in stocks that fund managers
overweight by a lot. For the stocks that fund managers underweight, we see that
the coefficients are negative but they are not statistically significant.21
2.4.4 Cross-Sectional Differences in the Behavior of Fund
Managers
After having established our main result, we examine factors that we hypothesize
to affect the relative strength of the two opposing effects, i.e., the effort-increasing
effect caused by costs associated with termination vs. the effort-reducing effect due
to limited outside options. To this end, we consider managerial skill in Section
2.4.4.1 and the size of the internal labor market in a fund family in Section 2.4.4.2.
21Although in unreported results the coefficients for stocks in the Q2 and Q3 buckets are positive
and suggest a monotonic increase when compared with the coefficient Q4, they are statistically
insignificant. This suggests that the overall performance effect results from the stocks the fund
managers overweight heavily.
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2.4.4.1 Low- versus High-Skilled Managers
We expect that the relative importance of the two effects associated with an increase
in NCC enforceability depends on a fund manager’s perception of her skill. A fund
manager who considers herself to be of lower skill is likely to be more concerned about
termination risk than about limited outside options relative to a fund manager who
considers herself to be more skilled. Therefore, we hypothesize that the performance
impact of increased NCC enforceability is stronger for less-skilled than for more-
skilled managers.
We measure a manager’s perception of her skill as the average SAT score of
matriculates at the institution where the manager obtained her bachelor degree.
We first collected information on which universities managers obtained their degree
from using Morningstar Direct, Morningstar Principia, SEC filings, LinkedIn, and
the websites of the fund companies. Then, from the College Scorecard provided
by the U.S. Department of Education, we obtained the average SAT scores of the
institutions from where managers graduated.22
To test the prediction that an increase in NCC enforceability leads to greater
performance increases for lower-skilled managers, we augment model (2.1) with two
variables: SATi,s,t, the average SAT score of the school from which the manager
graduated, and the interaction of Treatedi,s,t ·Postt with SATi,s,t (scaled by 1,000).
Consistent with our discussion above, we expect the interaction term to be negative.
The results provided in Table 2.9 support our hypothesis. The coefficient of
the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the
performance improvement due to increased NCC enforceability intensifies for lower-
SAT managers. For example, lower skilled managers at the 25-percentile of the
SAT distribution increase DGTW by 6 basis points per month, which constitutes
a performance improvement that is 10 basis points higher than that of managers
with median SAT scores. This is consistent with the view that for managers with
lower skill, the effort-increasing effect due to higher costs associated with termination
dominates the effort-reducing effect due to limited outside options to a greater extent
22See https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/.
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Table 2.9: Manager Skill and NCC Impact on Fund Performance
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate fund performance measures with changes in
NCC enforceability at the state level and their interaction with the skill level of the manager. The analysis is done
at the fund and monthly level. The construction of dependent variables and control variables is described in Table
2.3. Our main independent variable is Treated · Post, which equals 1 for firms in Florida in 1997-2004, -1 for firms
in Texas in 1995-2004 and for firms in Louisiana in 2002-03, and 0 otherwise. We interact Treated · Post with our
skill measure SAT , the average matriculates’ SAT score at the institution where the manager obtained her bachelor
degree, divided by 1,000. Regressions are run with fund, calendar month, and investment objective fixed effects.
T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Treated·Post 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗
(5.26) (3.87) (3.19) (7.95)
SAT 0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0039 0.0032
(0.02) (−0.17) (−1.18) (1.35)
Treated·Post·SAT −0.0113∗∗∗ −0.0130∗∗∗ −0.0169∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗∗
(−5.94) (−3.81) (−3.09) (−5.07)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 59,889 59,889 38,699 51,551
Within R2 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.003
than for managers with higher skill.23
2.4.4.2 Managers in Families with Large versus Small Internal Labor
Markets
We next test whether the reaction of fund managers to changes in NCC enforceability
depends on how developed the internal labor markets are in which managers operate.
Managers that work for larger fund families are expected to benefit from the presence
of more developed internal markets, which allow them to replace restricted across-
family mobility with within-family mobility [Papageorgiou (2014, 2018)]. In more
developed internal labor markets, managers still face the risk of being fired, but
at the same time, they have more opportunities to be internally promoted. Thus,
23We also examined whether increases in NCC enforceability have a different performance impact
for younger vs. older managers. Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) argue that the likelihood of being
fired due to poor performance is higher for younger managers than for older managers. This
suggests that an increase in the costs of being fired due to stricter NCCs is more relevant for
younger managers than for older managers. At the same time, an opposing effect is also likely:
limited outside options due to stricter NCCs are likely to be more important for younger managers
since they are just starting their career in the fund business. Unreported results suggest that
manager age does not affect the performance impact of changes in NCC enforceability significantly,
which is consistent with the two effects offsetting each other.
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Table 2.10: Size of the Internal Labor Market and NCC Impact on Fund Performance
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate fund performance measures with changes in
NCC enforceability at the state level and their interaction with the size of the internal labor market. The analysis
is done at the fund and monthly level. The construction of dependent variables and control variables is described
in Table 2.3. Our main independent variable is Treated · Post, which equals 1 for firms in Florida in 1997-2004, -1
for firms in Texas in 1995-2004 and for firms in Louisiana in 2002-03, and 0 otherwise. We interact Treated · Post
with FamilySize, which is given by the total number of funds in the family to which the fund belongs. Regressions
are run with fund, calendar month, and investment objective fixed effects. T-statistics, based on standard errors
clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% significance level, respectively.
Return Style-adj. Return Carhart DGTW
Treated·Post 0.0004 0.0005∗ 0.0009∗∗ 0.0006∗∗
(1.34) (1.73) (2.58) (2.33)
FamilySize 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.57) (1.00) (−0.56) (−0.10)
Treated·Post·FamilySize 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0000
(3.70) (4.13) (4.20) (0.86)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 103,308 103,308 71,184 94,324
Within R2 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.002
the managers’ concerns of a limited upside after increased NCC enforceability are
mitigated in larger families. This weakens the relative importance of the effort-
reducing effect in favor of the disciplining effect. Therefore, we expect the positive
performance effect of increased NCC enforceability to be greater in larger families
than in smaller families.
We measure the size of the internal labor market in a fund family by the number
of family funds. To quantify the effect of family size on the performance impact
of changes in NCC enforceability, we augment equation (2.1) with two variables:
FamilySizei,s,t, the number of family funds, and the interaction of Treatedi,s,t ·
Postt with FamilySizei,s,t. Consistent with our discussion above, we expect the
interaction term to be positive.
Results from this regression are reported in Table 2.10. They show that, as ex-
pected, FamilySizei,s,t interacts positively with Treatedi,s,t · Postt. Except for the
DGTW specification, the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level in all specifications. Overall, the evidence from Table 2.10 sup-
ports our hypothesis: Fund managers in larger families increase their performance
2. The Impact of Labor Mobility Restrictions on Managerial Actions 39
more than fund managers in smaller families following increased enforceability of
NCCs. This is consistent with the notion that the effort-reducing effect of lim-
ited outside options is less important in larger families where managers have more
opportunities to be promoted internally.
2.5 Other Actions of Fund Managers in Response
to NCCs
So far, we have shown that one action managers take in response to increased NCC
enforceability is to increase their output, i.e., deliver better performance. This makes
fund managers more valuable for their fund families and thus reduces their likelihood
of being fired. In this section, we document other actions fund managers take that
are not intended to deliver a better performance. In Section 2.5.1, we document
that managers also make themselves valuable to the fund family by window dressing
their portfolios, which can help attract new money and consequently generate more
income for the fund family. In Section 2.5.2, we show that fund managers respond
to increased NCC enforceability by taking less risk.
2.5.1 The Impact of NCCs on Window Dressing
We hypothesize that fund managers increase window dressing to attract new cus-
tomers and thus generate additional fee income for the fund family when NCCs
become stricter. Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014) document that window dressing
by mutual fund managers influences investment flows.24 Thus, by window dressing
with the intention of attracting more flows and inflating assets under management,
fund managers can potentially improve the profitability of their fund family and
consequently increase their standing and job security in the fund family. At the
same time, this higher contribution of fund managers to the profitability of the
fund management company is likely to increase their compensation as well as their
24Seminal papers on window dressing by institutional investors are Scharfstein and Stein (1990),
Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991), and Sias and Starks (1997).
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chances of being promoted in the internal labor market, which is more important
when outside options due to stricter NCCs are limited.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate model (2.1) with the two measures of window
dressing developed by Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014) and Solomon, Soltes, and
Sosyura (2014) as dependent variables. The first one, Rank Gap, measures the
gap between a fund’s return rank and a rank based on its stock holdings. The
latter is calculated as the average of a rank based on the proportion of winners
(the higher the proportion of winners, the higher the rank) and losers (the lower the
proportion of losers, the higher the rank). The intuition is that if a fund’s return was
low relative to other funds, despite its portfolio covering a relatively high amount
of winners and low amount of losers, this is interpreted as evidence of window
dressing. The second measure of window dressing is the Backwards Holding Return
Gap (BHRG).25 It is measured as the difference between the quarterly return, net
of expenses and trading costs, of a hypothetical portfolio consisting of a fund’s end-
of-quarter holdings assumed to have been held through the whole quarter up until
the next report date and the fund’s actual quarterly return. As with Rank Gap,
high values of BHRG indicate that reported holdings suggest higher returns than
actually realized, consistent with window dressing. Results from these regressions
are presented in Table 2.11.
In Table 2.11, the positive coefficients of Treatedi,s,t · Postt, statistically signifi-
cant at the 1%-level, are consistent with managers increasing their window dressing
behavior after an increase in NCC enforceability. These results are also economically
significant. For example, a coefficient of 0.0035 in the regression using BHRG as
the dependent variable corresponds to an increase in window dressing behavior that
amounts to 61% of the sample mean for BHRG. The increased window-dressing
that we document suggests that fund managers respond to increased NCC enforce-
ability by making themselves more useful to the fund family in ways that go beyond
changes in fund performance.
25Other studies that use BHRG include Brown, Sotes-Paladino, Wang, and Yao (2017) and
Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018). Bai, Ma, Mullally, and Solomon (2019) additionally employ
Rank Gap.
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Table 2.11: Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability on Window Dressing
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate window dressing measures with changes in NCC
enforceability at the state level. The analysis is done at the fund and quarter level. Our two window dressing
measures are the Rank Gap by Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014) and the Backwards Holding Return Gap (BHRG)
by Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura (2014). Fund control variables are calculated as described in Table 2.3. Our main
independent variable is Treated · Post, which equals 1 for firms in Florida in 1997-2004, -1 for firms in Texas in
1995-2004 and for firms in Louisiana in 2002-03, and 0 otherwise. Regressions are run with fund, calendar quarter,
and investment objective fixed effects. T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the state level, are reported




Expense Ratio −0.0447 −0.2661
(−0.09) (−0.95)









Within R2 0.009 0.002
2.5.2 The Impact of NCCs on Risk Taking
We now move to our final hypothesis: stricter NCC enforceability causes fund man-
agers to play it safe by (i) reducing portfolio risk, (ii) deviating less from their peers,
and (iii) engaging less in tournament behavior. The rationale underlying this hy-
pothesis is that fund managers benefit less from taking risk (in absolute terms or
relative to their peers) when NCCs are stricter. If the risky actions that fund man-
agers take lead to poor performance, fund managers run the risk of being fired and
the costs associated with termination are higher in case of stricter NCC enforceabil-
ity. At the same time, when NCC enforceability is stricter, fund managers benefit
less from risky actions even if they lead to great performance simply because their
outside options are more limited.
To test the predictions (i) and (ii), we run model (2.1) with risk and herding
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measures as dependent variables. These are volatility (V olatility), return semi-
deviation (Semi − Deviation), downside beta (Downside − Beta), and portfolio
herding (Herding). We compute return volatility as the standard deviation of a
fund’s past twelve months’ net returns. The next two variables measure downside
risk. Semi−Deviation, which also uses a fund’s past twelve months’ returns, reflects
deviations from the mean for returns that were below the mean. We follow Whaley
(2002) and compute Downside − Beta based on the covariance with the market
only when the excess fund and market returns are both below the zero threshold.
To compute Herding, we first calculate a stock-level based herding measure follow-
ing Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), which we then aggregate at the fund
level by value-weighting it over all stocks in a fund’s portfolio. The results of our
regressions are presented in Table 2.12.
Panel A of Table 2.12 shows that, as expected, increased enforceability of NCCs
leads to a decrease in portfolio risk taking and an increase in herding. Specifically,
an increase in NCC enforceability leads to a decrease in V olatility of 15 basis points,
in Semi−Deviation of 36 basis points, and a decrease in Downside−Beta of more
than 0.09, which are all sizable relative to the sample means of these variables. For
example, the decrease of 0.09 in Downside − Beta corresponds to a reduction of
about 9% of the sample mean. The positive and significant coefficient of Treatedi,s,t ·
Postt in regressions with Herding as dependent variable suggests that an increase
in NCC enforceability leads to more herding by the affected fund managers. This
increase in herding is of striking economic magnitude, in that the coefficient of
Treatedi,s,t · Postt amounts to 172% of the sample mean for the herding measure.
Thus, evidence from Panel A clearly supports hypotheses (i) and (ii).
Managers investing much more like their peer group appears surprising at first
blush and at odds with the fact that a fund manager needs to deviate from her peers
to outperform them. However, when combined with the results of Section 2.4.3, these
results suggest that although fund managers take fewer risky bets relative to their
peers, which is consistent with increased herding, at the same time they redirect
more effort towards stocks where they have an information advantage, which helps
deliver better performance.
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Table 2.12: Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability on Risk Taking
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate risk taking measures with changes in NCC
enforceability at the state level. The analysis is done at the fund and yearly level. Our risk measures of Panel A are
V olatility, Semi−Deviation, Downside−Beta following Whaley (2002), and Herding, the holdings value weighted
sum of the Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) herding measure. In Panel B, we relate the risk adjustment
ratio defined by equation (2.2) to performance of the first part of the year (PerfFirst), measured as either style-
adjusted return or as ranks based on raw returns. Ranks are calculated for each market segment and year separately.
They are normalized so that they are equally distributed between zero and one, with the best fund manager in its
respective segment getting assigned the rank of one. Fund control variables are calculated as described in Table 2.3.
Regressions are run with fund, calendar year, and investment objective fixed effects. T-statistics, based on standard
errors clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Panel A: Portfolio risk and herding
Volatility Semi-Deviation Downside-Beta Herding
Treated·Post −0.0015∗∗ −0.0035∗∗ −0.0926∗∗ 1.2528∗∗∗
(−2.00) (−2.28) (−2.24) (4.54)
Expense Ratio 0.0925 0.1680 1.8942∗∗ 52.176
(0.62) (0.58) (2.15) (0.21)
Turnover Ratio 0.0004 0.0004 −0.0174∗∗ −0.0151
(1.41) (0.56) (−2.03) (−0.19)
Flow 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗
(2.35) (2.05) (2.00) (2.95)
Log(Age) −0.0018∗ −0.0021 −0.0633∗∗∗ −0.2335
(−1.69) (−0.98) (−3.00) (−0.92)
Log(TNA) 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.1179∗∗∗ −0.1211
(3.27) (3.31) (9.72) (−1.17)
Observations 8,514 8,514 8,514 2,227
Within R2 0.010 0.008 0.032 0.005
We now move on to hypothesis (iii), i.e., the tournament hypothesis. Brown,
Harlow, and Starks (1996) are the first to examine the risk taking incentives of fund
managers in a tournament setting. They show that fund managers with poor interim
performance increase their risk taking in the second half of the year to catch up with
the interim winners. However, since an increase in NCC enforceability increases the
costs associated with being fired, we expect fund managers to cut back on their
tournament-driven actions in the face of increased NCC enforceability. To test this
hypothesis, we use the risk adjustment ratio of Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009)
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Table 2.12: Impact of Changes in NCC Enforceability on Risk Taking (Continued)
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RARi,s,t captures how much fund managers change their risk in the second half of
the year relative to the first half. σ
(1)
i,s,t denotes the realized portfolio risk of fund
i in state s in the first half of year t. It is calculated using the actual portfolio
holdings and the actual volatility of the corresponding portfolio returns in the first
half of the year. The intended portfolio risk, σ
(2),int
i,s,t , in the second half of year t is
calculated using the actual portfolio holdings in the second half and the forecast of
the volatility of the corresponding portfolio returns in the second half of the year
(which is proxied by the realized stock volatility of that same portfolio in the first
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half of the year).26 Our regression model to test for the impact of changes in NCC
enforceability on tournament behavior reads as:
RARi,s,t = β0 + β1 · PerfFirsti,s,t + β2 · Treatedi,s,t · Postt
+ β3 · PerfFirsti,s,t · Treatedi,s,t · Postt + Controls+ FE + εi,s,t,
(2.3)
where PerfFirsti,s,t denotes performance of fund i in state s during the first half of
year t. We measure performance as style-adjusted returns or as ranks based on raw
returns. Ranks are calculated for each market segment and year separately. They
are normalized so that they are equally distributed between zero and one, with
the best fund manager in its respective segment getting assigned the rank of one.
According to the traditional tournament literature, we expect a negative coefficient
of PerfFirsti,s,t (β1 < 0), i.e., the lower the performance in the first half of the year,
the more fund managers increase risk in the second half of the year. Like in model
(2.1), Treatedi,s,t · Postt captures the change in enforceability of NCCs, Controls
denotes fund-level controls, and FE the various fixed effects; εi,s,t denotes the error
term. The main variable of interest is the interaction term. The coefficient β3 shows
how a change in enforceability impacts tournament behavior. Since we expect that
fund managers engage less in tournaments when enforceability of NCCs increases,
we expect β3 to have the opposite sign of β1, i.e., β3 > 0.
Panel B of Table 2.12 presents the results. It clearly shows that an increase in
NCC enforceability mitigates the tournament behavior of fund managers. Whereas
we observe a general tendency for tournament-like behavior (β1 < 0), we see that
this behavior changes when NCC enforceability is increased (β3 > 0). This change
is strong, both in statistical and economic terms. β3 is statistically significant at the
1%-level in each model specification. Furthermore, the size of β3 is larger than the
size of β1 in absolute terms, i.e., the change effect dominates the baseline tournament
effect. This implies that an increase in NCC enforceability prevents fund managers
from engaging in tournaments. They no longer increase the risk of their portfolio in
26This approach for measuring intended risk is the same as the one used in Kempf, Ruenzi, and
Thiele (2009) and Ma, Tang, and Gómez (2019). For more details, please see the appendix of
Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009).
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response to poor interim performance but instead play it safe. This finding again
highlights the importance of career concerns resulting from NCCs.
In summary, the results from Table 2.12 clearly show that fund managers play
it safe when NCC enforceability increases. This is highly sensible since increased
NCC enforceability leads to higher potential costs and lower potential benefits from
risk taking.
2.6 Conclusion
In the last few years, non-compete clauses in employment contracts, intended to
restrict labor mobility, have received growing attention from academics, regulators,
politicians, companies, and the public at large. While the focus of this debate has
been on how these restrictions affect overall state or firm economic activity, we know
little about how the targeted members of the labor force respond to such restrictions.
Our paper contributes to this ongoing debate through a unified examination of the
effect that NCCs have on the behavior of managers by looking at a number of
possible actions that managers can undertake.
Using the mutual fund industry as a testing laboratory, we show that managers
respond to increased NCC enforceability by increasing their contribution to the rev-
enue of their fund company. They do so by improving their performance through
a concentration of their increased effort towards stocks where they have an infor-
mation advantage, while at the same time they increase window dressing in order
to attract new investor flows, which increase the asset base of the family and con-
sequently the fee income for the fund company. In addition, we find that stricter
NCCs discipline managers’ risk taking, as shown by noticeable reductions in their
portfolio risk, portfolio deviations from their peers, and engagement in fund tour-
naments. All these behavioral changes of fund managers are highly sensible given
that stricter NCCs increase their costs associated with being fired and reduce their
options in the external labor market.
Our findings also inform the regulatory debate regarding possible courses of
action with respect to enforceability of NCCs by providing a micro-view on how
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employees adjust their behavior in response to changes in NCC enforceability. Both
fund management companies and fund investors are affected by how fund managers
react to increased NCC enforceability. On one hand, fund management companies
might benefit from an alignment of incentives, whereby employees increase con-
tribution to the firm’s revenue, but on the other hand, they might have to pay
higher compensation to entice managers to accept stricter labor mobility restric-
tions. Given that detailed compensation data for mutual fund managers is not
available, this makes the net effect of stricter NCC enforceability on fund families
unknown. This alignment of incentives proves beneficial to fund investors, however,
who stand to gain from the improved fund performance.
At a macro level, the fact that employees face greater incentives to reign in their
risk-taking behavior could contribute to reduced systemic risk. Whether and to what
extent similar effects extend to other important financial institutions such as banks,
insurance companies, or hedge funds is an interesting venue for future research.
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Chapter 3
Finding your calling: Skill
matching in the mutual fund
industry
3.1 Introduction
Managerial skill is a key factor for the success of mutual funds, which, with more
than $17 trillion in assets under management, are important for millions of investors
relying on them to achieve their financial goals [e.g., Investment Company Institute
(2019)]. To best exploit the skills of their fund managers, fund families need to
optimally match managerial skills and job requirements demanded by the different
fund types. How fund families and managers arrive at this optimal match is largely
unknown, however. Occupational match theory suggests that one way in which the
optimal match happens is through a learning-by-trying process, whereby managers
try out different types of funds until their best match is found.1 Consistent with this
idea, some fund families (e.g., Fidelity Management & Research) try to facilitate the
manager match discovery by instituting programs where junior portfolio managers
This chapter is based on Cici, Hendriock, and Kempf (2020a). For helpful comments and
discussions we thank Stefan Jaspersen, Peter Limbach, Alexander Puetz, and seminar participants
at the University of Cologne, Iowa State University, and University of Missouri.
1Seminal work by Mortensen (1978, 1986), Jovanovic (1979), Diamond (1981), and Miller (1984)
lays the foundation of occupational match theory. More recent papers on this topic include Ortega
(2001), Papageorgiou (2014, 2018), and Addison, Chen, and Ozturk (2018).
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serve as portfolio managers in certain funds for relatively short periods of time on a
rotational basis.2 Our paper is the first to study this learning-by-trying process in
the fund industry and its implications for fund families and managers.
Within the U.S. mutual fund industry, funds are typically mandated to follow
a clearly-defined investment style and are required to invest at least 80% of their
assets in accordance with the investment style suggested by their name under Sec-
tion 35d-1 of the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940. Fund managers operate
within the boundaries of these clearly-delineated investment styles and are typically
viewed as being experts in a particular investment style. For example, Bill Miller, a
former manager of Legg Mason Value Trust, was distinctly recognized as a “value”
manager, whereas Thomas Rowe Price, Jr., a former fund manager and founder
of T. Rowe Price, was recognized as a “growth” manager. However, for a fund
manager that is starting out her career, neither the family nor the manager herself
know what particular style she is best suited for. Nevertheless, they can discover
the manager’s best style match jointly over time while the manager tries different
investment styles. This search process and the arrival of the manager at her best
style match should finally lead to higher productivity of the fund manager in the
form of better performance.
To identify points in time when managers arrive at their best style match, we
study the sequence of managerial moves to different styles during a manager’s career.
Rationality suggests that a manager will move to a new style as long as the manager
and the family think that the new style is a better fit than the manager’s current
style. Thus, the manager is expected to eventually settle into a style where she
achieves her optimal level of productivity. This is in line with Jovanovic (1979),
who “predicts that workers remain on jobs in which their productivity is revealed
to be relatively high and that they select themselves out of jobs in which their
productivity is revealed to be low.” Consistent with this, a fund manager who
has tried a number of investment styles and has returned to one of her previously-
tried styles has arguably reached her optimal style match. The idea is that both
the manager and the family have likely realized that this previously-tried style was
2See Huang (2014).
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the best match for the manager and facilitated the manager’s return to that style.
Therefore, we use the point in time when a fund manager returns to one of her
previously-tried styles to identify the end point of a search process that ended in
ultimate discovery of the manager’s best style match.
Conceivably, successful searches might happen even when a manager does not
return to a previously-tried style. For example, the best style fit of a manager
might have been discovered when the manager was a senior analyst while supporting
portfolio managers operating in different investment styles. However, ex-ante it is
impossible to distinguish these cases from instances whereby the manager did not
return to a previously-tried style and her style match discovery did not happen.
Therefore, our approach provides a lower bound of all the style match discoveries,
which contributes to attenuation bias as some of these other successful searches we
cannot identify will end up in the control group.
We start our analysis by providing an anatomy of the learning-by-trying process,
uncovering a number of interesting facts. The average manager tries four different
styles over a time span of six years before she finds her best style match. In 70
percent of these cases, the fund manager returns to the style in which she delivered
the best performance in the past. This supports the notion that returning to a
previously-tried style is in response to learning in which style a manager has the
highest productivity.3 After having discovered their best style match, about 94
percent of those managers stay in the same style for the remainder of their careers.
This is sensible from the career perspective of the manager, who will rationally
switch only to positions that constitute a better fit with her style type, eventually
settling into more stable positions closer to her optimal level of productivity and
compensation. Taken together, these initial findings suggest that learning-by-trying
of manager style types happens and that the search for the best style fit takes a
long time and a considerable number of tries. Furthermore, the stability observed
afterwards is highly suggestive of the notion that the return to a previously-tried
3This is consistent with a number of studies showing that the rate at which employees move to
a different occupation declines with tenure. The rationale would be that because longer-tenured
employees are more likely to have found their best occupation match, they would be less likely to
move to another occupation, where productivity would be lower [e.g., Flinn (1986), Kambourov
and Manovskii (2008, 2009b), Antonovics and Golan (2012), and Papageorgiou (2014)].
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style by a fund manager is the equilibrium outcome of a process that underlies the
search for a best style match.
In order to further understand the process of best style match discovery, we
explore a number of factors that can potentially affect the speed with which it hap-
pens. We find that a manager who has more opportunities to try different styles
is quicker to find her style match. This is the case when a manager works in fund
families that offer a larger number of styles and in states with weaker labor mobility
restrictions, which enable the manager to try different styles across different fund
families. In addition, we find that managers with prior work experience outside the
financial industry find their best style match sooner than other managers. This is
consistent with these managers having an informational advantage in some sectors
or styles [e.g., Cici, Gehde-Trapp, Göricke, and Kempf (2018)], which reduces the
number of styles they need to try before they find their best match. Finally, man-
agers that attended institutions with higher student SAT scores take significantly
less time to find their best style match. One possible reason is that such managers
are inherently smarter, which helps them figure out their style type sooner; another
one is that they have a better network of connections that facilitates this process
either through more opportunities to try different jobs or through mentoring.
Having documented how learning-by-trying takes place, we next test the main
hypothesis of the paper: Fund managers generate better performance after they
have reached their best style match. To do so, we compare the performance of
a fund manager before and after she has found her style match in a difference-
in-differences setting. In doing so, we also control for possible self-selection issues
that arise due to the possibility that more-skilled managers decide to move to fund
families with more resources while their learning-by-trying takes place. This form
of self-selection would lead us to overestimate the performance improvement that
results from the manager reaching her best style match. To address this concern,
we measure performance effects following the manager’s style match within the
same family, i.e., we include manager-by-family fixed effects in our regressions. Our
findings support our hypothesis that performance improves after a manager has
found her best style match by documenting a performance improvement that ranges
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from 116 to 158 basis points per year.
The performance improvement we document is also consistent with two alter-
native explanations. First, it is possible that performance improves because the
manager is simply enhancing her human capital in a learning-by-doing or on-the-job
training fashion [e.g., Golec (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), Greenwood and
Nagel (2009), and Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2017)].4 Simply put, the larger the
number of different styles the manager has managed, the more investment knowl-
edge she has acquired, which then translates into superior performance. However,
we rule out this alternative explanation in a matched-sample analysis, whereby we
compare a manager who has reached her best match with another manager from the
same family that has tried the same styles and had the highest propensity score with
respect to the amount of time spent in the various styles. Second, perhaps some
managers who have tried various styles are likely to have accumulated a certain
amount of organizational power, which they use to first return to their preferred
previously-tried style and afterwards to divert disproportionately more resources to
their funds. If organizational power is responsible for the performance improvement
we document, we ought to see a stronger performance improvement for managers
with longer family tenure, which we use as a proxy for organizational power, relative
to managers with shorter family tenure. We find no such difference and thus rule
out organizational power as a possible explanation.
The discovery of managers’ best style match and subsequent performance im-
provement raises various implications for fund families and fund managers. With
regards to fund families, we expect them to exploit their new information regard-
ing the style match of their managers to maximize the performance for the entire
family. We document support for this in a number of findings. First, we find that
fund families are more likely to promote managers after they have arrived at their
best style match by increasing the amount of assets under their management. This
is highly sensible and the most direct way for families to exploit the information
they have about the skills of their managers. Second, fund families exploit the in-
4Using French matched employer-employee data, Nagypál (2007) finds that firms place greater
importance on the learning about the quality of the match between employee skills and jobs than
on-the-job learning by employees.
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vestment ideas of these managers in other funds managed by affiliated managers.
Specifically, we find that the ideas of a fund manager are followed more by affiliated
fund managers after the fund manager has reached her best style match. We also
expect fund families to tailor their hiring strategies to their capabilities for making
the discovery of their managers’ style matches possible. Specifically, we find that
larger families, which enjoy the benefits of larger internal labor markets, are more
likely to hire managers that have not yet found the best style fit. This is highly
sensible, since the size of the internal labor market determines the number of oppor-
tunities they can offer their managers to try different styles. Thus, larger families
can better figure out their managers’ types.
Armed with information about their style type and being matched to that style,
fund managers are expected to exploit this information to their own advantage. We
find that the extent of managers’ conviction increases after they have found their
best style match: these managers tilt their portfolios away from those of their peers
after discovery of their style match and exploit this newly-found information in their
personal investment decision making. Specifically, managers significantly increase
their ownership in the funds that they manage after they have found their best style
fit.
Our paper is related to the literature that studies the personnel decisions of
mutual fund families. Cheng, Massa, Spiegel, and Zhang (2013) and Berk, van
Binsbergen, and Liu (2017) show that personnel decisions by mutual fund families
on average create value for their investors. Zambrana and Zapatero (2017) show that
fund families assign “Stock Pickers” to manage funds focused on a particular style
and “Market Timers” to manage funds across different styles, which is consistent
with these managers being put to their best uses. However, to make these decisions,
fund families need to know the types of their managers. We add to this literature by
showing that fund families can figure out the managers’ types in a learning-by-trying
fashion that is consistent with occupation match theory. In addition, we document
that the outcome of this learning-by-trying process has important implications for
the behavior of mutual fund families and managers.
Our paper also contributes to a growing literature that examines the impact that
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fund managers’ human capital has on their performance. For example, a number
of studies has looked at the performance effects of human capital traits such as
education, on the job-experience, and work experience outside the financial sector
[e.g., Golec (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), Greenwood and Nagel (2009),
Fang, Kempf, and Trapp (2014), Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2017), and Cici,
Gehde-Trapp, Göricke, and Kempf (2018)]. Our findings contribute to this literature
by suggesting that precise performance related inferences could be hampered by the
fact that fund managers are not always optimally matched to the best positions
given their skills. The discovery of their best style fit takes some time, meaning that
they are not operating at their fullest productivity level before this happens. Thus,
any true performance effects related to human capital would be harder to detect
prior to the manager having reached her optimal style match.
Finally, our paper contributes to the large literature on occupational matching,
especially to the empirical part of this literature.5 These empirical papers rely on
the premise of an underlying equilibrium model that results in employees and firms
being matched after some learning has occurred about the match quality of different
pairwise combinations tried. Building on this and using tenure as a proxy for the
likelihood that an employee has been matched, these studies primarily examine
tenure effects on turnover or wage. The empirical prediction being tested is that an
employee with longer tenure, who is more likely to be optimally matched to a job,
will be less likely to leave that job and should have a higher salary that is reflective
of her higher productivity. Our study contributes to this literature by documenting
directly the productivity gains that accrue once the occupational match is reached.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss our data
sources, describe our main methodology, and provide descriptive information about
our sample managers. In Section 3.3, we provide details on the process that leads
to optimal style match. We examine the impact that the discovery of optimal style
match has on subsequent managerial productivity in Section 3.4. Sections 3.5 and
5Theoretical papers include Mortensen (1978, 1986), Jovanovic (1979, 1984), Diamond (1981),
Miller (1984), Ortega (2001), Papageorgiou (2014, 2018), and Addison, Chen, and Ozturk (2018).
Empirical research was conducted in, e.g., McCall (1990), Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990), Eriksson
and Ortega (2006), Kambourov and Manovskii (2008, 2009a,b), and Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii
(2015).
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We obtain fund and family names, monthly net returns, total nets assets under man-
agement, investment styles, and further fund specific information such as expense
and turnover ratios from the Center for Research on Security Prices Survivorship
Bias Free Mutual Fund (CRSP MF) Database. For mutual funds with different
share classes, we aggregate all observations at the fund-level based on the asset
value of the share classes. We limit the universe to include only actively man-
aged, domestic U.S. equity funds, thereby excluding index, international, balanced,
bond, and money market funds. To categorize funds into styles, we use CRSP Style
Code, which aggregates information from the previous Lipper, Strategic Insight, and
Wiesenberger objective codes. We categorize funds based on the funds’ dominant
objective code from the CRSP MF database, and the seven style categories used are:
Sector (EDS), Mid Cap (EDCM), Small Cap (EDCS), Micro Cap (EDCI), Growth
(EDYG), Growth & Income (EDYB), and Income (EDYI).
The portfolio holdings data come from the Thomson Financial Mutual Fund
Holdings database, which we merge with the CRSP mutual fund data using the
MFLINKS database and with the CRSP stock data using stock CUSIPS. Portfolio
holdings for each fund are either of quarterly or semi-annual frequency. Our sample
spans the period from 1992 through 2016.
To obtain information on managerial fund employment records, we use Morn-
ingstar Direct. We merge Morningstar Direct with the CRSP MF database by
CUSIPs and dates. In case of missing CUSIPs, we use a fund’s share classes TICKER
and date combination. If TICKER is also missing, funds are manually matched by
name. A manager’s tenure in the mutual fund industry is determined by her first
appearance in the Morningstar Direct database. For biographical information on
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age and schooling, we employ several data sources. Besides Morningstar Principia
CDs and managers’ biographical information as provided via Morningstar Direct, we
search through fund filings with the SEC (e.g., forms 485APOS/485BPOS and 497
and accompanying statements of additional information), Marquis Who’s Who, as
well as newspaper articles. We also use the web to search on Bloomberg, LinkedIn,
and through university sources such as yearbooks, alumni, and donation pages.
3.2.2 Methodology
In our main tests we relate the manager’s performance or other variables of interest
to our key variable, Style Match, in a yearly panel-regression at the manager level
as specified in equation (3.1):
yi,t+1 = αi,f + θt + ωs + β · Style Matchi,t + ~γ · ~ci,t + εi,t+1. (3.1)
yi,t+1 denotes either the performance or another variable of interest for manager i
at time t + 1. ~γ is the vector of coefficients associated with fund, manager, and
family level covariates described in the following and Table 3.1, which are stacked
into vector ~c. ε denotes the error term.
We construct our Style Match variable as follows. First, we identify the point
in time when a manager has returned to a previously-tried style. Then, we code
Style Match as equal to one for all observations the managers manages that
style from that point on and zero else, in particular for all observations before.
Style Match also equals zero for all observations belonging to all other managers
who have not returned to a previously-tried style.
It is important that we control for the endogenous relation between style match
discovery and innate manager characteristics and also the endogenous selection of
managers to mutual fund families. For example, higher ability managers might be
more likely to find their best style match in the first place. At the same time, higher
ability managers might be more likely to join families with more resources where
they are more likely to find their best fit and also generate better performance in part
due to greater family support. To control for that, our identification strategy focuses
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on style matches that happen for the same manager within a given fund family by
including manager-by-family fixed effects denoted by αi,f . We also include time
fixed effects θt to account for common time variant factors and style fixed effects ωs
to control for commonalities within investment styles.
We include control variables measured at the manager, fund, and family level.
Regarding the control variables measured at the manager level, we use the num-
ber of distinct styles that the manager has worked in (#Styles Tried) up to
each particular point in time and the natural logarithm of her industry tenure
[Log(Industry Tenure)] to control for the investment experience or human capi-
tal accumulated in a learning-by-doing fashion.
Our control variables measured at the fund and family level are standard in the
mutual fund literature. To aggregate fund-level variables at the manager-level, we
follow previous research [e.g., Ibert, Kaniel, van Nieuwerburgh, and Vestman (2018)]
and divide a fund’s total net asset value equally among all managers managing that
fund to obtain per-manager assets. We then build a per-manager asset weighted
sum of fund-level variables to obtain variables at the manager level. Fund level con-
trols include: the natural logarithm of age [Log(Fund Age)]; the natural logarithm
of total net assets [Log(Fund Size)]; the fund’s expense ratio (Expense Ratio);
portfolio turnover ratio (Turnove Ratio); and flows computed as the change in net
assets not attributable to fund performance and normalized by beginning of period
fund assets (Flows). At the family level, we use the natural logarithm of family
total net assets [Log(Family Size)] as a control variable.
Given that our panel is characterized by a large number of individuals (N = 8,647
managers) but a small number of years (T = 25 years), we follow the guideline in
Petersen (2009) and cluster standard errors at the manager-level.
3.2.3 Sample Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample. The average sample manager
has worked in roughly two distinct styles and has been in the mutual fund industry
for about seven years.
The average fund in our sample is about 15 years old, holds $1.5 billion in assets,
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for the total sample. The sample period is from 1992 through 2016. Besides
the mean, this table reports the standard deviation (std) as well as the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile (p10, p50,
and p90, respectively). #Styles Tried is the number of styles a manager has worked for throughout her career.
Industry Tenure is the time managers spent in the mutual fund industry in years. Fund Age is the age of the fund
in years. Fund Size is given by the total net assets under management (AUM) per fund in $ millions. Expense Ratio
is the annual expense ratio in percent. Turnover ratio is the annual portfolio turnover ratio in percent. Flow is
the monthly percentage growth in net assets under management unrelated to fund performance. Family Size is
given by family AUM in $ millions.
mean std p10 p50 p90
#Styles Tried 1.76 0.99 1.00 1.00 5.00
Industry Tenure [years] 7.13 6.22 0.99 5.43 15.76
Fund Age [years] 14.74 12.79 2.99 11.45 30.06
Fund Size [$ million] 1, 540.90 4, 433.38 21.20 314.60 3, 534.28
Expense Ratio [%/year] 1.26 0.77 0.80 1.19 1.79
Turnover Ratio [%/year] 82.56 111.68 18.47 61.00 156.10
Flow [%/month] 0.23 1.55 −0.21 −0.01 0.62
Family Size [$ million] 28, 082.41 70, 744.42 82.60 6, 635.23 59, 101.50
charges an expense ratio of 1.26%, has an annual portfolio turnover of 83 percent,
and experiences monthly flows of 0.23%. The average family in our sample manages
$28 billion in assets.
3.3 An Anatomy of Learning-by-Trying
We now take a closer look at the sample managers that returned to a previously-
tried style. We document that this happens for one third of the sample managers,
and focusing on these managers, we first provide some descriptive results. Then, we
explore factors that can potentially affect the speed with which these managers find
their best style match.
From Table 3.2 we observe that, on average, a manager tries about four different
styles before arriving at her best style match, but the number of styles tried ranges
between two and five (based on 10th and 90th percentiles). During this process,
managers end up working, on average, for about four different funds. It takes about
six years for the average manager to reach the optimal style match, which constitutes
more than half of her industry tenure. The range is between two to eleven years,
suggesting that for some managers learning-by-trying of their best style matches
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Table 3.2: Managers that Reach Style Match
This table reports statistics for the managers that return to a previously-tried style during the 1992-2016 sample
period. Besides the mean, this table reports the standard deviation (std) as well as the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile
(p10, p50, and p90, respectively). #Styles Tried and #Funds Tried are, respectively, the number of styles and
number of funds a manager tried before returning to a previously-tried style. T ime until Style Match represents the
length of time (in years) until style match. The last two rows, respectively, report the fraction of managers that return
to a style where they generated the best performance across all styles tried (% Return to best performing style) and
the fraction of managers that stayed in the same style after reaching style match (% Stay in same style afterwards).
mean std p10 p50 p90
#Styles Tried 3.6 1.1 2.0 3.0 5.0
#Funds Tried 4.4 3.5 2.0 4.0 9.0
Time until Style Match
[years]
5.7 3.6 2.0 5.0 10.6
% Return to best
performing style
70
% Stay in same style
afterwards
94
happens much faster and for some others much slower – an issue that we will analyze
in more detail later in this section.
In 70% of the times a manager returns to a style where she generated the best
performance across all the styles that the manager tried in the past. Thus, hav-
ing learned in which style a manager has the highest productivity, the family and
the manager rationally decide for the manager to return to that particular style.
Interestingly, we observe very little mobility after the best style match has been
discovered, with 94% of the managers staying in the same style for the remainder of
their careers.
Summing up, the considerable number of styles and funds tried as well as the
considerable length of time spent in the process suggest that learning-by-trying of
managers’ style types is not a trivial process. Most importantly, stability observed
afterwards is consistent with the return to a previously-tried style by a fund manager
being the equilibrium outcome of a process that underlies the search for a best style
match [Jovanovic (1979)].
Given the cross-sectional variation in the length of time it takes to find the opti-
mal style match, we next examine its possible determinants using a linear regression
model. In other words, focusing on the managers that achieve their optimal style
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match, we examine what drives the speed with which that happens. The dependent
variable is the time between when the manager first showed up in the database
and the first day when she returned to a previously-tried style, measured in days.
The independent variables included for this analysis are motivated by hypotheses
developed below.6
We first hypothesize that style matches are reached faster when the manager has
more opportunities to try different styles. We capture the size of a manager’s oppor-
tunity set using two variables. First, we use the number of styles offered by the fund
family (#Family Styles) to capture the options the manager has within the family.
Second, we use the extent of labor mobility restrictions at the state level to measure
how easily a manager can switch between employers and thereby try different styles.
We measure these restrictions based on the strength of enforceability of non-compete
clauses in employment contracts, which are used by firms to restrict labor mobil-
ity. Specifically, we add Garmaise’s (2011) non-compete clause enforceability index
(NCC − Index) constructed for each state based on Malsberger’s (2004) methodol-
ogy as an additional explanatory variable to our regression. The higher the index,
the stricter non-compete clause enforceability is.
Next, we hypothesize that fund managers with prior work experience outside the
financial industry find their optimal style match faster. The idea is that this outside
work experience offers managers an informational advantage in some sectors, which
makes them more suitable for some styles than for others [e.g., Cici, Gehde-Trapp,
Göricke, and Kempf (2018)]. Therefore, the fund manager needs to try fewer styles
before achieving her best style fit. To capture this effect in our regression, we include
the dummy variable Practical Experience that equals one if a fund manager has
worked outside the financial industry before she became a fund manager, and zero
otherwise. We categorize a fund manager as having outside work experience like
in Cici, Gehde-Trapp, Göricke, and Kempf (2018) but do not limit our sample to
managers of diversified funds as we also include sector fund managers.
Finally, we include the average student SAT score of the undergraduate insti-
6Results are similar when we use a Cox proportional hazard model [Cox (1972)], which estimates
the relation between the hazard rates and the independent variables.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Style Match Discovery Speed
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions that relate the speed of best style match discovery with a
number of characteristics. The focus of analysis is on the managers that during the sample period returned to one
of their previously-tried styles. The dependent variable is the time between when the manager first showed up in
the database and the first day when she returned to a previously-tried style, measured in days. The independent
variables include: #Family Styles, the number of different styles the family a manager is currently working for offers;
NCC − Index, an index by Garmaise (2011) quantifying the strength of non-compete clause (NCC) enforceability
ranging from 0 (weakest) to 12 (strongest) and available for the 1992-2004 period; Practical Experience, which
equals one if a fund manager has worked outside the financial industry before he became a fund manager, and zero
otherwise; and SAT , which equals one if the manager obtained her bachelor degree from an institution at which the
average matriculates’ SAT score is above median, and 0 otherwise. The regression is run with time and style fixed
effects. T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the manager level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Time until Match Discovery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)








Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,296 527 1,561 2,042 415
Adj. R2 0.086 0.016 0.001 0.001 0.045
tution that the manager attended. A higher college SAT score could suggest that
the manager has a higher inherent ability and a better network of contacts in the
financial industry [e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1999a)]. A manager who is inherently
smarter is likely to figure out sooner her abilities and her best style match and a
better network could benefit the manager by enlarging the opportunity set of posi-
tions that she can try. Thus, we expect that higher-SAT managers are able to find
their optimal match faster. We employ a dummy variable SAT , which equals one if
the manager obtained her bachelor degree from an institution at which the average
matriculates’ SAT score is above median. We obtain SAT scores from the College
Scorecard provided by the U.S. Department of Education.7
The regression results are provided in Table 3.3. Since Garmaise’s (2011) non-
compete clause enforceability index is available only until 2004, we report results
7See https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/.
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from univariate regressions (Columns 1-4) as well as from a regression that includes
all independent variables (Column 5). For this latter regression, the sample period is
limited to 1992-2004, during which period we observe 415 fund managers returning
to a previously-tried style.
Evidence from Table 3.3 is in line with our predictions. When the manager has
more opportunities to try different styles and when the manager has attended insti-
tutions with a higher average student SAT score, that manager can find her optimal
style match sooner. In addition, managers with prior work experience outside the
financial industry find their best style match sooner than other managers. This is
consistent with these managers having an information advantage in certain sectors
or styles, which reduces the number of styles they need to try before they find their
best match.
3.4 Performance after Discovery of Style Match
3.4.1 Main Result
The economic rationale for finding the style match of a fund manager is for that
manager to operate at the highest possible level of productivity, which is an optimal
outcome for both the fund family and the manager. It is optimal for the fund family
because by deploying the fund manager at her best style match it can generate higher
fund performance and consequently higher fee revenue. It is optimal for the fund
manager because in competitive labor markets we would expect her compensation
to increase to a higher level that reflects her higher level of productivity.
To test the hypothesis that the performance of the fund manager improves after
her best style match has been realized, we estimate equation (3.1) with manager
performance as the dependent variable. We employ four measures of performance:
raw return (Return); style-adjusted return (Style Return); Carhart (1997)-4-factor
alpha (Alpha4); and Fama and French (2015)-5-factor alpha, augmented with the
momentum factor (Alpha6) [Fama and French (2018) and Barillas and Shanken
(2018)]. To measure style-adjusted returns in period t, we subtract from the return of
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Table 3.4: Performance after Discovery of Style Match
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate performance measures with changes in style
match status of a manager. The analysis is done at the manager- and year-level. Our performance measures
include: The raw return (Return), style-adjusted return (Style Return), Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha (Alpha4),
and Fama and French (2015)-5-factor alpha, augmented with the momentum Factor [Fama and French (2018) and
Barillas and Shanken (2018)] (Alpha6). To measure style-adjusted returns in period t, we subtract from the raw
return of a given fund the mean raw return over the same period of all funds belonging to the same investment
objective. We compute alphas as the intercept of monthly regressions of a manager’s monthly excess return over
the risk free rate on a linear combination of the respective factors corresponding to each model. All performance
measures are annualized by compounding the twelve monthly returns corresponding to each calendar year. Our
main independent variable is Style Match, constructed as in Section 3.2.2. Control variables at the manager, fund,
and family level are constructed as in Table 3.1. Regressions are run with time, style, and manager-by-family fixed
effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the manager level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Return Style Return Alpha4 Alpha6
Style Match 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗
(2.77) (3.24) (3.05) (2.83)
#Styles Tried −0.0016 −0.0012 −0.0008 −0.0013
(−0.61) (−0.52) (−0.39) (−0.58)
Log(Industry Tenure) −0.0042∗∗ −0.0060∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0016
(−2.43) (−3.86) (−2.73) (−0.95)
Log(Fund Age) 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0063∗
(8.04) (7.26) (3.46) (1.65)
Log(Fund Size) −0.0315∗∗∗ −0.0280∗∗∗ −0.0173∗∗∗ −0.0158∗∗∗
(−21.04) (−19.95) (−13.62) (−11.05)
Exp. Ratio 0.0440 0.2950 1.4000∗∗∗ 0.0564
(0.12) (0.52) (2.66) (0.08)
Turn. Ratio −0.0027∗∗ −0.0023∗ −0.0002 0.0011
(−2.12) (−1.96) (−0.30) (0.72)
Flow −0.0067∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗∗
(−6.62) (−6.12) (−4.22) (−4.16)
Log(Family Size) −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0042∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0024
(−2.64) (−2.50) (0.04) (−1.38)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manage×Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,699 29,759 29,582 29,582
Adj. R2 0.737 0.065 0.115 0.120
a given fund the mean return over the same period of all funds belonging to the same
investment objective. We aggregate fund-level returns and style-adjusted returns to
the manager-level by the method described in Section 3.2.2. We compute alphas
as the intercept of monthly regressions of a manager’s monthly excess return over
the risk free rate on a linear combination of the respective factors corresponding to
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each model.8 All performance measures are annualized by compounding the twelve
monthly returns corresponding to each calendar year.
Results are reported in Table 3.4. The coefficients on our main variable,
Style Match, are positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level
for all performance measures. The magnitude of the coefficients also suggests a sig-
nificant economic effect in terms of performance improvement following discovery of
the managers’ style matches. Specifically, for managers who reach their best style
match, the subsequent performance improvement is 116 to 158 basis points per year
relative to other funds. This evidence suggests that finding the style match of fund
managers pays off for the fund family and the manager, who both stand to benefit
from the higher level of productivity that a best matched manager can achieve.
3.4.2 Parallel Trends Assessment and Persistence of Perfor-
mance Improvement
In order to support a causal interpretation of our inferences obtained from the
difference-in-differences estimation, in Table 3.5 we provide a test of the identifying
assumption that managers returning to a previously-tried style and the control group
exhibit parallel trends before the style match discovery. Specifically, in the first
column corresponding to each performance measure, we augment model (3.1) with
three indicator variables that identify managers that attained style match discovery
- in each of the prior three years (Pre1 · Style Match, Pre2 · Style Match, and
Pre3 · Style Match). Results reported in Table 3.5 and corroborated visually in
Figure 3.1 show that none of the variables Pre1 ·Style Match, Pre2 ·Style Match,
and Pre3 ·Style Match are significantly different from zero, i.e., performance of the
two groups of managers shows parallel trends prior to achievement of style match.
We also examine the persistence of the performance improvement following the
managers’ style match discovery. To do so, in the second column corresponding to
each performance measure in Table 3.5, we replace Style Match with three indicator
variables that identify managers that reached style match discovery - in three





























Table 3.5: Parallel Trends Assessment and Persistence of Performance
In this table, we modify our main analysis of Table 3.4 in order to test for parallel trends and the persistence of the performance effect. In the first column corresponding to each
performance measure in Table 3.5, we augment model (3.1) with three indicator variables that identify managers that attained style match discovery - in each of the prior three years.
In the second column corresponding to each performance measure, we replace Style Match with three indicator variables that identify managers that reached style match discovery -
in three subsequent periods, i.e., the first year, second year, and all years after the second year (third year or later) subsequent to style match. The construction of all dependent and
independent variables is described in Table 3.4. Regressions are run with time, style, and manager-by-family fixed effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the
manager level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Return Style Return Alpha4 Alpha6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre3·Style Match 0.0019 0.0020 −0.0021 −0.0020 −0.0028 −0.0028 0.0043 0.0044
(0.29) (0.30) (−0.34) (−0.33) (−0.49) (−0.49) (0.68) (0.69)
Pre2·Style Match −0.0081 −0.0078 −0.0023 −0.0021 0.0022 0.0022 −0.0006 −0.0004
(−1.11) (−1.08) (−0.31) (−0.28) (0.39) (0.39) (−0.08) (−0.06)
Pre1·Style Match −0.0005 −0.0003 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0033 −0.0032
(−0.08) (−0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (−0.62) (−0.60)
Style Match 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗
(2.72) (3.21) (3.05) (2.69)
Post1·Style Match 0.0084 0.0101∗ 0.0101∗ 0.0072
(1.18) (1.69) (1.89) (1.07)
Post2·Style Match 0.0093 0.0119∗ 0.0137∗∗ 0.0130∗∗
(1.36) (1.81) (2.56) (1.98)
Post3+·Style Match 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0171∗∗∗
(3.55) (3.82) (2.64) (3.20)
Manager Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager×Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,699 29,699 29,759 29,759 29,582 29,582 29,582 29,582
Adj. R2 0.737 0.737 0.065 0.065 0.115 0.115 0.120 0.120
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Figure 3.1: Parallel Trends Assessment and Persistence of Performance
In this figure, we plot the regression coefficients from Table 3.5, along with their 95%-confidence interval error bands.
(a) Return (b) Style Return
(c) Alpha4 (d) Alpha6
subsequent periods, i.e., the first year, second year, and all years after the second
year (third year or later) subsequent to style match discovery (Post1 ·Style Match,
Post2 · Style Match, and Post3 + ·Style Match).
Results show that performance improvement following the discovery of style
match exhibits persistence and becomes stronger over time. Performance improve-
ment in the first subsequent year, although economically significant, is statistically
significant only for two of the specifications. This is consistent with the manager not
reaching an optimal level of productivity right away in the first year, possibly due
to distractions that come from adopting to the research infrastructure of the new
fund, adjusting to a new work environment (e.g., new colleagues), and communicat-
ing with new clients. In year two and beyond performance improvement gets much
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stronger both in an economic and statistical sense, which suggests that productivity
gains coming from the best style match become noticeable once the manager has
gone through an initial period of adjustment.
3.4.3 Alternative Explanations
3.4.3.1 Learning-by-Doing
It is possible that the performance improvement we document results from greater
investment experience that the manager acquires as she tries more different styles
[Golec (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), Greenwood and Nagel (2009), and
Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2017)]. That is why among the controls used in the
regression we include the number of styles tried by the manager along with her
industry tenure. Although the number of styles tried is not statistically significant
in the linear model underlying Table 3.4, it could be that it effects the dependent
variable in a non-linear way. To rule that out, we proceed as follows. For each
fund manager who has reached her best match, we identify a control manager, i.e.,
another manager from the same family that has tried the same styles and has the
highest propensity score with respect to the length of time she tried the various
styles. These pairs then constitute the observations on which we estimate model
(3.1).
Results are reported in Table 3.6. Constructing the control group in the manner
described above is restrictive, resulting in a much smaller sample of about 4,500
observations, relative to a sample of roughly 29 thousand observations in Table 3.4.
Nonetheless, despite the smaller sample used in Table 3.6, the coefficients on the
Style Match variable are still positive and exhibit similar levels of economic and
statistical significance as those from Table 3.4.9
In sum, our main finding that managerial productivity improves after a manager
reaches her best style match continues to hold even after we control for experience
9We come to the same conclusion when we use an even more restrictive approach to construct
the control group. This alternative control group is constructed by ensuring that in addition to
the conditions imposed in Table 3.6, the control manager has the closest propensity score based
on the manager and fund characteristics described in Table 3.1 (as the family characteristics, by
construction, are equal, since we perform the matching within the same family).
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Table 3.6: Matched Sample Analysis of Performance after Discovery of Style Match
In this table, we repeat our main analysis of Table 3.4 using a subsample of manager that found their style match
(treated) and a control group of managers that did not find their match (untreated) managers. For each fund
manager who has reached her best match, we identify a control manager, i.e., another manager from the same
family that has tried the same styles and has the highest propensity score with respect to the length of time she
tried the various styles. The construction of all dependent and independent variables is described in Table 3.4.
Regressions are run with time, style, and manager-by-family fixed effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard
errors clustered at the manager level, are reported in parentheses ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Return Style Return Alpha4 Alpha6
Style Match 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗
(3.91) (3.99) (3.13) (2.72)
#Styles Tried 0.0048 0.0033 −0.0001 −0.0012
(1.58) (1.23) (−0.06) (−0.47)
Log(Industry Tenure) −0.0044∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0039∗∗ −0.0009
(−2.05) (−3.04) (−2.42) (−0.46)
Log(Fund Age) 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗ 0.0035
(5.14) (5.09) (2.58) (0.84)
Log(Fund Size) −0.0252∗∗∗ −0.0239∗∗∗ −0.0150∗∗∗ −0.0135∗∗∗
(−12.89) (−13.29) (−9.55) (−7.77)
Exp. Ratio 0.7647 −0.2046 0.1427 −12.207
(1.17) (−0.36) (0.24) (−1.21)
Turn. Ratio −0.0020 −0.0019 −0.0002 0.0003
(−1.25) (−1.55) (−0.44) (0.48)
Flow −0.0085∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗ −0.0051∗∗∗
(−4.74) (−3.85) (−2.51) (−2.65)
Log(Family Size) −0.0007 0.0037∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0038∗
(−0.28) (1.71) (3.20) (1.95)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manage×Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,608 4,622 4,519 4,519
Adj. R2 0.761 0.044 0.164 0.142
in a more rigorous way. This increases our confidence that the performance im-
provement we document is the result of learning-by-trying of style matches and not
the result of greater experience (learning-by-doing) acquired by the manager in the
process.
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3.4.3.2 Managerial Preferences and Organizational Power
It is possible that the results documented above are caused by a combination of
some managers’ preferences for certain styles and their organizational power within
their fund family. Since a manager’s power within a fund family will likely increase
with her tenure with the family, a manager who has tried various styles is likely to
have accumulated sufficient power, which she uses to first return to her preferred
previously-tried style and afterwards to divert disproportionately more resources to
her fund. To explore this possibility, we employ High Family Tenure, an indicator
variable which equals one if the current family tenure of the respective manager is
greater than the median family tenure of all managers in the same year, and zero
otherwise. If organizational power is responsible for the performance improvement
we document, we ought to see a positive and significant coefficient when we interact
Style Match with High Family Tenure.
Table 3.7 shows results from a model that augments model (3.1) with
High Family Tenure and its interaction with Style Match. Results show that
both High Family Tenure and its interaction with Style Match are statistically
insignificant. Thus, we are unable to find supporting evidence for the explanation
that the return to a previously-tried style and the subsequent performance improve-
ment are the product of these managers having more organizational power.
3.5 How do Families Respond to Optimal Style
Discovery?
In this section we examine the implications that style match discovery has for mutual
fund families. We explore three possible ways in which fund families exploit the
information they acquired after a manger has reached her best style match. In
Section 3.5.1, we test whether fund families are more likely to promote managers who
have reached their best style match by increasing their assets under management.
Then, we examine whether fund families extend the newly-found advantage to other
funds in the family in Section 3.5.2. Both strategies would be intended to maximize
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Table 3.7: Managerial Preferences and Organizational Power
In this table, we augment our main analysis of Table 3.4 to test for the impact of managerial preferences and
managers’ organizational power. We employ High Family Tenure, an indicator variable which equals one if the
current family tenure of the respective manager is greater than the median family tenure of all managers in the
same year, and zero otherwise and interact this variable with Style Match. The construction of all dependent and
independent variables is described in Table 3.4. Regressions are run with time, style, and manager-by-family fixed
effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the manager level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Return Style Return Alpha4 Alpha6
Style Match 0.0215∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0150∗∗
(2.37) (2.94) (3.12) (2.29)
High Family Tenure −0.0018 −0.0009 −0.0005 −0.0020
(−0.82) (−0.43) (−0.28) (−0.83)
High Family Tenure · −0.0074 −0.0128 −0.0074 −0.0019
Style Match (−0.91) (−1.55) (−1.40) (−0.32)
Manager Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager×Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 29,699 29,759 29,582 29,582
Adj. R2 0.737 0.065 0.115 0.120
returns for the entire family. Finally, in Section 3.5.3 we explore the broader hiring
implications for families with more versus less developed internal labor markets.
3.5.1 Do Families Promote Managers Who Reach Their
Style Match?
Consistent with fund families taking advantage of the information they acquire after
the style match of a manager has been found, we expect that fund families will be
more likely to promote the corresponding managers by increasing their assets under
management. To test this hypothesis, we model the probability that a manager is
promoted as a function of the variables introduced in equation (3.1) using a linear
probability model. The dependent variable is Promotion, a binary variable that
equals one if a manager is promoted in a given year and zero otherwise. We determine
that a manager has had a promotion if the reshuffling of her responsibilities resulted
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Table 3.8: Promotion of Managers that Reached their Style Match
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate promotion probability with changes in style match
status of a manager. The analysis is done at the manager- and year-level. The dependent variable is Promotion, a
binary variable that equals one if a manager is promoted in a given year and zero otherwise. We determine that a
manager has had a promotion if the reshuffling of her responsibilities resulted in greater assets under management
than before. Such instances include the manager being assigned to an additional fund or the manager being moved
out of the existing fund and into a different fund with larger assets under management. The construction of the
independent variables is described in Table 3.4. Regressions are run with time, style, and manager-by-family fixed
effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the manager level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗,









Manager× Family FE Yes
Observations 27,314
Adj. R2 0.268
in greater assets under management than before. Such instances include the manager
being assigned to an additional fund or the manager being moved out of the existing
fund and into a different fund with larger assets under management.
Results are presented in Table 3.8. They show that after arriving at her best style
match a manager is more likely to be promoted in the following period than before.
The coefficient on the Style Match variable is both statistically and economically
significant. It suggests that the probability of promotion increases by 5.5 percentage
points, which is roughly 11% of the unconditional probability of promotion. With
this evidence we are able to provide a direct link from the style match discovery
process and the resulting private information that families generate about the skills
of their managers to the optimal deployment of managers’ talent by fund families.
3.5.2 Do Families Further Scale Up the New Information?
In the previous section we showed that fund families rationally exploit the informa-
tion they acquire about managerial skill after the manager has reached her best style
match by allocating more capital to that manager. Another rational strategy would
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be to extend the benefits of this newly-found information to other funds in the fam-
ily (hereafter, affiliated funds). If fund families follow this strategy, we would expect
affiliated funds to utilize the investment ideas from a colleague who has discovered
her best style match more than those of other colleagues who have not done so.
Following the methodology of Cici, Gehde-Trapp, Göricke, and Kempf (2018), we
employ a linear probability model where we model the likelihood that a trade con-
ducted by a family manager is followed by affiliated funds. The unit of observation
is a trade of a given stock j conducted by a manager i in quarter t.
trade followedj,i,t = χf,s,t + α · SM Tradej,i,t + ~γ · ~ci,t + εj,i,t. (3.2)
The dependent variable trade followedj,i,t is a dummy variable, which equals one
if a trade conducted in stock j by manager i in quarter t is followed by a trade in
the same direction by at least one affiliated fund manager subsequently in quarter
t + 1 or t + 2, and zero otherwise. The key independent variable SM Trade is an
indicator variable that equals one when the trade was conducted by a manager who
has reached her style match and zero otherwise. If affiliated managers are more
likely to follow the ideas of a manager who is operating at her best style match than
those of managers who have not reached this point, then we expect the coefficient
on this variable to be positive. εj,i,t denotes the error term.
Our control variables, stacked into vector ~c, include: the natural logarithm of
market capitalization [Log(Firm Size)]; past 12-month compounded stock return
(Past Return); past 12-month stock return volatility (Past V olatility); and book-
to-market ratio (Book − to −Market). Because the analysis is at the family level
and we also want to impose the restriction that only trades of managers that have
the same style be considered, we employ family-by-style-by-report date fixed effects,
denoted by χf,s,t. Standard errors are clustered by fund family and style.
Table 3.9 reports the results. In the first column, we condition on trades that
initiate a position in the portfolio of managers in stocks that are not concurrently
held by any of the affiliated managers. Stocks that appear for the first time in the
portfolio of a particular manager, but not in those of affiliated managers, are most
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Table 3.9: Utilization of Trade Ideas by Affiliated Managers
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate the probability that a trade by a manager who has
found her style match is followed subsequently by affiliated managers. The analysis is done at the stock-family-style-
and quarter-level. The observations for Initiating Buys are identified as stocks that are held for the first time by a
manager having found her style match and not held concurrently by an affiliated fund in the same style at time t.
Remaining Buys are identified as increases in shares held and exclude initiating buys. For Terminating Sales, the
dependent variable equals one if there is at least one other fund within the same family in the same style at t+1 or t+2
selling the stock off. Remaining Sales are identified as reductions in shares held and exclude Terminating Sales.
Our main independent variable is SM Trade, an indicator variable that equals one when the trade was conducted by
a manager who has reached her style match and zero otherwise. Our control variables include the natural logarithm
of market capitalization [Log(Firm Size)]; past 12-month compounded stock return (Past Return); past 12-month
stock return volatility (Past V olatility); and book-to-market ratio (Book − to − Market). Regressions are run
with family-by-style-by-report-date fixed effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the family
and style level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance level, respectively.









SM Trade 0.0122∗∗ 0.0129∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗
(2.03) (2.01) (8.81) (2.17)
Log(Firm Size) 0.0374∗∗ 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.0438∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗
(2.97) (5.43) (3.43) (5.13)
Past Return 0.0088∗∗ 0.0178∗∗ 0.0042 0.0081
(2.57) (2.91) (1.25) (1.37)
Past Volatility 0.4854∗∗ 0.9988∗∗ 0.7483∗∗ 1.1224∗∗
(2.48) (2.76) (2.85) (2.77)
Book-to-Market −0.0035 −0.0101 −0.0105 −0.0197
(−0.79) (−0.69) (−1.56) (−1.16)
Family×Style×Report-Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 486,998 2,023,244 964,073 1,627,854
Adj. R2 0.155 0.250 0.184 0.341
likely to have been the product of ideas generated by that manager.
The coefficient on the SM Trade variable in the first column is positive and
statistically significant at the 5% level.10 Its value suggests that when the new ideas
are from a manager that operates at her best style match, they have a 1.2 percentage
points higher probability that they are subsequently utilized by the family’s other
funds. This is economically significant as it constitutes more than a 12% increase in
probability relative to the baseline probability (not reported in the table) that the
family’s other funds follow the ideas of their colleagues in general. This evidence is
10Because it only considers the following of ideas with a time lag, this likely underestimates the
economic effect given that fund managers can observe the trades of affiliated managers in the same
quarter and thus adopt their ideas sooner.
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consistent with affiliated managers paying greater attention to the investment ideas
coming from a manager that is at her best style match than those of other managers
and being more likely to act on those ideas. For completeness, in Column 2, we show
results when we condition on the rest of stock purchases conducted by managers.
The coefficient on the SM Trade variable continues to be significant.
Finally, in the last two columns, we condition on the stock sales of managers.
Mutual fund managers typically face short-selling constraints. This would prevent
affiliated funds from acting on negative information on a specific stock that was gen-
erated by their colleagues operating at their best style match unless they currently
own that stock. For this reason, we apply a filter to the stock sales by keeping only
those that correspond to stocks that were held by at least one affiliated fund at the
beginning of t.
In Column 3, the observations comprise all sales that terminate a position and
in Column 4 they comprise the rest of the sales. The coefficient on the SM Trade
variable continues to be positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the
affiliated managers pay closer attention to the selling decisions of their colleagues
operating at their best style match.
In sum, results from this and the previous section suggest that fund families uti-
lize the human capital of managers that operate at their optimal level of productivity
in their best style match by applying it to a larger asset base, which goes beyond
funds managed by the managers that are at their best style match themselves.
3.5.3 Implications for the Hiring Decisions of Fund Families
Our findings have broad implications for how families approach hiring of new man-
agers. Fund families with developed internal markets, e.g., larger families, have a
larger opportunity set of style offerings for their managers to work in during their
learning-by-trying process. This makes it more likely for managers working for
larger families to try out more different styles and find their best style match faster
than managers working for smaller families, consistent with occupation match the-
ory [e.g., Papageorgiou (2018)]. For this reason, we expect that larger families tend
to hire managers that are not yet at their best style match because such families
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Table 3.10: Implications for the Hiring Decisions of Fund Families
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate manager characteristics of hires to the number
of funds in the hiring fund family. The analysis is done at the level of hires. The dependent variable is whether the
manager hired has already reached her style match (SM Manager), coded as a (1/0) indicator variable. The main
independent variable is #Family Styles, measured by the number of different styles in the family. Control variables
include manager and family controls described in Table 3.1. T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the









have more opportunities to facilitate the style match discovery of these managers.
Conversely, we expect that smaller families, which have fewer style offerings and are
therefore less able to facilitate style match discovery, tend to hire managers who
have already reached their style match.
To test this hypothesis, we first identify all hires within our sample, with ac-
companying information as to which manager was hired and in which family the
hiring took place. The dependent variable is whether the manager hired has already
reached her style match (SM Manager), coded as a (1/0) indicator variable. The
main independent variable is size of the internal labor market measured by the num-
ber of styles offered by the fund family (#Family Styles). We regress SM Manager
on #Family Styles along with manager and family controls introduced in Section
3.2.2 and cluster standard errors at the family level.
Results reported in Table 3.10 show that the likelihood that the hired manager is
a manager who has already reached her style match is significantly negatively related
with the size of the internal labor market. This finding supports our hypothesis that
fund families with larger internal labor markets are in a position to hire managers
who have not yet discovered their best style match.
Overall, the findings from this section suggest that fund families respond to the
outcome of the style match discovery process in two key ways: First, they utilize the
productivity gains that follow the discovery of the style match of their managers to
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a large asset base, and second, they follow hiring practices that reflect their ability
to make the optimal style match discovery of their managers possible.
3.6 How do Managers Respond to Style Match
Discovery?
In this section we examine the implications that the outcome of learning-by-trying
has for fund managers, i.e., how fund managers respond to the discovery of their
best style fit. In Section 3.6.1 we examine whether managers adjust their investment
behavior and in Section 3.6.2 whether they change the level of personal investments
in the mutual funds that they manage.
3.6.1 Investment Behavior
Avery and Chevalier (1999) develop an equilibrium model, whereby managers with
positive private information about their skills exhibit self-confidence by anti-herding,
i.e., going against the trades of other managers. The predictions of this model are
corroborated by Jiang and Verardo (2018) who document that more skilled managers
herd less. This suggests that a manager who has learned her best style match and
knows where her skill is highest is expected to exhibit a higher degree of conviction
by investing differently from her peers. Thus, we would expect a manager to tilt her
portfolio away from the typical portfolio of her peers after she has arrived at her
style match.
To test this hypothesis, we examine the extent to which the difference of a
manager’s portfolio relative to the average peer portfolio increases after the manager
finds the best style match. The dependent variable, Active Peer Share, which
measures this difference, is constructed as follows. Similar to Cremers and Petajisto
(2009) and Petajisto (2013), we calculate
Active Peer Sharei,t =
M∑
j=1
|wj,i,t − wj,peeri,t|, (3.3)
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Table 3.11: Investment Behavior
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate how far a manager’s portfolio deviated from
that of her peers with changes in the style match status of a manager. The analysis is done at the manager-
and year-level. The dependent variable is Active Peer Share, constructed as described in Section 3.6.1 Our main
independent variable is Style Match, constructed as in Section 3.2.2. Control variables at the manager, fund, and
family level are constructed as in Table 3.1. Regressions are run with time, style, and manager-by-family fixed
effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the manager level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗,












where wj,i,t and wj,peeri,t are, respectively, the portfolio weights of stock j held by
manager i and in manager i’s benchmark based on her peer portfolio at time t.
The sum is taken over the universe of all M stocks. If a manager holds exactly
the peer portfolio, her Active Peer Share will be zero, whereas if she invests only
into one stock and the corresponding peer weight is zero, Active Peer Share will
be two. We employ the same independent variables, controls, and fixed effects as in
our estimation of equation (3.1).
Results are reported in Table 3.11. They show that Active Peer Share increases
after managers reach their style match relative to other funds. This result is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level and also economically significant. The coefficient on
the Style Match variable suggests an increase in Active Peer Share of 0.6648 after
style match discovery, which is economically meaningful given that the maximum
value Active Peer Share can take is two. This evidence suggests that fund managers
use the information they acquire about their best style fit to amplify the utilization
of these skills where their productivity is highest in a way that is consistent with
them exhibiting a higher level of conviction.
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3.6.2 Managerial Fund Ownership Changes
The finding that managers exhibit significant improvement in performance after
they have found their best style match could suggest yet another way in which fund
managers exploit their newly-found advantage. In particular, fund managers could
increase their personal investments in the funds that they manage in order to person-
ally benefit from the better performance that follows. A similar investment motive
is supported by Gupta and Sachdeva (2019), who show that hedge fund managers
invest strategically in the funds that they manage, an action that contributes sizable
returns to their personal wealth. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that
managers might not want to increase their personal investments in the funds that
they manage following their style match discovery. The idea is that in a compet-
itive labor market, the manager should experience increased compensation that is
commensurate with her new, higher level of productivity. This would mean that
the manager would have a larger fraction of her wealth tied to the fortunes of the
fund family and she might prefer to counter this from a diversification perspective.
Ex-ante it is not clear which of these two effects dominates.
We obtain data on managerial ownership mutual funds have to disclose per SEC
Rule S7-12-04 for the 2004-2012 period.11 Mutual fund managers are not required
to report the actual level of their mutual fund ownership but they have to report
whether their ownership falls in one of six ranges.12 Given the compensation levels
of mutual fund managers, we consider the distinction among lower ranges as trivial
and therefore introduce a binary variable, High Ownership, which equals one if the
manager’s ownership in the fund was above $500,000 and zero otherwise.13
To examine whether fund managers increase ownership in the funds they manage
after reaching their style match, we model the likelihood of a fund manager being in
the high ownership group, i.e., High Ownership being equal to one, as a function
of the independent variables employed in equation (3.1). It is important to note
11We thank Florian Sonnenburg for kindly providing us with the managerial ownership data
used in Martin and Sonnenburg (2015).
12The six ranges are: $1-$10,000; $10,001-$50,000; $50,001-$100,000; $100,001-$500,000;
$500,001-$1,000,000; and above $1,000,000.
13Results are robust when we define High Ownership to denote a managerial ownership level
at above $1,000,000.
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Table 3.12: Managerial Fund Ownership
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate how much a manager is personally invested into
the fund she manages with changes in the style match status of a manager. The analysis is done at the manager- and
year-level. The dependent variable is High Ownership, an indicator variable, which equals one if the manager’s
ownership in the fund was above $500,000 and zero otherwise. Our main independent variable is Style Match,
constructed as in Section 3.2.2. Control variables at the manager, fund, and family level are constructed as in Table
3.1. Regressions are run with time, style, and manager-by-family fixed effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard
errors clustered at the manager level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at












that we are able to control for unobserved heterogeneity in managerial ownership at
the family level due to internal policies requiring family managers to invest certain
amounts into the funds they manage [see, e.g., Laise (2006), Khorana, Tufano, and
Wedge (2007), and Taylor (2011)] with our fixed effects structure.
Results are reported in Table 3.12. They show that managers are more likely to
be in the High Ownership category after they have reached their best style match.
This result is highly significant, with statistical significance at the 1% level. It is
also economically significant, as finding the manager’s best style match leads to an
increase in the likelihood that the manager will be in the High Ownership group by
about 10 percentage points, which constitutes 100 percent of the unconditional prob-
ability that a manager will be in the High Ownership group. This finding suggests
that managers exploit their newly-found information in their personal investment
decision making.
Overall, the evidence from Section 3.6 suggests that fund managers change their
behavior in two significant ways following discovery of their best style match, which
highly supports the notion that the learning-by-trying process has important impli-
cations for fund managers.
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3.7 Conclusion
Our paper is the first to study how mutual fund managers arrive at the point where
they are optimally matched to investment styles. We find that, consistent with
occupational match theory, this process happens in a learning-by-trying fashion,
whereby managers try different styles until they arrive at their optimal style match.
Learning of the style match of fund managers is involved, requiring a significant
number of tries and considerable time. These challenges notwithstanding, some fund
managers are able to arrive at their style match discovery much faster than others.
These managers had more opportunities to try different styles, had prior industry
work experience outside of asset management, and attended institutions with higher
student SAT scores. This process is highly important because the productivity gains
of fund managers after their best style match has been discovered are economically
significant, making this a worthwhile quest for both fund managers and fund families.
The findings of our study have important implications for fund families and fund
managers. These implications are related to how these players respond following
discovery of managers’ best style matches. Fund families respond rationally after
they discover the best style match of their managers. To maximize returns for
the entire family, they try to increase the asset base footprint of the investment
ideas of their best-style-matched managers who are operating at a higher level of
productivity. In addition, depending on the size of their internal labor market their
hiring decisions reflect their capabilities to make optimal style matches possible.
Thus, if their internal labor market is small, which diminishes their capabilities for
identifying managers’ style matches, they do not spend resources on the discovery
of their managers’ best style matches but rather hire external managers whose style
match has already been discovered. Managers also respond rationally to learning
that they are optimally matched to an investment style by exhibiting a higher level
of investment conviction. Specifically, they tilt their portfolio away from the typical
portfolio of their peer managers to amplify the gains from their higher productivity
in that particular style, and they also utilize this information for their personal
gain by increasing ownership in the funds where they are optimally matched by
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style. These findings contribute to furthering our understanding of how fund families
and fund managers interact when it comes to talent acquisition, development, and
deployment. More generally, our study sheds light on the importance of match
finding between employees and companies by documenting sizable productivity gains
that happen as a result of this process.
Chapter 4
Implied Cost of Capital and
Mutual Fund Performance
4.1 Introduction
For a long time, finance researchers have been trying to discern, whether mutual
fund managers, as a large and important class of institutional investors, have skill
when it comes to picking stocks. This quest by scholars has been at the heart of
understanding important concepts in finance, such as the efficient market hypoth-
esis or how information advantages are developed and exploited by market partici-
pants. However, research on the ability of active mutual fund managers to beat their
benchmark, i. e., generate positive active returns after costs commonly referred to
as “alpha”,1 unanimously provides evidence for the scarcity of this skill. Fama and
French (2010) conclude that “true alpha [...] is negative for most if not all active
funds”. Yet, the U.S. mutual fund industry has seen enormous growth, having de-
cupled over the past 25 year alone, with 17.7 trillion U.S. dollar under management
by the end of 2018 [Investment Company Institute (2019)]. This mismatch between
the track record of the mutual fund industry’s performance and its growth gave rise
This chapter is based on Hendriock (2020). For helpful comments and discussions I thank
Alexander Kempf and Alexander Puetz.
1A different topic is active managers’ ability to extract money from the market and generate
positive value for their firms, confer Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), Berk, van Binsbergen, and
Liu (2017), and van Binsbergen, Kim, and Kim (2019).
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to the “mutual fund puzzle” put forth by Gruber (1996).
In this paper, I try to add a piece to this puzzle and examine the ability of
funds’ holdings’ implied cost of capital (ICC) to ex-ante identify funds with positive
alpha and thereby inform the capital allocation process of financial decision makers.
Hereof, research documents that it is mainly guided by past performance2 - yet,
on average, funds outperforming in one period do not repeat their achievement in
the next. Persistence documented in early studies was later explained by recently
successful managers holding stocks with high past performance - i.e., momentum;
further, persistence seems to be entirely absent in recent times.3 Thus, research
turned towards analyzing whether fund characteristics help discern future “winners”
from “losers”, documenting associations of performance with, e.g., fund age, flows,
and expenses.4 While these findings are important to further our understanding
of the nature of skill in the mutual fund industry, we still lack an understanding
of what strategies managers in their day-to-day business (should) employ and how
fund investors can turn mere correlations into implementable investment strategies
with real profits.
This study aims to document the extent to which ICC of a fund can serve as a
building block for such kind of a strategy. The main insight of this paper is that
current ICC appear to map into future fund performance in a way that lets investors
profit from the small fraction of mutual fund managers which indeed seems to have
skill picking stocks. That is, ICC seem to be one information advantage successfully
exploited by skilled managers.
The focus on ICC is motivated by literature on their return-predictive capabili-
ties. Conceptually, ICC of a firm equate its current market value of equity to present
value of expected future cash flows. Pástor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008) show
theoretically how ICC are particularly apt as a proxy for time-varying expected
2Confer, e.g., Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Guercio and Tkac (2008), Barber, Huang,
and Odean (2016), and Berk and van Binsbergen (2016).
3Carhart (1997) attributes persistence as documented in Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and
Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) to momentum; Choi and Zhao (2020) do not find evidence
for persistence between 1994 and 2018.
4Confer Howell (2001) and Ferson and Schadt (1996), Rakowski and Wang (2009), as well as
Carhart (1997) and Russell (2010), respectively. For a review of studies on the association between
characteristics both at the manager as well as fund level and fund performance, confer Jones and
Wermers (2011).
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returns; based on theoretically justifiable valuation models, ICC take into consid-
eration future growth opportunities and, as a function of current market values,
are inherently forward looking. Empirically, ICCs indeed have been documented to
positively predict future returns and other measures for “performance”.5 When it
comes to exploiting this association between current ICC and future performance,
however, Esterer and Schröder (2014) underline the detrimental effect of transaction
costs necessary, stating profit potentials “revealed by the ICC [were] not large enough
to allow for substantial trading opportunities using diversified equity portfolios.”
Regarding transaction costs and implementation opportunities, active mutual
funds arguably are in a preferential position; as part of potentially large institutions
specialized on financial transactions, respective costs are comparably low [Frazzini,
Israel, and Moskowitz (2018)]. Further, whereas ICC-based investment rules ana-
lyzed in literature either simply value-, though mostly equal-weight stocks, mutual
fund managers can - both to the detriment as well as advantage - exert their discre-
tion in portfolio selection. An issue yet unexplored is whether investors, by means
of funds’ reported holdings and respective ICCs, can turn paper gains of ICC-based
strategies into actual profits.
This study provides empirical evidence that they can. On the onset, it conducts
a portfolio-based analysis to study the relation between fund-level ICC and future
performance. Each quarter, a fund-level ICC is calculated as the value-weighted
average of the ICCs of the stocks in the fund’s portfolio, which in turn are computed
as the mean over eight commonly used metrics. Proxies for expected earnings used
to calculate ICCs obtain from analysts respectively the three most widely used cross-
sectional earnings prediction models [Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang (2012) and Li and
Mohanram (2014)]. Consecutively, funds are sorted into equally-weighted portfolios,
based on ICC-quintiles. Over a horizon of 25 years, a $1 investment into bottom
portfolios led to a seven-fold increase from 1992 to 2016. In comparison, $1 invested
in top portfolios would have grown to $15.
5Confer, e.g., Claus and Thomas (2001), Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Easton (2007), Pástor,
Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008), Botosan, Plumlee, and Wen (2011), Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang
(2012), Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013), Li and Mohanram (2014), Esterer and Schröder (2014),
Schröder (2018), and Bielstein and Hanauer (2019). The literature on ICC in general as well as its
applications in research is extensive; Richardson, Tuna, and Wysocki (2010) provide a review.
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Considering adjustments for factor tilts respectively investment styles, funds in
bottom quintile portfolios show average one and six factor alphas of around -30 to
-20 basis points per month, whereas top portfolios deliver alphas between zero and
ten basis points, resulting in a significant spread. In terms of loadings according
to the six factor model in Fama and French (2018), high-ICC managers appear
to place bets on small and value firms as well as gross profitability and against
stock momentum, consistent with both ICCs being used as part of an investment
strategy based on fundamental analysis and a “mechanical” effect owing to ICCs’
computational properties.
Although quintile-based analyses are parsimonious and such widely used in lit-
erature, they cannot serve as basis for a viable outperforming investment strat-
egy. While reported individual fund returns are net of transaction costs, portfolio
turnover, which amounts to approximately 30% in the top quintile, necessitates ad-
ditional payments of front-end loads for entering new positions and back-end loads to
sell off funds leaving the portfolio. Additionally, only the spread-portfolio’s perfor-
mance is significant, which is infeasible, as mutual funds cannot be shorted. Further,
given the small fraction of funds being able to generate alpha in the first place, quin-
tiles are hardly fine enough. Also after excluding load-funds, yielding a time series
of returns purely net of costs, and stratification based on ICC-deciles the positive
difference in performance between top and bottom portfolio remains. Additionally,
top decile portfolios exhibit positive one and six factor alphas of roughly 25 basis
points per month, resolving the necessity to short funds.
The portfolio analysis provides evidence for positive factor alphas, corroborating
the notion that returns from an ICC-based strategy do not simply reflect investment
styles respectively originate from factor tilts. However, it does not allow to control
for other fund characteristics potentially associated with future performance. Hence,
I relate current ICC to future fund performance in panel regressions. Results provide
evidence of a close to one-to-one correspondence between changes in ICC and future
performance, independent of what earnings estimates enter the calculation of ICCs.
Also holding fund-manger-matches fixed to control for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity at the fund-manager-level, ICCs continue to be positively correlated
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with future performance, corroborating the notion that a high-ICC strategy in itself
is associated with high fund performance; this association is not explained by high-
ICC funds being systematically concentrated in particular styles at certain times
either. With regard to persistence of this association, ICCs are strongly correlated
with performance up to two years in the future.
After documenting this baseline result, this study seeks to delve deeper into trad-
ing mechanisms associated with an ICC strategy. Relating trading decisions with
ex-post realized fund performance, it tries to shed light on whether fund managers’
active decisions altering their funds’ ICC correlate with contemporaneous perfor-
mance. It documents that the larger the fraction of a manager’s buys (sells) was in
firms with increasing (decreasing) ICC, the higher was contemporaneous fund per-
formance. A complete “correct” trading decision on average translated into roughly
2.5 percentage points higher quarterly fund performance, reinforcing that ICC-based
strategies seem to pay off.
Next, this study turns towards possible determinants of managers employing
such kind of strategies. A main motivation for combining return predictability
via ICCs and identification of skilled managers is based on evidence for, on the
one hand, transaction costs preventing effective utilization of ICCs for portfolio
selection and, on the other hand, managers’ alleged access to a more efficient trading
apparatus [Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz (2018)]. Along these lines, cross-sectional
heterogeneity among funds potentially correlates with their likelihood of adopting
high-ICC strategies. Whereas trading costs are not reported, Cici, Dahm, and
Kempf (2018) construct a proxy for the efficiency of a mutual fund family’s trading
desk, expected to be negatively correlated with transaction costs. Consistent with
funds facing lower transaction costs being more likely to employ a high-ICC strategy,
funds with higher trading desk efficiency exhibit higher ICCs, corroborating the
notion that favorable transaction costs are part of the explanation for why mutual
funds are able to gather rents of a strategy based on ICC. With regard to manager
characteristics, in accordance to successfully implementing strategies based on ICCs
representing a form of skill, managers who received their bachelor’s degree from
universities with high average matriculate SAT scores, meant to proxy for innate
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abilities, display above average ICCs.
To learn more about possible implications of ICC-based strategies, this study
examines, whether they change incentives faced by managers. If they consider ICCs
for portfolio allocation and are aware of the potential performance consequences,
ICCs in particular add to the repertoire of how managers can react to being ranked
unfavorable relative to their peers and such might influence risk-taking. Brown,
Harlow, and Starks (1996) are the first to document how fund managers with poor
interim performance increase risk in the second half of the year to catch up with
interim winners. A high ICC, however, provides another means to close the gap
towards their peers. Consistent with managers relying on this strategy paying off,
this study provides evidence that mid-year losers with high ICCs increase risk less
relative to their peers with low ICCs.
Finally, this study closes with an analysis of whether investors respond towards
funds’ ICCs. Given the positive association between current ICC and future per-
formance, investors might direct their money accordingly. A fund’s ICC, however,
is not reported in its prospectus; instead, an investor would need to collect both
market and fundamental information to compute ICCs by herself. Given evidence
for limited resources, attention, and financial literacy of less sophisticated retail
investors,6 they might be insensitive to a fund’s ICC. In contrast, institutional in-
vestors with both the means and knowledge to determine its value and uncovering
its positive association with future fund performance potentially respond to it. In
this vein, this study documents that retail share classes do not receive additional
money based on ICCs, whereas institutional investors appear to reward funds with
high ICC with higher flows, consistent with awareness of and confidence in ICCs’
association with future fund performance.
This study contributes to the literature on delegated asset management, specif-
ically with regard to the question of whether there exists skill in the active mutual
fund industry and if so, how it can be identified. Previous studies evolved in an ef-
6For studies suggesting retail respectively individual investors being less sophisticated than
institutional, confer, e.g., Hand (1990), Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), Walther (1997), Bal-
sam, Bartov, and Marquardt (2002), Bonner, Walther, and Young (2003), Asthana, Balsam, and
Sankaraguruswamy (2004), Franco, Lu, and Vasvari (2007), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2007),
Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers, and Teoh (2008), and Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman (2012).
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fort to increase the power of tests, shifting the focus of analysis from fund returns to
more specialized tests intended to separate skill from luck. Accepting that a subset
of mutual fund managers appears to have skill, research has turned to understanding
which characteristics of mutual funds and their managers are associated with better
performance.7 This study provides evidence that funds implementing a theoretically
motivated strategy backed by research based on ICCs generate outperformance and
are identifiable ex-ante.
Further, this study adds to the literature on managerial incentives in the mutual
fund industry. In particular, compensation schemes based on assets under man-
agement and asymmetric performance-based boni [Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003)
and Ma, Tang, and Gómez (2019)], paired with a convex performance-flow relation
[e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2012)],
according to which investors punish bad performance less by disinvestment than
they reward good performance by inflows, give rise to an option-like pay-off, in-
centivizing managers to engage into “tournament” behavior [Nalebuff and Stiglitz
(1983) and Rosen (1986)]. Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) document evidence
for tournaments in the fund industry per se, whereas Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) find
evidence for tournaments within fund families. Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009)
show how career concerns due to higher unemployment risk during recessions allevi-
ate tournament behavior, as the option-like pay-off is distorted because of managers
facing more severe consequences of bad performance. This paper provides evidence
that another determinant of how managers respond towards trailing their peers is
which investment strategies they follow and how much they (can) rely on them by
documenting that managers with high ICC temper their tournament behavior.
This paper also contributes to the literature on determinants of investors’ capital
allocation. Previous research documents strong evidence for mutual fund investors
catering to past performance [Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Guercio
7Respective studies start from Jensen (1968), who, using a market model, denies the existence of
skill, and continue over, e.g., Lehmann and Modest (1987), Ippolito (1989), Grinblatt and Titman
(1989, 1992, 1993), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1997), Wermers (1999), Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), Wermers (2000),
Kothari and Warner (2001), Pinnuck (2003), Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010), Fama and
French (2010), and Wermers (2020), who all, to varying degree, document some sort of skill.
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and Tkac (2008), Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016), and Berk and van Binsbergen
(2016)], despite its limited use forecasting future performance. This study docu-
ments that sophisticated investors able to identify funds with high ICC steer their
investments accordingly, whereas there appears to be no such behavior for an in-
vestor class less well equipped.
Finally, this study adds to the literature on ICCs and their association with future
realized returns (see above). Whereas there is mixed evidence at the individual
stock- respectively strong evidence for return predictability at the stock-portfolio-
level, in either regard, ICC-based strategies appear to fail being monetizable owing
to underlying costs. This paper provides evidence for mutual fund managers being
able to seize the potential of an ICC-based strategy, in particular due to their access
to efficient trading opportunities.
The results of this study potentially have both theoretical and practical impli-
cations. Theoretically, the opportunity to ex-ante identify investments going to
generate positive performance unexplained by pertinent factor models opens ques-
tions with regard to market efficiency and the correct specification of performance
measurement. The two most obvious implications were that markets lack a form of
semi-strong efficiency or performance attribution is ill-specified, i.e., ICCs capture
a risk factor not accounted for. Retail investors’ insensitivity towards a fund’s ICC,
as they potentially lack the necessary capabilities to detect it, would speak towards
the former, such that performance can persist. Hence, as a potential practical im-
plication, disseminating information about a fund’s ICC, e.g., via incorporation into
ratings investors are shown to respond to,8 could help increasing awareness and such
drive flows, with the potential to eliminate performance opportunities, i.e., increase
efficiency of markets. Yet still, the concept of ICC might be hard to communicate
or “sell” to an investor group with low involvement and financial training. For asset
managers, this study’s findings might serve as positive evidence for the viability of
ICC-based investments.
8In particular, Evans and Sun (2018) provide evidence for modifications of how “Morningstar
Stars” are calculated implicitly changing the asset pricing respectively style attribution model
investors cater to. Hartzmark and Sussman (2019) show how investors respond to newly introduced
sustainability ratings. The general effect of Morningstar ratings on flows is studied by Guercio and
Tkac (2008).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
sample and how earnings estimates and ICCs of firms and ultimately funds are
calculated. Section 4.3 presents the main result, portfolio- and regression-based
evidence for the ability of ICC to forecast fund performance. In Section 4.4, I explore
possible determinants of funds employing a high-ICC strategy, analyzing the impact
of trading efficiency at the family- and innate ability at the manager-level. Section
4.5 considers whether the positive association between ICC and fund performance
triggers responses by market participants, analyzing managers’ incentives to engage




The data in this study are collected from several sources. Fund and family names,
monthly net returns, total nets assets under management, investment styles, and
further fund specific information such as expense and turnover ratios, as well as
loads for years 1992 to 2016 are obtained from the Center for Research on Security
Prices Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund (CRSP MF) Database. For mutual
funds with different share classes, all observations are aggregated at the fund-level.
In case of quantitative information, aggregation is performed based on the asset value
of share classes; qualitative information on investment style and family is the same
across all share classes. A fund’s age is determined by the initial offering date of its
oldest share class. I limit the universe to include only actively managed, diversified,
domestic U.S. equity funds, thereby excluding index, international, balanced, bond,
money market, and sector funds.
To obtain information on managerial fund employment records, I use Morn-
ingstar Direct [confer, e.g., Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (2017) and Patel and
Sarkissian (2017)], which is merged with the CRSP MF database by CUSIPs and
dates. In case of missing CUSIPs, I use a fund share class’s TICKER and date
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combination. If TICKER is also missing, funds are manually matched by name.
Portfolio holdings data come from the Thomson Financial Mutual Fund Hold-
ings database, which are merged with CRSP mutual fund data using the MFLINKS
database and with the CRSP stock data using stock CUSIPS. Portfolio holdings for
each fund are either of semi-annual or quarterly frequency.9 Data on firm funda-
mentals come from COMPUSTAT. I obtain consensus analyst forecasts for earnings
and earnings’ growth rates from I/B/E/S.
4.2.2 ICC and Expected Earnings Proxies
The central metric used in this study derives from firms’ ICC. Based on a certain
corporate valuation model, they represent the rate of return implied by current price
and forecasts of future pay-offs, which in turn are determined by earnings and their





(1 + ri,t+τ )τ
, (4.1)
where Pi,t denotes market value of equity of firm i at time t, Et(Xi,t+τ ) =:
E(Xi,t+τ |Ψt) the expected value, conditional on the information set available at
time t, Ψt, of “pay-off”, reified within the respective model framework, of firm i τ
periods ahead, and ri,t+τ are the cost of equity, i.e., just ICC, of firm i for the τth
period ahead. T represents the end point of business activities. More specifically,
according to the going-concern principle, T is assumed to converge to infinity and
the term structure of equity rates to be flat, such that ri,t+τ = ri,t ∀ τ . Hence, for
one firm, ri,t is still allowed to vary over time, but for one point in time, is constant.
Over the last 25 years, literature developed numerous models to obtain ICCs,
which can be grouped into dividend discount models (DDMs), residual income mod-
els (RIMs), and abnormal earnings growth models (AEGMs). Under the assump-
tions inherent to all of them,11 however, they are mere algebraic reformulations of
9Confer SEC rule RIN 3235-AG64, effective date May 10, 2004.
10This is analogous to internal rates of return calculated from the market price of a bond and
coupon payments, commonly referred to as “yield to maturity”.
11Heinrichs et al. (2013), employing the principle of financial statement articulation, extend the
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each other, which lend themselves to expose certain economic concepts.
In a first step, following literature [e.g., Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang (2012), Li
and Mohanram (2014), and Hess, Meuter, and Kaul (2019)], a firm’s ICC obtains
as the average over commonly used ICCs.12 In particular, I employ the two DDMs
employed by Pástor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008), Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan
(2009), and Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013) respectively Gordon and Gordon
(1997). The two RIMs used in this study are the three-phase model by Gebhardt,
Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) respectively two-phase model in Claus and Thomas
(2001). Finally, the four AEGMs I employ are the model introduced by Ohlson
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) as well as the modified price earnings growth (MPEG)
model [Easton (2004)], the price earnings growth (PEG) model, and ICCs based on
the forwarded price earnings ratio (PE). Appendix to Chapter 4 provides details on
how each of these eight models is specified and their empirical implementation.
In a second step, firm-level ICCs are aggregated at the fund-quarter-level com-
puting a value-weighted average of the respective ICCs corresponding to the stocks




wf,i,t · ICCi,t, (4.2)
where ICCf,t denotes the ICC associated with fund f at time t, Nf,t the number
of stocks the fth fund holds at time t, and wf,i,t the weight of fund f in stock i at
time t. ICCi,t denotes the ICC of stock i at time t.
While market value of equity is observable to the econometrician, the numerator
in equation (4.1), expected pay-off, is not. Historically, literature used analysts’
forecasts as a proxy for market expectations of future earnings to derive expected
pay-offs, one venue also followed in this paper. However, these forecasts come with
certain restrictions. There is evidence for systematic biases, resulting from, e.g., ca-
reer concerns to curry favor with target firms’ executives to secure future investment
banking business respectively not be excluded from certain meetings [e.g., McNichols
and O’Brien (1997), Lin and McNichols (1998), Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000),
standard models to establish empirical equivalence under non-ideal conditions.
12Theoretically, forecasts combination is motivated by a diversification motive with regard to
specification respectively model error. Empirically, “simple”, “robust” estimation schemes tend to
work well [Timmermann, Granger, and Elliott (2006)].
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Westphal and Clement (2008), Mohanram and Gode (2013), and Larocque (2013)].
Further, coverage by analysts is limited, especially for earlier years and smaller firms.
As a response, research developed cross-sectional or “mechanical” earnings fore-
casts [e.g., Fama and French (2000), Gerakos and Gramacy (2012), Hou, van Dijk,
and Zhang (2012), and Li and Mohanram (2014)], which are also used in this study.
Literature documents that related earnings surprises exhibit higher earnings re-
sponse coefficients than surprises with regard to analysts’ forecasts. This suggests
that they better reflect market expectations and such better align the left-hand-side
of equation (4.1) with the numerator on its right-hand-side.
To obtain cross-sectional earnings forecasts, in pooled OLS-regressions,13 a con-
stant and current accounting data are related to earnings τ periods ahead. This
results into coefficient estimates for each regressor, which subsequently are multi-
plied with current accounting data and summed to obtain an estimate for earnings
in t + τ . Following literature, I use rolling regressions with a window of ten years
and assume a reporting lag of minimum three and maximum fourteen months. As
fund holdings are reported every quarter, four separate regression specifications are
run each year in March, June, September, and December.
Figure 4.1 shall illustrate the estimation procedure in June of year t. For ex-
ample, to obtain an earnings estimate for June t+ 1, first, using the past ten years
of data, a pooled OLS-regression of earnings one year ahead on current accounting
information is performed (i.e., earnings in t, ..., t − 9 are regressed on accounting
information in t− 1, ..., t− 10, avoiding look-ahead bias). Second, for each firm in t,
resulting coefficients are multiplied with its accounting data in t to obtain an earn-
ings forecast. That way, firms for which earnings estimates in t can be computed
do not have to have entered the previous regression; coefficients are the same for all
firms and applied to all with relevant accounting data in t, which reduces survivor-
ship requirements and distinguishes the cross-sectional from a time series approach,
where regressions are run for each firm separately.14 Appendix to Chapter 4 pro-
13Recent research examines the usefulness of quantile regressions, in particular median regres-
sions, confer Konstantinidi and Pope (2016) and Easton, Kapons, Kelly, and Neuhierl (2020).
14Empirical evidence is in favor of analyst over time series forecast, confer Ball and Brown
(1968), Brown, Richardson, and Schwager (1987), O’Brien (1988), Lobo (1992), and Bradshaw,
Drake, Myers, and Myers (2012).
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of Cross-Sectional Earnings Estimation Procedure
This figure illustrates the procedure of how cross-sectional earnings estimates are obtained, by way of example for
forecasts made in June. Each year t, depicted on the time-axis, under consideration of minimum three and maximum
fourteen months reporting lag, denoted by the overbrace, a constant and firms’ latest balance sheet information are
collected in matrix Xt, where each row corresponds to one firm-year. Based on ten years of accounting data, pooled
cross-sectional OLS regressions are run of τ periods ahead realized earnings, τ ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, on balance sheet
information, specified according to EP (2014), RI (2014), and HvDZ (2012), respectively. Underbraces depict the
interval of data points entering the respective regressions. Resulting estimated coefficients are stacked into column
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vides an overview of the three models used in this paper: The earnings persistence
(EP) model, as the most reduced model, and residual income (RI, to distinguish
from ICC-models) model by Li and Mohanram (2014) as well as the pioneer, most
comprehensive model by Hou, van Dijk, and Zhang (2012) (HvDZ).
4.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for the 3,699 funds analyzed in this study.
The sample period spans from 1992 to 2016. Panel A provides information about
the distribution of fund characteristics. It reports 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles,
alongside the mean and standard deviation, for the main covariates used in regres-
sion analyses as well as fund-level ICC. The average fund is 13 years old, oversees
approximately 1 billion U.S. dollars, has an expense ratio of 1.3 percent per year,
and turns over its portfolio slightly less than once on an annual basis. Flows, net of
the impact of returns, amount to 2.22% per quarter, on average. Over half of funds
are managed by a team. Fund-level ICCs are distinguishable between analyst-based
ICCs on the one hand and ICCs with mechanical earnings forecasts as inputs on the
other; whereas the latter, with means of roughly 6.5%, closely resemble each other,
ICCs based on analysts are approximately 50% larger. This is consistent with the
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table shows descriptive statistics for the quarterly sample of 3,699 mutual funds during 1992-2016. Panel A
presents 25, 50, and 75 percentiles (p25, p50, and p75, respectively), as well as the mean (x) and standard deviation
(Std) of fund characteristics. Age denotes fund age in years. TNA denotes fund size, measured as fund total net
assets in $ million. Exp. Ratio is the fund expense ratio in % p.a. Turn. Ratio is the fund turnover ratio in %
p.a. Flow is the percentage quarterly growth in funds’ new money, net of the effect of returns. I(Team) is an
indicator variable equal to one if the fund is managed by a team and zero else. ICC, for every fund every quarter,
obtains as a value-weighted ICC of the funds’ portfolios’ constituents, based on four different proxies for expected
earnings, as described in Section 4.2.2. Panel B reports average cross-sectional Pearson correlation coefficients
below and Spearman rank correlation coefficients above the diagonal between fund-level ICCs. Panel C provides
autocorrelation coefficients of fund-level ICCs up to a lag length of eight quarters.
Panel A: Fund Characteristics
p25 p50 p75 x Std
Control variables
Age [years] 4.67 9.50 16.75 13.23 13.15
TNA [$ million] 45.60 181.10 708.90 1, 042.48 3, 523.40
Exp. Ratio [%] 0.98 1.21 1.50 1.30 1.35
Turn. Ratio [%] 34.00 63.00 108.00 87.07 117.60
Flow [%] −3.85 −0.75 3.99 2.22 15.96
I(Team) [%] 0.00 100.00 100.00 59.93 49.00
Fund-level ICC
Analyst [%] 8.24 9.01 9.93 9.15 1.52
EP (2014) [%] 5.09 6.00 7.09 6.28 2.25
RI (2014) [%] 5.06 6.13 7.34 6.33 1.89
HvDZ (2012) [%] 4.75 5.96 7.28 6.15 1.99
Panel B: Pearson and Spearman Correlations between Fund-level ICC
Analyst EP (2014) RI (2014) HvDZ (2012)
Analyst 1.00 0.65 0.63 0.56
EP (2014) 0.58 1.00 0.82 0.78
RI (2014) 0.59 0.79 1.00 0.95
HvDZ (2012) 0.53 0.74 0.93 1.00
Panel C: Autocorrelation of Fund-Level ICC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Analyst 0.83 0.73 0.64 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.50 0.49
EP (2014) 0.85 0.73 0.66 0.61 0.55 0.50 0.47 0.44
RI (2014) 0.92 0.85 0.80 0.77 0.73 0.70 0.67 0.64
HvDZ (2012) 0.93 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.69
positive analyst forecast bias documented in literature [e.g., Lim (2001), Hou, van
Dijk, and Zhang (2012), Mohanram and Gode (2013), and Larocque (2013)], as,
ceteris paribus, higher expected pay-offs in equation (4.1) imply higher ICC. Cross-
sectional variation seems to be considerable, as the interquartile range amounts to
1⁄3 of the median.
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Panel B informs about cross-sectional correlations between different ICC mea-
sures; below the diagonal, it reports Pearson correlation coefficients and Spearman
rank correlation coefficients above.15 Again, a stratification into analyst- and model-
based ICCs is recognizable; whereas correlations with analyst-based ICCs amount
to roughly 0.60, correlations between model-based ICCs are never below 0.79. ICCs
based on RI and HvDZ show the highest correlation (0.93 respectively 0.95), con-
sistent with the high similarity between the underlying models’ inputs.
Finally, Panel C reports autocorrelation coefficients for lags up to eight quarters,
i.e., two years. Although it is lowest for EP-based ICCs, persistence in general
appears to be high, with coefficients of around 0.85 for one lag and still above 0.60
for eight lags in case of the two more complex earnings models and below 0.50
for analyst- and EP-based ICCs. These findings may be relevant for persistence
of possible performance-predicting capabilities of ICCs and, related, turnover in
portfolio-based analyses I turn to in the next section.
4.3 ICC and Fund Performance
This section is concerned with the main research object of this paper, the association
between current ICC and future fund performance. It starts with a portfolio-based
analysis in Section 4.3.1. Thereafter, in Section 4.3.2, it transitions to a regression-
based approach in an aim to control for possible confounding covariates. Within
this framework, Section 4.3.3 studies trading mechanisms related to ICCs.
4.3.1 Portfolio Approach
The portfolio analysis is specified in following manner. Each quarter, funds are
sorted into quintile portfolios, based on their current holdings’ implied ICC. Funds
with the lowest ICC enter portfolio 1 (bottom portfolio), whereas funds with the
highest ICC are allocated to portfolio 5 (top portfolio). Within portfolios, funds
are equally weighted. The five portfolios are held for three months, until the next
holdings’ report date, when the sorting procedure is repeated. The first sort is based
15All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%-level.
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative Fund Returns of ICC-Percentile-Portfolios.
This figure plots cumulative returns of equally-weighted fund-portfolios corresponding to the bottom (magenta) and
top (blue) quintiles of fund-level ICCs. These obtain as value-weighted ICCs of the funds’ portfolios’ constituents,
based on four different proxies for expected earnings, constructed for every fund every quarter as described in Section
4.2.2. Each quarter, funds are sorted based on their holdings’ implied ICC and quintiles are determined. According
to these quintiles, equally-weighted portfolios are built and held over the subsequent quarter.
(a) Analyst (b) EP (2014)
(c) RI (2014) (d) HvDZ (2012)
on holdings in December 1991, the last on holdings in September 2016. This results
into a return series over 300 months (25 years à 12 months) and 98 rebalances.
For a first impression of ICCs’ discriminating capabilities in terms of future fund
performance, Figure 4.2 plots cumulative returns of the bottom (magenta) and top
(blue) portfolio for each of the four earnings specifications. Values are all in the same
ball park; whereas bottom portfolios never show more than a seven-fold increase, top
portfolios reach values twice as large. No strategy, however, seems to be charmed
against recessions. Losses during the 2008/2009-crisis are particularly high. As
ICCs are based on market prices, which during “extraordinary” periods potentially
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are less informative,16 this finding seems to be less of a surprise.
Although Figure 4.2 provides evidence for ICCs being able to discern funds
with high returns from funds with low returns, differences could be attributable
to differences in risk (or factor respectively style exposure), leaving ICCs useless
to discriminate skillful managers. Hence, in addition to returns (Return), besides
style-adjusted returns (SReturn), which obtain by subtracting from a fund’s re-
turn in one month the mean return of all funds in the same investment category
in the same month, I calculate two performance measures based on linear factor
models: Jensen-Alpha (Alpha1), the intercept from a regression of fund-portfolio
excess returns over the risk-fee rate on a proxy for the market factor, and Alpha6,
the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alpha, augmented with the momentum factor
[Barillas and Shanken (2018) and Fama and French (2018)], calculated analogously
to Alpha1.17 While Alpha1 has been documented as the performance measure a
large fraction of investors and hence fund customers, whose investment and divest-
ment decisions determine fund managers’ career outcomes, care for most [Barber,
Huang, and Odean (2016) and Berk and van Binsbergen (2016)], Alpha6 is meant
to capture additional risk or investment styles mutual fund managers follow and
more “sophisticated”, like institutional, investors may “correct” for. Finally, I ad-
just returns as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (DGTW ), where
a stock’s characteristic-adjusted return in a given month is computed by subtract-
ing from its return the return of its benchmark portfolio, which is a value-weighted
portfolio of all stocks in the same size, book-to-market, and one-year past return
quintile. These adjusted returns are then value-weighted at the fund-portfolio-level.
To asses statistical significance for Return, SReturn, and DGTW , their time series
are regressed on a constant; corresponding t-values are based on Newey and West
(1987)-adjusted standard errors accounting for a lag length of twelve months.
16Literature argues mainly based on insights from behavioral finance. For a review, confer
Hirshleifer (2015). E.g., crises are seen as periods with strong negative emotions alleviating existing
biases as well as particularly bad news, to which investors appear to systematically falsely react to
[e.g., Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) and Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)]. Veronesi (1999)
provides a dynamic, rational expectations equilibrium model where prices underreact to good news
in bad times. In all cases, the gap between prices and fundamental values widens.

























Table 4.2: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Portfolio Sorts
This table presents results from portfolio sort analyses of funds’ ICC and future fund performance. For every fund every quarter, a value-weighted ICC of the funds’ portfolios’
constituents, ICC, based on four different proxies for expected earnings, is constructed as described in Section 4.2.2. Each quarter, funds are sorted according to their most recent
ICC. Panel A presents average monthly returns (Return), style-adjusted returns (SReturn), Jensen Alpha (Alpha1), the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alpha, augmented with
the momentum factor (Alpha6), and characteristics adjusted returns (DGTW ), described in Section 4.3.1, of equally-weighted ICC quintile portfolios, stratified according to which
earnings estimates entered the calculation of ICC. Besides quintile porfolio performance measures, the bottom row reports the top-minus-bottom-performance of the corresponding
spread portfolio. Panel B presents factor loadings corresponding to regressions underlying Alpha6. Finally, Panel C reports the top and bottom portfolio performance as well as the
spread portfolio performance for decile portfolios based on no-load fund share classes. Performance measures are reported in % per month. T-statistics [according to Newey and West
(1987), considering 12 monthly lags, in case of Return, SRetun, and DGTW ] are reported in parentheses. Throughout the table, ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Panel A: Performance of Quintile Portfolios.
Analyst EP (2014)
ICC-rank Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
1
0.60∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.07 0.57∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.08
(2.48) (−2.36) (−3.27) (−3.76) (−1.32) (2.28) (−3.34) (−4.72) (−5.63) (−1.46)
2
0.72∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.08∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.02 0.68∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.2∗∗∗ −0.00
(3.12) (−0.33) (−2.02) (−4.18) (−0.51) (2.91) (−0.85) (−2.83) (−5.28) (−0.04)
3
0.77∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.03 −0.14∗∗∗ 0.01 0.77∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.03 −0.15∗∗∗ 0.02
(3.18) (1.20) (−0.6) (−3.97) (0.25) (3.19) (0.96) (−0.55) (−4.21) (0.59)
4
0.85∗∗∗ 0.06 0.03 −0.15∗∗∗ 0.08 0.89∗∗∗ 0.09 0.09 −0.10∗ 0.03
(3.41) (0.93) (0.40) (−2.63) (1.54) (3.65) (1.49) (1.10) (−1.83) (0.63)
5
0.90∗∗∗ 0.07 0.05 −0.14∗ 0.05 0.93∗∗∗ 0.07 0.10 −0.04 0.07
(3.17) (0.89) (0.42) (−1.91) (0.83) (3.37) (0.93) (0.84) (−0.72) (1.33)
5-1
0.29∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.25∗ 0.08 0.12∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗
























Table 4.2: ICC and mutual fund performance: Portfolio Sorts (Continued)
Panel A: Performance of Quintile Portfolios (Continued).
RI (2014) HvDZ (2012)
ICC-rank Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
1
0.55∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.10∗ 0.57∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.09∗
(2.27) (−3.93) (−5.68) (−6.27) (−1.86) (2.24) (−4.30) (−4.98) (−5.66) (−1.68)
2
0.68∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.01 0.69∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.12∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.00
(2.91) (−1.41) (−2.87) (−5.45) (−0.35) (2.92) (−1.44) (−2.69) (−5.39) (−0.08)
3
0.77∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.04 −0.16∗∗∗ 0.01 0.76∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.05 −0.16∗∗∗ −0.00
(3.12) (0.46) (−0.76) (−4.51) (0.13) (3.06) (0.62) (−1.08) (−4.52) (−0.02)
4
0.88∗∗∗ 0.09 0.06 −0.12∗∗ 0.05 0.89∗∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.09 −0.10∗ 0.05
(3.49) (1.48) (0.70) (−2.17) (1.01) (3.66) (1.74) (1.15) (−1.93) (0.94)
5
0.96∗∗∗ 0.13 0.14 −0.01 0.10∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.11 0.13 −0.02 0.09
(3.57) (1.52) (1.26) (−0.18) (1.67) (3.56) (1.41) (1.22) (−0.41) (1.50)
5-1
0.40∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(3.4) (2.70) (3.28) (3.68) (2.80) (3.51) (2.71) (3.54) (3.90) (2.48)
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Table 4.2: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Portfolio Sorts (Continued)
Panel B: Factor Loadings of Regressions underlying Alpha6.
Analyst
ICC-rank Alpha6 βMKT βSMB βHML βRMW βCMA βUMD
1
−0.22∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.00 0.04 0.05∗∗ 0.03 −0.04∗∗∗
(−3.76) (58.39) (−0.13) (1.46) (1.97) (0.83) (−3.06)
2
−0.14∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.02∗∗∗
(−4.18) (104.6) (0.99) (3.07) (6.61) (0.43) (−3.34)
3
−0.14∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.02∗∗∗
(−3.97) (100.44) (9.25) (6.43) (7.71) (1.31) (−3.03)
4
−0.15∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.06∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(−2.63) (63.35) (14.44) (5.28) (6.59) (1.68) (−3.63)
5
−0.14∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.08∗∗∗
(−1.91) (49.42) (21.9) (5.59) (5.94) (0.76) (−5.08)
5-1
0.08 0.04 0.56∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.04∗
(0.83) (1.61) (16.17) (3.24) (3.19) (0.06) (−1.91)
EP (2014)
ICC-rank Alpha6 βMKT βSMB βHML βRMW βCMA βUMD
1
−0.31∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.08∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01
(−5.63) (67.67) (0.38) (0.69) (3.09) (0.15) (1.17)
2
−0.2∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.02∗∗
(−5.28) (93.5) (0.73) (3.47) (6.26) (0.72) (−2.35)
3
−0.15∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.04∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(−4.21) (102.69) (8.31) (6.42) (8.76) (1.87) (−3.69)
4
−0.10∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(−1.83) (66.94) (15.82) (6.34) (6.92) (2.28) (−5.05)
5
−0.04 0.95∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.11∗∗∗
(−0.72) (60.01) (28.43) (6.75) (5.89) (0.94) (−9.7)
5-1
0.26∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.03 −0.13∗∗∗
(3.94) (−3.17) (24.17) (5.25) (2.57) (0.69) (−9.3)
RI (2014)
ICC-rank Alpha6 βMKT βSMB βHML βRMW βCMA βUMD
1
−0.29∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.07∗∗∗ −0.02 0.01
(−6.27) (77.08) (0.56) (0.43) (3.06) (−0.78) (1.35)
2
−0.20∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.02∗∗∗
(−5.45) (95.01) (3.38) (3.29) (7.23) (0.18) (−2.69)
3
−0.16∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.02∗∗∗
(−4.51) (98.8) (11.37) (7.39) (7.63) (1.52) (−3.06)
4
−0.12∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.04 −0.05∗∗∗
(−2.17) (63.98) (14.55) (6.33) (6.75) (1.15) (−4.43)
5
−0.01 0.94∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(−0.18) (53.65) (21.79) (5.71) (5.41) (2.49) (−9.11)
5-1
0.28∗∗∗ −0.03 0.47∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
(3.68) (−1.51) (18.18) (4.59) (2.73) (2.6) (−8.56)
4. Implied Cost of Capital and Mutual Fund Performance 103
Table 4.2: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Portfolio Sorts (Continued)
Panel B: Factor Loadings of Regressions underlying Alpha6 (Continued).
HvDZ (2012)
ICC-rank Alpha6 βMKT βSMB βHML βRMW βCMA βUMD
1
−0.30∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ −0.01 0.08∗∗∗ −0.03 0.02
(−5.66) (68.43) (4.53) (−0.56) (3.08) (−0.88) (1.43)
2
−0.21∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.02∗∗
(−5.39) (92.29) (5.17) (3.49) (7.2) (0.18) (−2.5)
3
−0.16∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.04∗∗∗
(−4.52) (100.78) (9.81) (6.97) (8.01) (1.05) (−5.08)
4
−0.10∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(−1.93) (68.62) (14.35) (6.37) (7.31) (2.33) (−4.49)
5
−0.02 0.95∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(−0.41) (59.97) (22.2) (7.64) (5.24) (2.48) (−9.26)
5-1
0.28∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(3.9) (−2.21) (14.74) (6.66) (1.97) (2.69) (−8.64)
Table 4.2, Panel A, reports performance measures for each of the five quintile
portfolios separately as well as the hypothetical top-minus-bottom-portfolio short
in the bottom and long in the top portfolio. Consistent with previous research on
ICC at the stock-level, spreads are highest and always statistically significant at the
1%-level for ICCs based on mechanical earnings forecasts. Alphas and returns are
approximately of same magnitude (30 to 40 basis points per month), indicating that
spread returns do not simply originate from factor exposure. Values for DGTW ,
which are based on a fund’s holdings, are, with on average 15 basis points, the
lowest. An adjustment of returns for which investment category the funds belong to
reduces the spread by 10 basis points, leaving it still statistically significant, though.
The spread, however, does not inform about general discriminating power of
ICCs. Even absent a steady increase in performance from bottom to top portfolios,
it could potentially be significant. Hence, Panel A also reports performance of the
respective quintile portfolios. For illustration, Figure 4.3 plots the five performance
measures for all quintile portfolios based on ICCs derived from earnings forecasts ac-
cording to the model by HvDZ. It shows that for all measures, performance increases
from bottom to top portfolio. Style or factor adjusted measures are all (statistically
significant) below zero in the lower part and increase to values of around 10 basis
points for SReturn, Alpha1, and DGTW , respectively -2 basis points for Alpha6.
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Table 4.2: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Portfolio Sorts (Continued)
Panel C: Performance of Decile Portfolios.
Analyst
ICC-rank Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
1
0.61∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.23∗∗ 0.00 −0.34
(2.08) (−2.21) (−2.09) (0.01) (−1.36)
10
1.07∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗
(3.9) (2.29) (2.3) (3.06) (2.07)
10-1
0.47∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.50∗
(3.46) (3.08) (3.50) (2.22) (1.95)
EP (2014)
ICC-rank Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
1
0.62∗∗ −0.14∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.13 −0.13∗
(2.57) (−2.50) (−3.12) (−0.93) (−1.70)
10
1.06∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.17∗∗
(3.76) (2.02) (2.06) (2.46) (2.23)
10-1
0.43∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(2.92) (3.07) (3.82) (2.20) (2.79)
RI (2014)
ICC-rank Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
1
0.58 −0.14∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.10 −0.32
(1.60) (−2.19) (−3.22) (−0.72) (−1.58)
10
1.01∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.37∗∗
(3.22) (2.04) (2.4) (2.49) (2.03)
10-1
0.42∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(2.17) (2.79) (4.31) (2.07) (2.63)
HvDZ (2012)
ICC-rank Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
1
0.64∗∗ −0.18∗ −0.23 −0.26∗ −0.05
(2.18) (−1.76) (−1.54) (−1.68) (−0.35)
10
1.05∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(3.82) (2.02) (2.11) (1.75) (3.87)
10-1
0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(3.10) (2.69) (3.92) (2.59) (1.97)
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Figure 4.3: Average Monthly Performance of ICC-Percentile-Portfolios.
This figure plots, for all quintile portfolios indicated on the x-axis, average performance measures in % per month,
denoted on the y-axis, corresponding to the analysis in Table 4.2, Panel A, for ICCs derived from earnings forecasts
according to HvDZ (2012). In particular, for every fund every quarter, a value-weighted ICC of the funds’ portfolios’
constituents, based on proxies for expected earnings following HvDZ (2012), is constructed as described in Section
4.2.2. Each quarter, funds are sorted based on their holdings’ implied ICC and quintiles are determined. According
to these quintiles, equally-weighted portfolios are built and held over the subsequent quarter. Performance measures
include average monthly returns (Return), style-adjusted returns (SReturn), Jensen Alpha (Alpha1), the Fama and
French (2015) 5-factor alpha, augmented with the momentum factor (Alpha6), and characteristics adjusted returns
(DGTW ), described in Section 4.3.1.
(a) Return (b) SReturn
(c) Alpha1 (d) Alpha6
(e) DGTW
This could be interpreted as evidence that ICCs do not simply show extreme results
at the tails but no (or even perverse) discriminating power in-between.
To shed light on which factor tilts are associated with which ICC strategy, Panel
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B tabulates the whole set of coefficients in regressions underlying Alpha6, βMKT ,
βSMB, βHML, βRMW , βCMA, and βUMD, i.e., loadings corresponding to the mar-
ket, small-minus-big (size), high-minus-low (value), robust-minus-weak (profitabil-
ity), conservative-minus-aggressive (investment), and up-minus-down (momentum)
factor-mimicking portfolio, respectively. In comparison to funds with low ICCs,
high-ICC funds show larger exposure to firms which behave like small value-firms
with high operating profitability; in addition, they show a negative exposure to the
momentum portfolio. Value and profitability tilts are consistent with a fundamen-
tal investment approach, which screens firms with “cheap” valuations in relation
to their profitability prospects. However, size and momentum exposures could also
simply reflect how ICCs are calculated. If the market value of equity is relatively
low, which tends to be the case for small firms or firms with recent losses in terms of
stock returns, ceteris paribus, the larger the ICC needed to equate it to discounted
expected pay-offs. Further, high current profitability, considering the regressors in
earnings regression equations, tends to translate into comparably high future earn-
ings, which, ceteris paribus, also increase a firm’s ICC.
Cut-offs based on quintiles reveal a certain sorting pattern. However, only re-
turns, but none of the top portfolios’ risk- or style-adjusted performance measures,
are statistically significant different from zero, necessary for a feasible investment
approach. Additionally, considering portfolio turnover (not reported), on average
70% of the funds remain in the top portfolio from one period to the next (in line
with autocorrelations reported in Table 4.1, Panel B), such that investors potentially
need to pay back-end and front-end loads concerning the remnant 30%. Further,
provided evidence in previous research for managers able to beat their benchmark
after costs being scarce, 20%-percentiles might simply be too coarse.
In an aim to address these issues, the sorting-exercise, now based on decile port-
folios, is repeated for no-load share classes. Panel C reports performance measures
for bottom and top as well as corresponding spread portfolios. In general, spreads in-
crease; further, investors could realize a return of 1% per month. More importantly,
top portfolios now exhibit statistically significant risk respectively style adjusted
performance measures. Alphas range between 19 basis points and 37 basis points,
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statistically significant at the 5%-level, on average. Hence, feasible investments into
mutual funds with high ICC had led to entirely net-of-cost alphas for investors free
from any assumptions on trading costs, not readily reconstructed for analyses at the
stock-level.
4.3.2 Regression Analysis
Whereas portfolio sorts seem to provide first evidence for a positive association
between current ICC and future fund performance, possibilities to control for con-
founding characteristics at the fund level are limited. Hence, for the rest of the
paper, I turn towards panel regressions at the fund-quarter-level of the form
yf,t+1 = β · ICCf,t + ~γ · ~cf,t +~ι · ~ϕ+ εf,t+1, (4.3)
where yf,t+1 denotes one of the five performance measures of fund f in quarter
t + 1.18 ICCf,t is a fund’s quarterly
19 ICC at time time t, calculated as described
in Section 4.2.2. ~γ is the vector of coefficients associated with fund-level covariates,
which are described in Section 4.2.3 respectively Table 4.1 and stacked into vector
~cf,t. Thereby, following literature, Age and TNA are log-transformed to reduce
skewness. The specification of fixed effects is captured by ~ϕ, which denotes a vector
of length h, where h equals the number of fixed effects included in the model. ~ι is
the corresponding vector of ones and hence also of length h. εf,t+1 denotes the error
term, while · symbolizes the scalar product. The main variable of interest is β, the
coefficient of a fund’s ICC, where a positive coefficient were consistent with ICCs
being able to positively predict future performance.
Table 4.3 shows results for regression (4.3), estimated with three different spec-
ifications of fixed effects, separately for each of the four earnings specifications.
Throughout, given a “large” N (3,699) relative to a “small” T (100), standard er-
18In quarterly regressions, Alpha1 and Alpha6 are obtained as follows. First, for a given fund,
monthly alphas are computed as the difference between actual returns and expected return, esti-
mated using factor loadings computed from a regression of the preceding 36 monthly excess returns
on a constant and proxies for the respective factor(s). Second, these monthly alphas are aggregated
to the quarterly level using compounding.



























Table 4.3: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Panel Regressions
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate future, quarterly fund performance with most recent fund-level ICC. The analysis is performed at the fund-quarter-
level. The five analyzed performance measures are return (Return), style-adjusted return (SReturn), calculated by subtracting from the raw return of a fund the mean raw return of
funds with the same investment objective, Jensen-Alpha (Alpha1) and the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alpha, augmented with the momentum factor (Alpha6), computed for a
given fund each month as the difference between the actual return minus the expected return, estimated using factor loadings computed from a regression of the preceding 36 monthly
excess returns returns on the one respectively six risk factor(s), as well as characteristic-adjusted returns (DGTW ), estimated as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997),
where a stock’s characteristic-adjusted return in a given month is computed by subtracting from its return the return of the benchmark portfolio to which that particular stock belongs.
These adjusted returns are then value-weighted at the fund-portfolio-level. Monthly measures are aggregated to the quarterly level using compounding. The main independent variable
is ICC; for every fund every quarter, a value-weighted ICC of the funds’ portfolios’ constituents, based on four different proxies for expected earnings, is constructed as described in
Section 4.2.2. Controls are described in Table 4.1. Regressions are run with time and style [columns (1) to (5)], time-by-style [columns (6) to (10)], and time-by-style and fund fixed
effects (FE) [columns (11) to (15)], respectively. The four panels correspond to the four earnings specifications used to obtain stock-level ICCs. T-statistics, based on standard errors
























Table 4.3: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Panel Regressions (Continued)
Analyst
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
ICC 2.0715∗∗∗ 1.5225∗∗∗ 1.4616 0.2157∗ 0.4956∗∗∗ 1.2985∗∗∗ 1.1014∗∗∗ 0.7188∗∗∗ 0.3709∗∗∗ 0.4933∗∗∗ 1.6527∗∗∗ 1.4006∗∗∗ 1.2999∗∗∗ 0.8570∗∗∗ 0.7004∗∗∗
(18.17) (14.24) (14.25) (1.88) (4.21) (11.52) (9.83) (6.40) (2.60) (3.63) (9.72) (8.26) (6.76) (4.03) (3.38)
Log(Age) −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0005∗∗ −0.0005∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0006 −0.0014∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
(−1.37) (−0.99) (−2.34) (−2.35) (0.57) (−4.07) (−3.28) (−3.32) (−2.84) (−0.56) (0.27) (−0.16) (−0.83) (−1.90) (3.22)
Log(TNA) −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗
(−5.37) (−6.29) (−3.84) (−2.17) (−5.22) (−3.38) (−4.56) (−1.87) (−1.79) (−4.14) (−27.10) (−26.73) (−23.41) (−18.89) (−19.65)
Exp. Ratio −0.3043∗∗∗ −0.2869∗∗∗ −0.2996∗∗∗ −0.2579∗∗∗ −0.0254 −0.2889∗∗∗ −0.2758∗∗∗ −0.2877∗∗∗ −0.2562∗∗∗ −0.0190 −0.2157∗∗∗ −0.2070∗∗∗ −0.2222∗∗∗ −0.2691∗∗∗ −0.0107
(−14.44) (−17.42) (−12.19) (−17.08) (−0.68) (−16.25) (−19.18) (−12.21) (−16.43) (−0.50) (−7.13) (−5.21) (−11.57) (−7.91) (−0.25)
Turn. Ratio −0.0007∗∗ −0.0007∗∗ −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗ −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0004
(−2.35) (−2.30) (−2.68) (−2.98) (−3.58) (−2.68) (−2.34) (−3.65) (−3.24) (−3.23) (0.75) (0.78) (−1.43) (−1.01) (−1.08)
Flow −0.0000∗∗ 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000∗∗ 0.0000
(−2.05) (0.49) (−1.48) (−0.08) (−1.52) (−0.86) (0.10) (−1.02) (−1.23) (−0.35) (0.16) (2.09) (−0.79) (−2.17) (0.18)
I(Team) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 −0.0004 −0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004∗ −0.0003 −0.0001 0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0006∗
(0.61) (0.78) (0.02) (−1.57) (−0.79) (0.42) (0.54) (−0.26) (−1.66) (−1.36) (−0.36) (0.63) (−0.86) (−0.70) (−1.77)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Time×Style FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 124,371 124,371 114,618 114,618 118,823 124,371 124,371 114,618 114,618 118,823 124,371 124,371 114,618 114,618 118,823
Adj. R2 0.785 0.014 0.110 0.081 0.111 0.865 0.233 0.426 0.166 0.270 0.869 0.251 0.441 0.184 0.282
EP (2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
ICC 1.0728∗∗∗ 0.6747∗∗∗ 0.9108∗∗∗ 0.4925∗∗∗ 0.0888 0.6128∗∗∗ 0.5551∗∗∗ 0.5712∗∗∗ 0.6413∗∗∗ 0.2290 1.0707∗∗∗ 0.9715∗∗∗ 1.1198∗∗∗ 1.0451∗∗∗ 0.6935∗∗
(6.41) (5.65) (6.20) (4.87) (0.36) (4.60) (4.46) (4.83) (4.95) (0.70) (5.95) (5.70) (6.13) (6.22) (2.06)
Log(Age) −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0005∗∗ −0.0005∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 −0.0005 −0.0014∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
(−1.18) (−0.84) (−2.32) (−2.44) (0.71) (−4.07) (−3.31) (−3.49) (−3.11) (−0.45) (0.52) (0.04) (−0.70) (−1.88) (3.32)
Log(TNA) −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗
(−4.95) (−6.23) (−3.22) (−1.32) (−4.71) (−2.92) (−4.18) (−1.11) (−0.76) (−3.20) (−26.64) (−26.43) (−22.79) (−17.79) (−17.25)
Exp. Ratio −0.3120∗∗∗ −0.2881∗∗∗ −0.3009∗∗∗ −0.2611∗∗∗ −0.0313 −0.2908∗∗∗ −0.2801∗∗∗ −0.2852∗∗∗ −0.2642∗∗∗ −0.0305 −0.2261∗∗∗ −0.2186∗∗∗ −0.2246∗∗∗ −0.2756∗∗∗ −0.0206
(−12.18) (−18.11) (−11.57) (−20.34) (−0.77) (−14.90) (−18.52) (−13.34) (−23.49) (−0.67) (−13.02) (−9.20) (−13.28) (−11.59) (−0.40)
Turn. Ratio −0.0006∗ −0.0006∗ −0.0007∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗ −0.0005∗∗ −0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0003 −0.0006∗ −0.0004 −0.0004
(−1.83) (−1.89) (−2.15) (−2.86) (−3.44) (−2.39) (−2.04) (−3.33) (−2.98) (−3.07) (0.55) (0.59) (−1.66) (−1.23) (−1.07)
Flow −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000∗ −0.0000 −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000∗ −0.0000 −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000
(−3.24) (−1.11) (−2.74) (−0.75) (−1.45) (−1.77) (−0.67) (−2.10) (−2.23) (−0.58) (−0.34) (1.78) (−1.35) (−2.56) (−0.03)
I(Team) 0.0000 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0003 0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0006∗
(0.13) (0.34) (−0.32) (−1.46) (−1.10) (0.07) (0.26) (−0.38) (−1.57) (−1.52) (−0.70) (0.33) (−1.13) (−0.87) (−1.84)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Time×Style FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 124,429 124,429 114,663 114,663 118,868 124,429 124,429 114,663 114,663 118,868 124,429 124,429 114,663 114,663 118,868
























Table 4.3: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Panel Regressions (Continued)
RI (2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
ICC 1.8835∗∗∗ 1.3627∗∗∗ 1.6200∗∗∗ 0.5290∗∗∗ 0.4765∗∗∗ 1.2893∗∗∗ 1.2117∗∗∗ 0.8511∗∗∗ 0.6960∗∗∗ 0.6436∗∗∗ 1.7995∗∗∗ 1.6212∗∗∗ 1.3281∗∗∗ 1.1927∗∗∗ 0.9658∗∗∗
(19.86) (14.64) (19.31) (5.46) (4.69) (14.32) (12.97) (9.90) (6.15) (5.27) (13.12) (10.83) (9.59) (6.44) (5.27)
Log(Age) −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004∗ −0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0014∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
(−0.47) (−0.30) (−1.76) (−2.15) (0.83) (−3.70) (−2.99) (−3.23) (−2.77) (−0.40) (0.39) (−0.09) (−0.73) (−1.89) (3.27)
Log(TNA) −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0002∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0052∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗
(−6.06) (−6.90) (−4.24) (−2.06) (−5.23) (−3.63) (−4.84) (−1.93) (−1.78) (−4.06) (−26.71) (−26.41) (−22.97) (−18.62) (−18.66)
Exp. Ratio −0.3025∗∗∗ −0.2849∗∗∗ −0.2939∗∗∗ −0.2516∗∗∗ −0.0343 −0.2876∗∗∗ −0.2782∗∗∗ −0.2779∗∗∗ −0.2518∗∗∗ −0.0308 −0.2240∗∗∗ −0.2167∗∗∗ −0.2189∗∗∗ −0.2697∗∗∗ −0.0180
(−14.90) (−20.29) (−13.41) (−14.49) (−0.80) (−16.02) (−20.13) (−16.12) (−15.71) (−0.68) (−12.43) (−8.90) (−12.24) (−9.67) (−0.37)
Turn. Ratio −0.0005 −0.0005∗ −0.0006∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗ −0.0004∗ −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0004
(−1.65) (−1.73) (−2.03) (−2.74) (−3.42) (−2.12) (−1.77) (−3.22) (−2.86) (−2.90) (1.08) (1.05) (−1.30) (−0.86) (−1.18)
Flow −0.0000∗∗ 0.0000 −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000∗ −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000∗∗ 0.0000
(−2.45) (0.09) (−2.04) (−0.15) (−1.68) (−1.16) (−0.13) (−1.21) (−1.47) (−0.46) (0.27) (2.17) (−0.89) (−2.11) (0.25)
I(Team) 0.0001 0.0002 −0.0000 −0.0004 −0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0002 0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0006∗
(0.31) (0.55) (−0.11) (−1.48) (−0.81) (0.28) (0.47) (−0.31) (−1.62) (−1.27) (−0.48) (0.52) (−1.01) (−0.77) (−1.75)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Time×Style FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 124,399 124,399 114,635 114,635 118,848 124,399 124,399 114,635 114,635 118,848 124,399 124,399 114,635 114,635 118,848
Adj. R2 0.785 0.014 0.113 0.082 0.110 0.865 0.234 0.426 0.167 0.268 0.869 0.251 0.441 0.185 0.280
HvDZ (2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
ICC 1.3982∗∗∗ 1.0384∗∗∗ 1.3457∗∗∗ 0.4581∗∗∗ 0.3893∗∗∗ 0.8791∗∗∗ 0.8380∗∗∗ 0.7186∗∗∗ 0.5783∗∗∗ 0.4673∗∗∗ 1.3443∗∗∗ 1.2327∗∗∗ 1.1755∗∗∗ 1.0208∗∗∗ 0.7308∗∗∗
(16.82) (12.55) (18.25) (5.39) (4.53) (11.46) (10.18) (9.64) (5.98) (4.82) (11.85) (10.51) (8.96) (6.27) (5.02)
Log(Age) −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0005∗∗ −0.0004∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0003 −0.0000 −0.0005 −0.0013∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
(−0.83) (−0.57) (−2.03) (−2.26) (0.72) (−3.81) (−3.08) (−3.29) (−2.81) (−0.46) (0.47) (−0.02) (−0.68) (−1.83) (3.32)
Log(TNA) −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0001 −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗
(−5.76) (−6.61) (−3.80) (−1.89) (−5.10) (−3.40) (−4.60) (−1.67) (−1.55) (−3.92) (−27.13) (−26.80) (−23.25) (−18.73) (−19.20)
Exp. Ratio −0.2969∗∗∗ −0.2812∗∗∗ −0.2913∗∗∗ −0.2512∗∗∗ −0.0337 −0.2835∗∗∗ −0.2742∗∗∗ −0.2773∗∗∗ −0.2511∗∗∗ −0.0294 −0.2152∗∗∗ −0.2086∗∗∗ −0.2126∗∗∗ −0.2640∗∗∗ −0.0143
(−15.95) (−20.63) (−13.61) (−14.35) (−0.78) (−17.46) (−21.40) (−16.04) (−15.33) (−0.65) (−8.77) (−6.57) (−10.42) (−7.87) (−0.32)
Turn. Ratio −0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0006∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗ −0.0005∗ −0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 −0.0006∗ −0.0004 −0.0004
(−1.47) (−1.60) (−1.85) (−2.78) (−3.30) (−2.14) (−1.78) (−3.25) (−2.94) (−2.84) (0.72) (0.74) (−1.65) (−1.23) (−1.07)
Flow −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000∗ −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗∗ −0.0000 −0.0000∗ 0.0000
(−2.55) (−0.38) (−2.21) (−0.30) (−1.77) (−1.29) (−0.32) (−1.54) (−1.59) (−0.54) (0.77) (2.53) (−0.51) (−1.83) (0.45)
I(Team) 0.0000 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0004∗ −0.0003 −0.0002 0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0006∗
(0.12) (0.39) (−0.20) (−1.53) (−0.86) (0.11) (0.31) (−0.34) (−1.65) (−1.35) (−0.61) (0.41) (−1.07) (−0.84) (−1.84)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Time×Style FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 124,396 124,396 114,635 114,635 118,842 124,396 124,396 114,635 114,635 118,842 124,396 124,396 114,635 114,635 118,842
Adj. R2 0.784 0.012 0.111 0.082 0.111 0.865 0.232 0.426 0.167 0.270 0.868 0.250 0.440 0.184 0.281
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rors are clustered at the fund level [Petersen (2009)]. The first five columns report
results of regressions with time and style fixed effects to account for common time
variant factors and commonalities within one style. In the next five columns, time
and style fixed effects are interacted to control for commonality within time-style-
combinations. The addition of fund fixed effects in the last five columns is meant
to capture the impact of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between funds;
this constitutes the main specification for the rest of the paper. Results are in line
with the observations from the portfolio-sort analysis and uniform across different
specifications of fixed effects. In general, ICCs are statistically significantly asso-
ciated with future fund performance at the 1%-level. With respect to economic
interpretation of coefficients, an increase in quarterly ICC by one percentage point,
on average, was associated with an increase in future quarterly fund performance
by one percentage point, irrespective of the specific performance measure. This cor-
roborates the notion that the positive correlation between current ICCs and future
fund performance does not seem to be attributable to effects specific to one time,
style, or fund respectively characteristics at the fund-level.
With respect to the latter, Table 4.4 adds four additional variables shown to be
associated with fund performance.20 Besides active share (ActShare)21 [Cremers
and Petajisto (2009) and Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2013)], a measure for
how much a fund deviates from its benchmark, it adds the industry concentration
index (ICI) by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), a proxy for how concentrated
a fund’s holdings are within one industry relative to the market, and return gap
(RetGap) [Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008)], aimed to quantify “unobserved
actions” of mutual fund managers, calculated as the difference between actual gross
fund returns and returns implied by the fund’s latest portfolio disclosure. Finally, it
adds the respective performance measure over the past quarter (LaggedPerf). In
addition, I replace fund with fund-by-manager fixed effects. The intuition is that if
high-ICC strategies were indeed able to translate into higher future fund perfor-
20Due to data limitations - the sample size drops by 4⁄5 - this specification is merely used as
an additional analyses of whether the effect of ICCs is subsumed by different variables instead of
being used as the main specification.
























Table 4.4: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Subsumption Test
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions akin to Table 4.3, that relate future, quarterly fund performance with most recent fund-level ICC. The analysis is performed at the fund-quarter-level.
The five analyzed performance measures are return (Return), style-adjusted return (SReturn), calculated by subtracting from the raw return of a fund the mean raw return of funds with the same investment
objective, Jensen-Alpha (Alpha1) and the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alpha, augmented with the momentum factor (Alpha6), computed for a given fund each month as the difference between the
actual return minus the expected return, estimated using factor loadings computed from a regression of the preceding 36 monthly excess returns returns on the one respectively six risk factor(s), as well as
characteristic-adjusted returns (DGTW ), estimated as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), where a stock’s characteristic-adjusted return in a given month is computed by subtracting from its
return the return of the benchmark portfolio to which that particular stock belongs. These adjusted returns are then value-weighted at the fund-portfolio-level. Monthly measures are aggregated to the quarterly
level using compounding. The main independent variable is ICC; for every fund every quarter, a value-weighted ICC of the funds’ portfolios’ constituents, based on four different proxies for expected earnings,
is constructed as described in Section 4.2.2. In relation to Table 4.3, active share (ActShare) as per Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2013), the industry concentration
index (ICI) by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), the return gap (RetGap) in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008), and the lagged, respective performance measure (LaggedPerf) are added as regressors.
Controls are described in Table 4.1. Regressions are run with time-by-style and fund-by-manager fixed effects (FE), for each of the four earnings specifications used to obtain stock-level ICCs separately.
T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the fund level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Analyst EP (2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
ICC 2.6604∗∗∗ 2.5550∗∗∗ 2.0001∗∗∗ 1.3484∗∗∗ 1.5171∗∗∗ 1.5251∗∗∗ 1.4000∗∗∗ 1.4995∗∗∗ 1.9167∗∗∗ 0.8574∗∗∗
(8.44) (8.09) (5.98) (4.12) (4.85) (5.38) (4.77) (5.00) (6.40) (3.36)
ActShare 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗ 0.0109∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗
(3.78) (3.46) (4.05) (2.43) (2.56) (4.94) (4.61) (4.70) (2.28) (3.24)
ICI −0.0166∗∗∗ −0.0196∗∗∗ −0.0103∗ −0.0054 −0.0091 −0.0214∗∗∗ −0.0240∗∗∗ −0.0138∗∗ −0.0076 −0.0118∗∗
(−3.02) (−3.33) (−1.76) (−0.90) (−1.60) (−3.71) (−3.94) (−2.28) (−1.24) (−2.02)
RetGap 0.0098 −0.0035 −0.0091 −0.0226 0.0392∗ 0.0166 0.0032 −0.0048 −0.0234 0.0390∗
(0.44) (−0.16) (−0.43) (−0.82) (1.79) (0.75) (0.14) (−0.23) (−0.85) (1.79)
LaggedPerf 0.1605∗∗∗ 0.1901∗∗∗ 0.1525∗∗∗ −0.0147 0.0790∗∗∗ 0.1495∗∗∗ 0.1800∗∗∗ 0.1454∗∗∗ −0.0142 0.0741∗∗∗
(13.45) (17.05) (11.84) (−0.94) (5.64) (12.80) (16.25) (11.31) (−0.92) (5.36)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund×Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,668 25,668 24,744 24,744 25,185 25,668 25,668 24,744 24,744 25,185
Adj. R2 0.830 0.361 0.443 0.181 0.292 0.829 0.357 0.443 0.186 0.291
RI (2014) HvDZ (2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
ICC 1.8381∗∗∗ 1.7737∗∗∗ 1.3603∗∗∗ 1.5988∗∗∗ 0.8105∗∗∗ 1.4636∗∗∗ 1.4422∗∗∗ 1.2160∗∗∗ 1.3543∗∗∗ 0.5570∗∗
(6.72) (6.57) (4.96) (5.11) (3.22) (5.88) (5.94) (4.90) (5.36) (2.43)
ActShare 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗
(4.74) (4.39) (4.79) (2.50) (3.31) (5.54) (5.15) (5.28) (3.08) (3.73)
ICI −0.0231∗∗∗ −0.0258∗∗∗ −0.0149∗∗ −0.0089 −0.0128∗∗ −0.0235∗∗∗ −0.0263∗∗∗ −0.0154∗∗ −0.0094 −0.0130∗∗
(−3.99) (−4.21) (−2.47) (−1.43) (−2.19) (−4.09) (−4.29) (−2.54) (−1.52) (−2.20)
RetGap 0.0149 0.0012 −0.0048 −0.0236 0.0402∗ 0.0163 0.0025 −0.0040 −0.0223 0.0403∗
(0.68) (0.06) (−0.23) (−0.86) (1.84) (0.75) (0.11) (−0.19) (−0.81) (1.85)
LaggedPerf 0.1540∗∗∗ 0.1845∗∗∗ 0.1477∗∗∗ −0.0109 0.0752∗∗∗ 0.1541∗∗∗ 0.1847∗∗∗ 0.1478∗∗∗ −0.0115 0.0742∗∗∗
(13.20) (16.73) (11.45) (−0.70) (5.33) (13.21) (16.86) (11.66) (−0.74) (5.29)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund×Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,661 25,661 24,738 24,738 25,179 25,661 25,661 24,738 24,738 25,179
Adj. R2 0.830 0.358 0.441 0.183 0.290 0.830 0.357 0.441 0.182 0.290
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mance, skilled managers might be more likely to choose them. Simultaneously,
skilled managers, following an assortative matching rationale,22 potentially are
matched to specific funds with higher resources. Holding those matches constant,
I aim to control for endogeneity at the time-invariant manager-skill- and manager-
fund-match-level. Results indicate, that none of the considered aspects is able to
explain the positive association of current ICCs with future fund performance, sug-
gesting that a high-ICC strategy per se can help funds to achieve better performance.
Combining the positive association between future fund performance and current
ICC on the one hand with its high autocorrelation and moderate turnover in portfolio
sorts on the other suggests that correlation with performance might persist. That
is, the association of ICCs with performance were not limited to next quarter’s
value, but to performance further afar. To test this hypothesis, I relate semi-annual,
annual, and biennial future performance with current, correspondingly scaled ICC in
regression (4.3). To avoid using overlapping observations and more closely resemble
investment decisions of investors,23 I consider ICCs as of December; semi-annual
regressions allow to also use ICCs derived from holdings in June.
Table 4.5 documents results of corresponding regressions. While ICCs largely re-
main statistically significant for all maturities, consistent with strong, yet decreasing
autocorrelation in Table 4.1, both economic significance, measured by the size of co-
efficients, and statistical significance decrease with increasing horizon. For example,
the coefficients in regressions related to Alpha6 for HvDZ-based ICCs decrease from
approximately 0.8, statistically significant at the 1%-level, to 0.2, statistically signif-
icant at the 10%-level. Alpha6 is also the measure with lowest signs of persistence;
while significant in semi-annual and annual regressions, it is not significantly related
to ICCs in biennial regressions for EP- and RI-based earnings forecasts. This is
in line with factor loadings in Table 4.2, which seem to explain part of the return
accruing to ICC-based strategies.
Results are consistent with the notion that ICCs as a persistence characteristic
22For studies on assignment models, confer Mayer (1960), Sattinger (1975, 1993), Rosen (1982),
Gabaix and Landier (2008), and Terviö (2008).
23Several studies argue that investors primarily make their investment decisions based on cal-
endar year returns, confer, e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and
























Table 4.5: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Persistence
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate future, quarterly fund-portfolio performance with most recent fund-level ICC. The analysis is performed at the
fund-semi-annual-, fund-annual- and fund-biannual-level. The five analyzed performance measures are return (Return), style-adjusted return (SReturn), calculated by subtracting
from the raw return of a fund the mean raw return of funds with the same investment objective, Jensen-Alpha (Alpha1) and the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor alpha, augmented
with the momentum factor (Alpha6), computed for a given fund each month as the difference between the actual return minus the expected return, estimated using factor loadings
computed from a regression of the preceding 36 monthly excess returns returns on the one respectively six risk factor(s), as well as characteristic-adjusted returns (DGTW ), estimated
as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), where a stock’s characteristic-adjusted return in a given month is computed by subtracting from its return the return of the
benchmark portfolio to which that particular stock belongs. These adjusted returns are then value-weighted at the fund-portfolio-level. Monthly measures are aggregated to the
respective time-level using compounding. In particular, for each performance measure, the first columns correspond to semi-annual, the second columns to annual, and the third
columns to biannual values of the respective performance measures. The main independent variable is ICC; for every fund every quarter, a value-weighted ICC of the funds’ portfolios’
constituents, based on four different proxies for expected earnings, is constructed as described in Section 4.2.2. ICCs are scaled to match the respective time horizon. Controls are
described in Table 4.1. Regressions are run with time-by-style and fund fixed effects (FE), for each of the four earnings specifications used to obtain stock-level ICCs separately.

























Table 4.5: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Persistence (Continued)
Analyst
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
ICC 1.4296∗∗∗ 1.3464∗∗∗ 1.4351∗∗∗ 1.2638∗∗∗ 1.0832∗∗∗ 1.2203∗∗∗ 1.4274∗∗∗ 0.8486∗∗∗ 1.1244∗∗∗ 0.9238∗∗∗ 0.3717∗∗∗ 0.5196∗∗∗ 0.7900∗∗∗ 0.7764∗∗∗ 0.7876∗∗∗
(5.80) (5.51) (7.96) (5.49) (5.26) (8.47) (10.63) (4.92) (8.02) (5.90) (2.86) (3.82) (6.46) (6.24) (6.37)
Log(Age) −0.0005 0.0024 0.0052 −0.0010 0.0018 0.0099 −0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0015 −0.0077∗∗∗ −0.0030 0.0009 0.0026∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗
(−0.38) (0.92) (0.69) (−0.83) (0.75) (1.50) (−5.05) (0.05) (−0.22) (−4.91) (−1.04) (0.14) (2.33) (3.53) (2.20)
Log(TNA) −0.0109∗∗∗ −0.0230∗∗∗ −0.0462∗∗∗ −0.0105∗∗∗ −0.0215∗∗∗ −0.0431∗∗∗ −0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0365∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0125∗∗∗ −0.0277∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0135∗∗∗ −0.0280∗∗∗
(−25.91) (−23.84) (−22.58) (−25.99) (−24.30) (−23.68) (−9.15) (−22.37) (−21.11) (−6.66) (−18.25) (−16.62) (−19.56) (−19.68) (−18.02)
Exp. Ratio −0.4029∗∗∗ −0.5965∗∗∗ −0.8918∗∗∗ −0.3959∗∗∗ −0.5625∗∗∗ −0.7957∗∗∗ −0.3403∗∗∗ −0.4704∗∗∗ −0.7026∗∗∗ −0.3494∗∗∗ −0.6585∗∗∗ −0.6834∗∗∗ 0.0699∗∗∗ 0.1109∗∗∗ −1.5375∗∗∗
(−10.32) (−8.13) (−5.05) (−10.69) (−7.57) (−4.14) (−12.10) (−6.37) (−6.39) (−9.66) (−8.08) (−5.59) (2.89) (3.55) (−5.40)
Turn. Ratio 0.0016∗∗ 0.0022 0.0054∗∗ 0.0016∗ 0.0031 0.0049∗ −0.0005 −0.0011 0.0003 −0.0007 −0.0008 −0.0012 −0.0015∗∗ −0.0024∗ −0.0062∗∗
(1.97) (1.08) (1.96) (1.81) (1.43) (1.95) (−0.85) (−1.25) (0.22) (−1.23) (−0.82) (−0.72) (−2.42) (−1.82) (−1.97)
Flow 0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 0.0000∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000
(3.06) (−3.55) (−0.23) (1.81) (−4.37) (1.20) (1.47) (−1.10) (−0.73) (4.24) (−0.40) (0.47) (1.92) (3.13) (0.12)
I(Team) −0.0003 −0.0012 −0.0068∗ 0.0005 −0.0000 −0.0052 −0.0013∗ −0.0023 −0.0050 −0.0013∗ −0.0012 −0.0034 −0.0011∗ −0.0016 −0.0019
(−0.47) (−0.75) (−1.88) (0.71) (−0.01) (−1.61) (−1.70) (−1.48) (−1.38) (−1.82) (−0.78) (−1.04) (−1.73) (−1.23) (−0.61)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 60,014 29,462 12,182 60,014 29,462 12,182 54,472 27,592 12,175 54,472 27,592 12,175 56,159 26,476 10,208
Adj. R2 0.837 0.843 0.886 0.292 0.296 0.316 0.449 0.482 0.517 0.159 0.204 0.174 0.316 0.330 0.341
EP (2014)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
ICC 0.9516∗∗∗ 0.9972∗∗∗ 0.7169∗∗∗ 0.9363∗∗∗ 0.9280∗∗∗ 0.7555∗∗∗ 0.9927∗∗∗ 0.5812∗∗∗ 0.1974 0.6691∗∗∗ 0.3605∗∗∗ 0.2174 0.6366∗∗∗ 0.7890∗∗∗ 0.4877∗∗∗
(7.88) (5.82) (4.22) (7.87) (6.30) (5.81) (7.62) (3.94) (1.58) (4.97) (2.80) (1.62) (5.99) (6.12) (5.05)
Log(Age) −0.0001 0.0028 0.0053 −0.0007 0.0021 0.0097 −0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0002 −0.0006 −0.0075∗∗∗ −0.0030 0.0009 0.0028∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗
(−0.06) (1.08) (0.71) (−0.56) (0.86) (1.48) (−4.90) (0.08) (−0.09) (−4.82) (−1.07) (0.15) (2.45) (3.53) (2.23)
Log(TNA) −0.0109∗∗∗ −0.0227∗∗∗ −0.0464∗∗∗ −0.0104∗∗∗ −0.0212∗∗∗ −0.0429∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0184∗∗∗ −0.0375∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0123∗∗∗ −0.0278∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0132∗∗∗ −0.0280∗∗∗
(−26.27) (−23.85) (−22.67) (−26.19) (−24.20) (−23.55) (−9.21) (−22.74) (−21.22) (−6.82) (−18.48) (−16.85) (−19.48) (−19.40) (−17.82)
Exp. Ratio −0.4014∗∗∗ −0.6349∗∗∗ −0.8050∗∗∗ −0.3768∗∗∗ −0.5438∗∗∗ −0.7602∗∗∗ −0.3512∗∗∗ −0.5136∗∗∗ −0.6145∗∗∗ −0.3807∗∗∗ −0.6335∗∗∗ −0.6343∗∗∗ 0.0063 0.1164∗∗∗ −1.6381∗∗∗
(−15.15) (−9.69) (−5.94) (−9.89) (−9.75) (−4.44) (−17.46) (−11.06) (−6.69) (−16.43) (−9.72) (−5.63) (0.11) (4.48) (−6.09)
Turn. Ratio 0.0016∗∗ 0.0024 0.0045∗ 0.0016∗∗ 0.0032∗ 0.0043∗ −0.0005 −0.0008 −0.0005 −0.0007 −0.0005 −0.0016 −0.0013∗∗ −0.0023∗ −0.0060∗
(2.41) (1.35) (1.80) (2.16) (1.67) (1.89) (−0.87) (−0.95) (−0.40) (−1.22) (−0.62) (−0.97) (−2.06) (−1.74) (−1.96)
Flow 0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 0.0000∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000
(3.06) (−3.28) (−0.26) (1.76) (−4.17) (1.23) (1.35) (−1.10) (−0.89) (4.17) (−0.43) (0.45) (1.88) (3.53) (0.19)
I(Team) −0.0005 −0.0016 −0.0084∗∗ 0.0004 −0.0002 −0.0064∗ −0.0015∗ −0.0026 −0.0068∗ −0.0014∗∗ −0.0012 −0.0040 −0.0012∗ −0.0017 −0.0026
(−0.64) (−0.92) (−2.20) (0.57) (−0.14) (−1.90) (−1.88) (−1.59) (−1.77) (−1.96) (−0.80) (−1.20) (−1.83) (−1.25) (−0.81)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 60,042 29,472 12,187 60,042 29,472 12,187 54,493 27,598 12,180 54,493 27,598 12,180 56,178 26,478 10,210
























Table 4.5: ICC and Mutual Fund Performance: Persistence (Continued)
RI (2014)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
ICC 1.3488∗∗∗ 1.2200∗∗∗ 1.0160∗∗∗ 1.2238∗∗∗ 1.0612∗∗∗ 0.9090∗∗∗ 1.1786∗∗∗ 0.7885∗∗∗ 0.4322∗∗∗ 0.7873∗∗∗ 0.3909∗∗∗ 0.0973 0.7438∗∗∗ 0.6485∗∗∗ 0.4366∗∗∗
(11.02) (7.25) (5.65) (10.23) (7.45) (6.43) (10.69) (5.95) (3.22) (6.14) (3.66) (0.81) (6.96) (4.97) (4.25)
Log(Age) −0.0003 0.0027 0.0049 −0.0009 0.0020 0.0096 −0.0084∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0010 −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0031 0.0013 0.0027∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗
(−0.21) (1.02) (0.67) (−0.69) (0.83) (1.46) (−5.01) (−0.03) (−0.15) (−4.87) (−1.08) (0.20) (2.35) (3.55) (2.21)
Log(TNA) −0.0108∗∗∗ −0.0229∗∗∗ −0.0464∗∗∗ −0.0105∗∗∗ −0.0214∗∗∗ −0.0432∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0184∗∗∗ −0.0372∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0124∗∗∗ −0.0282∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0135∗∗∗ −0.0285∗∗∗
(−26.15) (−23.84) (−22.89) (−25.96) (−24.20) (−23.73) (−9.07) (−22.43) (−21.23) (−6.69) (−18.27) (−16.91) (−19.38) (−19.70) (−18.04)
Exp. Ratio −0.3879∗∗∗ −0.6377∗∗∗ −0.8261∗∗∗ −0.3621∗∗∗ −0.5434∗∗∗ −0.7721∗∗∗ −0.3357∗∗∗ −0.5190∗∗∗ −0.6299∗∗∗ −0.3702∗∗∗ −0.6322∗∗∗ −0.6277∗∗∗ 0.0215 0.1291∗∗∗ −1.6543∗∗∗
(−12.57) (−9.11) (−5.49) (−8.47) (−10.35) (−4.23) (−16.20) (−10.12) (−6.42) (−18.82) (−9.96) (−5.44) (0.43) (4.16) (−5.72)
Turn. Ratio 0.0015∗∗ 0.0020 0.0045∗ 0.0015∗∗ 0.0029 0.0043∗ −0.0005 −0.0012 −0.0004 −0.0007 −0.0009 −0.0016 −0.0014∗∗ −0.0022∗ −0.0062∗∗
(2.19) (1.18) (1.66) (1.97) (1.54) (1.78) (−1.00) (−1.46) (−0.33) (−1.33) (−0.97) (−0.97) (−2.24) (−1.72) (−1.98)
Flow 0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 0.0000∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000
(3.05) (−3.04) (−0.16) (1.80) (−3.86) (1.25) (1.40) (−1.10) (−0.80) (4.20) (−0.40) (0.41) (1.95) (3.37) (0.13)
I(Team) −0.0004 −0.0014 −0.0079∗∗ 0.0005 −0.0001 −0.0061∗ −0.0014∗ −0.0025 −0.0064∗ −0.0014∗ −0.0012 −0.0041 −0.0012∗ −0.0018 −0.0026
(−0.47) (−0.87) (−2.11) (0.71) (−0.10) (−1.83) (−1.78) (−1.54) (−1.70) (−1.87) (−0.80) (−1.25) (−1.74) (−1.33) (−0.83)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 60,027 29,465 12,181 60,027 29,465 12,181 54,480 27,592 12,174 54,480 27,592 12,174 56,168 26,473 10,208
Adj. R2 0.837 0.843 0.884 0.293 0.298 0.313 0.449 0.483 0.509 0.161 0.208 0.172 0.317 0.329 0.337
HvDZ (2012)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
ICC 1.0415∗∗∗ 1.1818∗∗∗ 1.1578∗∗∗ 0.9633∗∗∗ 1.0441∗∗∗ 0.9992∗∗∗ 1.1440∗∗∗ 0.7225∗∗∗ 0.5272∗∗∗ 0.7779∗∗∗ 0.2578∗ 0.1914∗ 0.5953∗∗∗ 0.6021∗∗∗ 0.4220∗∗∗
(5.51) (5.77) (7.41) (5.00) (5.99) (7.87) (10.87) (4.13) (4.52) (6.07) (1.79) (1.72) (5.54) (5.70) (4.28)
Log(Age) −0.0002 0.0027 0.0058 −0.0008 0.0020 0.0104 −0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0000 −0.0007 −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0029 0.0013 0.0028∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗
(−0.12) (1.01) (0.78) (−0.61) (0.80) (1.58) (−4.97) (0.01) (−0.10) (−4.83) (−1.03) (0.19) (2.45) (3.57) (2.27)
Log(TNA) −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0229∗∗∗ −0.0461∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗ −0.0213∗∗∗ −0.0430∗∗∗ −0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0184∗∗∗ −0.0370∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0125∗∗∗ −0.0280∗∗∗ −0.0066∗∗∗ −0.0135∗∗∗ −0.0285∗∗∗
(−26.35) (−24.18) (−23.00) (−26.00) (−24.41) (−23.89) (−9.11) (−22.68) (−21.23) (−6.68) (−18.25) (−16.87) (−19.75) (−19.98) (−18.12)
Exp. Ratio −0.3819∗∗∗ −0.6305∗∗∗ −0.8239∗∗∗ −0.3568∗∗∗ −0.5375∗∗∗ −0.7683∗∗∗ −0.3330∗∗∗ −0.5119∗∗∗ −0.6309∗∗∗ −0.3686∗∗∗ −0.6256∗∗∗ −0.6318∗∗∗ 0.0207 0.1167∗∗∗ −1.5969∗∗∗
(−10.48) (−10.72) (−5.75) (−7.14) (−8.98) (−4.36) (−15.73) (−11.52) (−6.56) (−19.21) (−9.01) (−5.48) (0.44) (4.25) (−5.48)
Turn. Ratio 0.0015∗∗ 0.0024 0.0042 0.0016∗∗ 0.0032∗ 0.0040∗ −0.0006 −0.0009 −0.0005 −0.0008 −0.0006 −0.0016 −0.0013∗∗ −0.0021∗ −0.0060∗
(2.35) (1.51) (1.59) (2.08) (1.81) (1.71) (−1.01) (−1.14) (−0.42) (−1.29) (−0.73) (−0.98) (−2.05) (−1.66) (−1.92)
Flow 0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000
(3.10) (−3.09) (0.15) (1.82) (−3.93) (1.47) (1.47) (−1.11) (−0.64) (4.27) (−0.41) (0.48) (1.90) (3.42) (0.09)
I(Team) −0.0004 −0.0014 −0.0077∗∗ 0.0005 −0.0001 −0.0059∗ −0.0014∗ −0.0024 −0.0063∗ −0.0013∗ −0.0012 −0.0040 −0.0012∗ −0.0018 −0.0025
(−0.55) (−0.83) (−2.03) (0.64) (−0.06) (−1.78) (−1.75) (−1.52) (−1.66) (−1.85) (−0.83) (−1.21) (−1.81) (−1.34) (−0.81)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 60,027 29,464 12,181 60,027 29,464 12,181 54,481 27,593 12,174 54,481 27,593 12,174 56,168 26,473 10,208
Adj. R2 0.836 0.843 0.885 0.290 0.299 0.317 0.449 0.482 0.510 0.161 0.207 0.173 0.315 0.329 0.337
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lend themselves as a measure for the long-term fate of a fund. This potentially
accommodates investors, considering that determination of a fund’s ICC arguably
is not a straightforward endeavor, in particular for retail investors (as discussed in
Section 4.5.2). Further, whereas investors’ positive flow response to high past fund
performance is still erroneous on average, for the subset of funds with both high
past performance and high ICC, investors are more likely to see their expectation
of high future performance fulfilled. Hence, albeit spuriously, for these investors
investment decisions could lead to a positive feed-back loop, potentially adding to
the explanation for why investors cater to past returns.
4.3.3 Fund Trades
After documenting evidence for a positive association between current ICC and fu-
ture fund performance, this study turns towards a closer examination of trading
mechanisms related to ICC. Retrospectively, given the time series of past returns
and holdings, one can discern by how much contemporary fund performance was
influenced by fund managers’ trades. To investigate how trading decisions based
on ICC altered a fund’s performance, I determine the fraction of a manager’s buys
and sells “in the same direction” traded firms’ ICCs changed. In particular, I com-
pute the trade-weighted percentage of buys (sells) in firms whose ICC increased
(decreased) over the same quarter, %SameDir Buys (%SameDir Sells).
Table 4.6 presents results for regression (4.3), augmented by the two trading
variables. Statistically significant at the 1%-level, economically, the results imply
that in case 100% of a fund’s buys and sells have been in the same direction as
the underlying firms’ change in ICC, contemporary fund performance was higher
by, respectively, approximately 2.5 percentage points. This corroborates the notion
that explicitly tailoring a fund’s strategy towards firms with higher ICC supports
higher performance.
In summary, Section 4.3 provides evidence for a positive association between
current ICC and future fund performance. This does not seem to be driven by time
effects, differences in styles, or specific fund-manager-matches and appears to be
























Table 4.6: Directional Trades and Fund Performance
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions that relate quarterly fund performance with the percentage of buys and sells into the direction of the change in stock-level ICCs
over the corresponding quarter. The analysis is performed at the fund-quarter-level. The five analyzed performance measures are return (Return), style-adjusted return (SReturn),
calculated by subtracting from the raw return of a fund the mean raw return of funds with the same investment objective, Jensen-Alpha (Alpha1) and the Fama and French (2015)
5-factor alpha, augmented with the momentum factor (Alpha6), computed for a given fund each month as the difference between the actual return minus the expected return, estimated
using factor loadings computed from a regression of the preceding 36 monthly excess returns returns on the one respectively six risk factor(s), as well as characteristic-adjusted returns
(DGTW ), estimated as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), where a stock’s characteristic-adjusted return in a given month is computed by subtracting from its
return the return of the benchmark portfolio to which that particular stock belongs. These adjusted returns are then value-weighted at the fund-portfolio-level. Monthly measures
are aggregated to the quarterly level using compounding. The main independent variables are ICC, %SameDir Buys, and %SameDir Sells. For every fund every quarter, a
value-weighted ICC of the funds’ portfolios’ constituents, ICC, based on four different proxies for expected earnings, is constructed as described in Section 4.2.2. %SameDir Buys
(%SameDir Sells) denotes the trade-weighted fraction of total buys (sells) in stocks where the ICCs increased (decreased) from one quarter to the next. Controls are described in
Table 4.1. Regressions are run with time-by-style and fund fixed effects (FE), for each of the four earnings specifications used to obtain stock-level ICCs separately. T-statistics, based
on standard errors clustered at the fund level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Analyst EP (2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
ICC 1.2962∗∗∗ 1.1142∗∗∗ 0.9705∗∗∗ 0.6674∗∗∗ 0.3565∗∗∗ 1.4509∗∗∗ 1.2897∗∗∗ 1.4655∗∗∗ 1.2824∗∗∗ 0.5706∗∗∗
(8.49) (7.64) (6.73) (4.42) (2.63) (10.49) (9.92) (9.16) (8.35) (4.22)
%SameDir Buys 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗
(20.10) (18.68) (19.34) (15.36) (16.22) (25.76) (23.84) (24.40) (20.78) (19.11)
%SameDir Sells 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0319∗∗∗ 0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗
(23.80) (21.28) (23.79) (15.57) (27.55) (32.65) (30.50) (31.85) (22.63) (37.97)
Log(Fund Age) 0.0005 0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0014 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0010 0.0021∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.25) (−0.45) (−1.54) (3.00) (0.95) (0.31) (−0.19) (−1.13) (3.19)
Log(AUM) −0.0057∗∗∗ −0.0057∗∗∗ −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0055∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0046∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0030∗∗∗
(−24.84) (−25.30) (−21.28) (−16.59) (−17.03) (−24.73) (−24.59) (−21.20) (−15.38) (−16.21)
Exp. Ratio −0.0877∗∗ −0.0948∗∗ −0.0690∗∗∗ −0.1383∗∗∗ 0.0478∗∗∗ −0.1498∗∗∗ −0.1560∗∗∗ −0.0970∗∗∗ −0.1907∗∗∗ 0.0097
(−2.42) (−2.53) (−3.66) (−5.41) (3.02) (−3.71) (−3.87) (−2.85) (−6.09) (0.50)
Turn. Ratio 0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0003 0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0004 −0.0001 −0.0005
(0.28) (−0.91) (−0.89) (0.84) (−1.33) (−0.19) (−1.35) (−1.29) (−0.17) (−1.62)
Flow 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000
(0.06) (1.48) (−0.49) (−1.35) (0.38) (0.37) (1.39) (−0.08) (−0.95) (0.55)
I(Team) −0.0001 0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0006 −0.0005 −0.0001 0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0005
(−0.29) (0.79) (−0.57) (−1.36) (−1.20) (−0.33) (0.61) (−0.67) (−0.87) (−1.41)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 105,453 105,453 97,964 97,964 102,881 104,200 104,200 96,708 96,708 101,644
























Table 4.6: Directional Trades and Fund Performance (Continued)
RI (2014) HvDZ (2012)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW Return SReturn Alpha1 Alpha6 DGTW
ICC 1.7562∗∗∗ 1.5651∗∗∗ 1.1841∗∗∗ 0.9860∗∗∗ 0.6093∗∗∗ 1.2241∗∗∗ 1.1124∗∗∗ 1.0276∗∗∗ 0.8140∗∗∗ 0.3834∗∗∗
(13.57) (12.09) (10.41) (8.67) (5.15) (10.48) (9.24) (9.11) (7.17) (3.58)
%SameDir Buys 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗
(23.53) (21.86) (22.15) (17.89) (17.95) (20.49) (18.66) (20.72) (16.82) (16.29)
%SameDir Sells 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0380∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗
(31.02) (29.06) (30.42) (23.15) (37.27) (28.56) (26.84) (29.06) (22.60) (35.28)
Log(Fund Age) 0.0006 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0011 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 −0.0007 0.0021∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.14) (−0.09) (−1.17) (3.11) (0.95) (0.30) (0.09) (−0.78) (3.25)
Log(AUM) −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0046∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0029∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0030∗∗∗
(−24.49) (−24.74) (−21.24) (−15.83) (−16.05) (−25.17) (−25.41) (−21.14) (−16.13) (−16.49)
Exp. Ratio −0.1409∗∗∗ −0.1524∗∗∗ −0.0937∗∗∗ −0.1849∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗ −0.1261∗∗∗ −0.1343∗∗∗ −0.0853∗∗∗ −0.1635∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗
(−3.91) (−3.88) (−3.04) (−5.50) (2.38) (−5.00) (−5.12) (−3.51) (−8.99) (2.08)
Turn. Ratio −0.0002 −0.0007∗ −0.0008∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0007∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0003 0.0001 −0.0003
(−0.66) (−1.84) (−2.46) (−1.16) (−2.45) (−0.29) (−1.37) (−1.10) (0.18) (−1.11)
Flow 0.0000 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000 0.0000
(0.78) (1.98) (0.29) (−0.71) (0.67) (0.36) (1.36) (−0.08) (−0.84) (0.27)
I(Team) −0.0002 0.0002 −0.0004 −0.0007 −0.0006 −0.0001 0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0006 −0.0005
(−0.41) (0.57) (−1.04) (−1.55) (−1.59) (−0.30) (0.67) (−0.94) (−1.53) (−1.41)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 103,745 103,745 96,331 96,331 101,198 103,565 103,565 96,241 96,241 101,040
Adj. R2 0.855 0.276 0.446 0.202 0.316 0.855 0.269 0.443 0.199 0.313
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4.4 Determinants of ICC Strategies
Having documented possible performance implications of a strategy based on ICCs,
this section seeks to uncover potential determinants of how likely managers are to
employ such a strategy. For this, I examine cross-sectional heterogeneity to study
correlations of ICCs with fund family and manager characteristics. Section 4.4.1
analyses the relation between trading efficiency as a measure for trading costs and
ICCs, whereas Section 4.4.2 investigates correlations with fund managers’ SAT scores
as a proxy for skill.
4.4.1 Trading Efficiency and ICC
Evidence of this study points towards a fund-investment strategy based on ICC
yielding actual profits, contrasting literature on ICC at the individual stock- and
stock-portfolio-level, where transaction costs appear to predominate returns. One
possible part of the explanation for why mutual funds seem to be able to seize the
performance potential inherent to a strategy based on ICC could be, that mutual
funds, as institutional investors, face particularly favorable trading conditions. This
in turn could imply that the height of trading costs mutual funds face were negatively
correlated with the probability that they employ high-ICC strategies.
Yet, funds’ trading costs are not directly observable. However, Cici, Dahm, and
Kempf (2018) derive a proxy for the efficiency of their families’ trading desk. The
higher the trading desk’s efficiency, the lower trading costs arguably are. Hence, I
test for the correlation between contemporaneous ICC and trading desk efficiency.
I follow Cici, Dahm, and Kempf (2018) to estimate trading desk efficiency at
the family-level. In particular, it obtains as the difference between the gross return
of the family’s SP500 index fund,24 incorporating trading costs, and the return
of the underlying index, inherently net of costs, within a week before and after
index reconstitutions. This difference is averaged for each index fund across all non-
overlapping index adjustment periods in a specific quarter to obtain the variable
24In cases of multiple SP500 index funds, Cici, Dahm, and Kempf (2018) choose the index fund
with the longest track record.
4. Implied Cost of Capital and Mutual Fund Performance 121
Table 4.7: Trading Efficiency and ICC
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions which relate quarterly fund-level ICC with family-level
trading efficiency. The analysis is performed at the fund-quarter-level. For every fund every quarter, a value-
weighted ICC of the funds’ portfolios’ constituents, ICC, based on four different proxies for expected earnings, is
constructed as described in Section 4.2.2 and serves as the dependent variable. The main independent variable is
TradingEfficiency, a contemporaneous measure for trading-efficiency at the family-level, following Cici, Dahm,
and Kempf (2018), described in Section 4.4.1. Controls are described in Table 4.1. Regressions are run with time-
by-style and fund fixed effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the fund level, are reported
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Analyst EP (2014) RI (2014) HvDZ (2012)
TradingEfficiency 0.1343∗∗ 0.1435∗∗ 0.2284∗∗∗ 0.2262∗∗∗
(2.26) (2.33) (4.10) (3.97)
Log(Age) 0.0003∗∗ 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002
(2.29) (0.13) (0.65) (1.17)
Log(TNA) −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗
(−5.88) (−4.68) (−6.17) (−6.09)
Exp. Ratio −0.0081 0.0484∗∗ −0.0023 0.0003
(−0.48) (2.30) (−0.12) (0.01)
Turn. Ratio −0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(−0.20) (0.10) (1.04) (0.53)
Flow 0.0000 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000
(0.95) (3.72) (3.31) (−0.95)
I(Team) −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0000 −0.0001
(−0.66) (0.45) (−0.12) (−0.99)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,432 20,458 20,443 20,436
Adj. R2 0.705 0.674 0.824 0.836
TradingEffiency. It reflects the family’s decisions, e.g., in terms of when to trade,
which trading venues and/or brokers to use to what extent, and how to place and
split which types of orders.
I use Morningstar Direct to obtain data on which funds identify as SP500 index
funds (benchmark “SP 500 TR USD”). Because funds outsourced to an external
asset management company presumably do not profit from the family’s trading
desk, Cici, Dahm, and Kempf (2018) exclude them from the analysis. To determine
outsourced funds, I retrieve semi-annual and annual NSAR-A and -B filings from the
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system maintained
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by the SEC. Item #8. informs about a fund’s advisors, the employers of the asset
managers conducting the day-to-day-business. I manually match NSAR-information
by fund share class name and date and construct a time series of which family is
affiliated with which advisor.
Table 4.7 presents results from a regression akin to model (4.3), where I corre-
late contemporaneous ICC as the dependent variable to trading efficiency, which is
the same for all funds in the same family in quarter t. Statistically significant at
the 5%-level, results indicate that funds in families with higher trading efficiency
are more likely to employ a high-ICC strategy. This is consistent with the notion
that a favorable transaction cost environment helps funds monetizing the previously
documented potential of ICC-based investments to generate outperformance.25
4.4.2 Fund Manager Skill and ICC
The positive association between ICC and fund performance is consistent with suc-
cessfully employing investment strategies based on firms’ ICCs reflecting skill, which
some managers are equipped with and which others lack. Hence, measures for a
manager’s skill might positively correlate with her funds’ ICC.
As a proxy for managerial skill I follow literature [e.g., Greenwood and Nagel
(2009) and Fang, Kempf, and Trapp (2014)] and use the average matriculates’ SAT
score of the institution where a manager obtained her bachelor’s degree. To col-
lect information on which universities managers obtained their degree from, I use
the following data sources. Besides Morningstar Direct and Morningstar Principia
CDs from 1996 to 2005, I search through fund filings with the SEC (e.g., forms
485APOS/485BPOS, 497, and accompanying statements of additional information),
Marquis Who’s Who, newspaper articles, LinkedIn, Bloomberg, the websites of fund
companies, as well as university sources such as yearbooks, alumni, and donation
pages. Average SAT scores of these institutions are obtained from the College Score-
25Adding TradingEfficency as a regressor to ICC in the analysis in Table 4.4 does not alter
results, reinforcing ICCs themselves being the actual driver behind performance. In an aim to
examine whether returns to ICC reflect an illiquidity premium, I consider alphas with respect to
the model in Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), who add a liquidity factor. Results (not reported) are
even stronger than for the six-factor alpha.
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Table 4.8: Fund Manager SAT Score and ICC
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions which relate quarterly fund-level ICC with fund managers’
SAT score. The analysis is performed at the fund-quarter-level. For every fund every quarter, a value-weighted ICC
of the funds’ portfolios’ constituents, ICC, based on four different proxies for expected earnings, is constructed as
described in Section 4.2.2 and serves as the dependent variable. The main independent variable is SAT , a contem-
poraneous measure for the SAT score of a fund’s managers, which obtains as the mean of a fund’s corresponding
managers’ associated SAT score. Controls are described in Table 4.1. Regressions are run with time-by-style and
fund fixed effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the fund level, are reported in parenthe-
ses. Throughout this table, ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Analyst EP (2014) RI (2014) HvDZ (2012)
SAT 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗
(3.47) (3.04) (2.86) (3.18)
Log(Age) 0.0001∗ 0.0001 0.0002∗ 0.0001
(1.70) (1.07) (1.80) (1.44)
Log(TNA) −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗
(−8.57) (−8.80) (−5.98) (−6.12)
Exp. Ratio −0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0428∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗
(−3.93) (11.83) (8.90) (4.47)
Turn. Ratio 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000
(1.25) (1.16) (2.06) (0.86)
Flow −0.0000 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0000
(−0.73) (0.32) (−0.15) (−0.92)
I(Team) −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗
(−2.61) (−1.67) (−2.74) (−2.97)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 83,843 83,870 83,863 83,856
Adj. R2 0.805 0.825 0.877 0.872
card provided by the U.S. Department of Education.26 To arrive at a value for SAT
at the fund-level, SAT , I compute the mean over the SAT scores of all managers
managing a fund at a specific point in time, requiring non-missing values for all
the fund’s managers. In order to ease interpretation of coefficients, SAT scores are
divided by 1,000.
Table 4.8 documents results from a regression of contemporaneous fund-level
ICC on SAT . Statistically significant at the 1%-level for each of the four ICC speci-
fications, economically results imply that managers associated with the highest SAT
26Confer https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/.
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scores, on average, had quarterly ICCs which were approximately 10 basis points
larger than ICCs of managers from universities at the other end of the spectrum,
which amounts to roughly 15% of the interquartile range of quarterly ICCs. This
provides evidence for skillful managers being more likely to tailor their investments
towards high ICCs, consistent with that one particular manifestation of innate abil-
ity in the mutual fund industry consists of applying a high-ICC strategy.
4.5 Implications of ICCs’ Correlation with Fund
Performance
This final section examines, what responses the positive association between cur-
rent ICCs and future fund performance might evoke, considering two of the central
parties involved in mutual fund markets. Section 4.5.1 analyses if incentives of man-
agers themselves are altered, whereas Section 4.5.2 turns towards an examination of
whether investors into mutual funds are influenced in their investment decisions.
4.5.1 ICCs’ Impact on Managerial Tournament Incentives
Given funds posses the means to capitalize on ICC strategies, they should try to
seize them. This knowledge in turn potentially affects a manager’s incentives. In
particular, she may rely on high ICCs to pay off in the future. This might induce
her to react differently from a manager who does not count on such a strategy.
Past research documents how a manager’s incentives influence risk-taking. In
particular, managers which lie behind their peers in the middle of the year tend to
engage into “risk shifting”, i.e., to increase risk, in an aim to catch up. Incentives
for this behavior are rooted in the pay-off structure managers in the mutual fund
industry face, which resembles a “tournament”, where winners obtain a price whilst
losers come away empty handed. This is due to the industry’s remuneration struc-
ture. Managers’ compensation comprises claims on variable, asymmetric boni [Ma,
Tang, and Gómez (2019)] “simply” expiring worthless, given a certain threshold is
not met. Simultaneously, another part of managerial pay is based on assets under
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management [Hu, Hall, and Harvey (2000) and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003)].
In this regard, it are investors who incentivize managers via their asymmetric re-
sponse to past performance; whereas high past performance is eminently rewarded
with large inflows, funds with low past performance loose comparably low amounts
of assets [e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos
(2012)]. Taken together, managers’ pay-off resembles that of an option - whose
value, ceteris paribus, increases with increasing “risk”.
Hence, managers have incentives to “shift” their risk to higher levels given they
trail their peers in order to increase their chances to catch up. If a manager, however,
in addition or instead relies on other parts of her investment strategy, e.g., high ICC,
to pay off, her incentives to increase risk might be muted respectively shut off.
To test for whether managers with high ICC temper their risk shifting, which
were lending support to the notion that managers are aware of the benefits of high-
ICC strategies and indeed utilize them, I relate mid-year, i.e., end-of-June, ICCs with
mid-year performance of managers. To capture how much fund managers intend to
change their risk in the second half of the year relative to the first, I construct the











f,t denotes realized portfolio risk of fund f in the first half of the year
(January to June), calculated using actual portfolio holdings and volatility of cor-
responding daily portfolio returns in the first half of the year; σ
(2),int
f,t represents
intended portfolio risk for the second part of the year (July to December), which
is computed using actual portfolio holdings in the second half of the year and a
forecast of volatility of corresponding returns, obtained as realized volatility of that
portfolio had it been held in the first half of the year. The regression model to test
for the impact of high-ICC strategies on tournament behavior is given by
RARf,t = δ1 ·Rankf,t + δ2 ·HighICCf,t + δ3 ·Rankf,t ·HighICCf,t
+ ~γ · ~cf,t +~ι · ~ϕ+ εf,t,
(4.5)
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Table 4.9: ICC and Tournament Behavior
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions which relate mid-year risk-shifting to mid-year performance-
ranks and fund-level ICC. The analysis is performed at the fund-year-level. The dependent variable is the risk-
adjustment ratio, RAR, as defined in Section 4.5.1, equation (4.4). The main independent variables are Rank,
HighICC, and their interaction. Rank is calculated for each investment category and year separately. It is
normalized to be equally distributed between zero and one, with the best fund manager in its respective investment
category being assigned rank one. To obtain HighICC, first, for every fund every quarter, a value-weighted ICC
of the funds’ portfolios’ constituents, ICC, based on four different proxies for expected earnings, is constructed as
described in Section 4.2.2. Second, this ICC is transformed into an indicator variable, HighICC, which takes the
value of one, if the respective fund’s ICC is larger than the median ICC in that year in the investment category the
fund belongs to, and zero else. Controls are described in Table 4.1. Regressions are run with time-by-style and fund
fixed effects (FE). T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the fund level, are reported in parentheses.
Throughout this table, ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Analyst EP (2014) RI (2014) HvDZ (2012)
Rank −0.0171∗∗∗ −0.0189∗∗∗ −0.0178∗∗∗ −0.0171∗∗∗
(−5.63) (−6.55) (−5.74) (−5.45)
HighICC −0.0069∗∗ −0.0043 0.0040 0.0031
(−2.43) (−1.57) (1.41) (1.06)
Rank · HighICC 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗
(2.78) (3.76) (3.20) (2.98)
Log(Age) 0.0047∗ 0.0046 0.0046∗ 0.0045
(1.67) (1.64) (1.65) (1.63)
Log(TNA) −0.0011 −0.0010 −0.0009 −0.0009
(−1.56) (−1.41) (−1.24) (−1.27)
Exp. Ratio −0.2092∗∗∗ −0.2143∗∗∗ −0.2129∗∗∗ −0.2133∗∗∗
(−11.65) (−11.76) (−11.87) (−11.83)
Turn. Ratio −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002
(−0.18) (−0.16) (−0.18) (−0.14)
Flow −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗ −0.0000∗∗∗
(−6.34) (−7.01) (−5.32) (−5.70)
I(Team) −0.0008 −0.0008 −0.0008 −0.0007
(−0.53) (−0.54) (−0.51) (−0.48)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,415 22,441 22,442 22,436
Adj. R2 0.164 0.164 0.166 0.166
where εf,t denotes the error term. Rankf,t, based on fund performance over the first
six months each year, is calculated for each investment category separately. It is
normalized to be equally distributed between zero and one, with the best fund in
its respective investment category being assigned rank one. As Rankf,t is interacted
with a fund’s ICC, I transform it into indicator variable HighICCf,t, equal to one for
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all funds whose ICC is larger than the median ICC in the same investment category
in June of the respective year and zero else. A negative δ1 were consistent with the
tournament literature, suggesting that the lower a manager’s rank, the larger her
risk shifting. The main variable of interest is δ3; a positive value lent support to the
notion that managers with the same low mid-year rank, albeit high ICC, increase
risk less relative to managers with low ICC.
Table 4.9 documents results from regression (4.5). The negative coefficient of
Rank, statistically significant at the 1%-level, provides evidence for the existence of
tournament-like behavior in the sample. In comparison, the coefficient of the inter-
action with HighICC is statistically significant positive at the same level. Further-
more, associated coefficients, δ1 and δ3, are approximately on par in absolute values,
with |δ3| amounting to roughly 75% of |δ1|, on average, consistent with managers
strongly tempering risk-shifting in case they have a high-ICC strategy at command.
This might serve as evidence for managers being both aware of the merits of such a
strategy and indeed relying on it.
4.5.2 Investors’ Response to Funds’ ICCs
Finally, this study aims to investigate investors’ awareness of the association between
ICCs and fund performance. For this purpose, it considers the relation between cur-
rent ICC and future fund flows. Rational investors probably would react to the
signal ICCs allegedly pose and direct investments into funds with high expected
performance. This signal, however, comes at a cost, which presumably is not con-
stant throughout a fund’s investor base. In terms of data necessary to determine a
fund’s ICC, a fund only provides its holdings. Data at the stock-level, e.g., market
and book values of equity, dividends, and earnings together with predictions thereof,
which are either based on analysts or obtained via statistical models, have to be ac-
cessible for and gathered by investors themselves. Consecutively, ICCs need to be
actually computed, necessitating the knowledge of the various models and respective
resources required for calculation. Furthermore, the association between ICC and

























Table 4.10: ICC and Mutual Fund Flows
This table presents results from pooled OLS regressions, that relate quarterly flows with fund-level ICC. The analysis is performed at the fund-share-class-quarter-level. The dependent
variable is Flow, the percentage quarterly growth in fund’s new money in %, net of the effect of returns. The analysis is split between retail share classes in Panel A and institutional
share classes in Panel B. The main independent variable is ICC; for every fund every quarter, a value-weighted ICC of the funds’ portfolios’ constituents, based on four different
proxies for expected earnings, is constructed as described in Section 4.2.2. Controls are described in Table 4.1. Regressions are run with time-by-style and fund fixed effects (FE).
T-statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the fund level, are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level,
respectively.
Panel A: Retail share classes Panel B: Institutional share classes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Analyst EP (2014) RI (2014) HvDZ (2012) Analyst EP (2014) RI (2014) HvDZ (2012)
ICC −0.0543 0.0884 −0.0679 0.2443 1.5890∗∗∗ 1.1785∗∗ 1.5882∗∗∗ 2.4125∗∗∗
(−0.20) (0.51) (−0.28) (0.87) (2.69) (2.00) (3.07) (4.20)
Log(Age) −0.0301∗∗∗ −0.0301∗∗∗ −0.0300∗∗∗ −0.0300∗∗∗ −0.0315∗∗∗ −0.0315∗∗∗ −0.0316∗∗∗ −0.0318∗∗∗
(−19.25) (−19.27) (−19.40) (−19.39) (−12.70) (−12.70) (−12.73) (−12.81)
Log(TNA) −0.0094∗∗∗ −0.0094∗∗∗ −0.0094∗∗∗ −0.0094∗∗∗ −0.0240∗∗∗ −0.0239∗∗∗ −0.0239∗∗∗ −0.0239∗∗∗
(−15.08) (−15.10) (−15.18) (−15.18) (−24.03) (−24.02) (−24.01) (−24.03)
Exp. Ratio −0.1422∗∗ −0.1404∗∗ −0.1354∗∗ −0.1351∗∗ −6.0129∗∗∗ −6.0082∗∗∗ −5.9959∗∗∗ −6.0227∗∗∗
(−2.03) (−2.05) (−2.03) (−2.02) (−10.85) (−10.85) (−10.83) (−10.88)
Turn. Ratio 0.0033∗∗ 0.0032∗∗ 0.0030∗∗ 0.0030∗∗ −0.0056∗∗ −0.0054∗∗ −0.0056∗∗ −0.0056∗∗
(2.41) (2.45) (2.38) (2.38) (−2.10) (−2.02) (−2.07) (−2.09)
Flow 0.1987∗∗∗ 0.1986∗∗∗ 0.2000∗∗∗ 0.2000∗∗∗ 0.1558∗∗∗ 0.1553∗∗∗ 0.1555∗∗∗ 0.1555∗∗∗
(12.84) (12.84) (13.17) (13.17) (21.86) (21.84) (21.87) (21.88)
I(Team) −0.0015 −0.0015 −0.0014 −0.0014 0.0009 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008
(−0.78) (−0.79) (−0.74) (−0.74) (0.22) (0.13) (0.14) (0.19)
Past Return 0.3320∗∗∗ 0.3337∗∗∗ 0.3326∗∗∗ 0.3333∗∗∗ 0.3392∗∗∗ 0.3399∗∗∗ 0.3405∗∗∗ 0.3435∗∗∗
(15.43) (15.71) (15.66) (15.66) (12.17) (12.29) (12.27) (12.38)
Time×Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 274,757 275,068 274,973 274,882 109,094 109,134 109,155 109,149
Adj. R2 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130
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I hypothesize that a moderating factor for the subjective costs of the signal
and hence investors’ reaction can be derived from their classification into retail
and institutional. While the “representative agent” for the former might be the
average U.S.-household with presumably limited “resources” (confer the references
in the introduction), institutional investors might have the means mentioned above
at command. This suggests that retail investors would not react to current ICC,
while institutional did.
Table 4.10 tests for this hypothesis, employing a fund’s future flow as the de-
pendent variable in regression (4.3) and past fund return (Past Return) as an
additional control variable.27 The analysis is stratified by retail (Panel A) and in-
stitutional share classes (Panel B). While there is no association between current
ICC and future flow in the retail stratum, it is positive and significant at the 5%-
level for EP-based ICCs and at the 1%-level for the remaining ICCs in the panel of
institutional share classes. Concerning economic significance, a 1-percentage-point
increase in ICCs is associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in quarterly flows,
on average. This is consistent with limited attention of retail investors respectively
allegedly more sophisticated institutional investors’ awareness of ICCs’ positive as-
sociation with future fund performance.
4.6 Conclusion
What kind of trading strategies do skillful mutual fund managers employ and how
can investors identify them? Although research documents that portfolio selection
based on firms’ ICCs in general founders on necessary transaction costs, mutual
fund managers seem to be able to bring to bearing corresponding return potentials.
Computing holdings’ implied ICC of mutual funds, this study provides evidence
for a viable correlation between a fund’s current ICC and its future performance.
This association is present both in portfolio sorts, which result into actual, risk- re-
spectively style-adjusted performance after costs, and panel regressions, which allow
to control for confounding factors at the time-, style-, and fund-level. Consistent
27Inferences remain the same, when return is replaced by either of the other four performance
measures.
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with mutual funds being particularly well equipped to actually implement ICC-
based investment decisions due to their preferential trading opportunities, funds
with access to trading desks with a high degree of efficiency are more prone to em-
ploy a high-ICC strategy. Likewise, based on the average matriculates’ SAT score of
the institutions managers received their bachelor’s degree from, managers with sup-
posed higher innate ability employ such a strategy more often. In general, managers
themselves appear to be both aware of and confident with respect to ICC-based
investment strategies, as they are less likely to engage into risk-shifting should they
lie behind their peers in the middle of the year but have a high-ICC strategy at their
command. With regard to investors’ awareness, however, only more sophisticated
institutional investors seem to recognize and trade based on the positive association
between current ICCs and future performance as opposed to retail investors.
In summary, with regard to the questions raised in the introduction that are
tackled by research - whether mutual fund managers have skill picking stocks and
how information advantages are developed and exploited by market participants -,
a fraction of funds seems to demonstrate skill by exploiting information and trading
cost advantages with respect to an investment strategy based on ICC. Hence, part
of the explanation for the “puzzling” prosperity of the mutual fund industry might
be, that some funds with reliable proficiencies indeed exist.
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NCCs in the Investment Industry
Since human capital is one of the most important means of production for mutual
fund families [e.g., Berk, van Binsbergen, and Liu (2017)], the main rationale for
utilizing NCCs by mutual fund management companies is to retain talent. In ad-
dition, by restricting employee mobility, fund families hinder dissemination of their
organization knowledge to competitors and also keep their portfolio managers from
taking the firms’ clients with them when they join a competitor or start their own
firm.
There are no requirements for investment firms such as mutual fund families and
affiliated entities to report information related to their use of NCCs, thus detailed
data on which of their employees are subject to NCCs and under what terms is
unavailable. Nonetheless, given the human capital- and knowledge-intensive nature
of the mutual fund industry, there are a number of indications that NCCs are com-
monly used in this industry. There is some indirect evidence that comes from the
survey of Starr, Prescott, and Bishara (2019). Although the survey does not single
out mutual fund managers, these individuals fit the income and industry profile
of employees that the survey shows to be typically subjected to such restrictions.
For example, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara (2019) document that employees in the
highest income bracket ($150K+) have the highest incidence rate, as high as about
60%, of being subjected to NCCs. Moreover, the broader industry in which they
work, i.e., financial services, is close to the top 20% of industries with the highest
incidence rate of NCCs.
There is also some direct, albeit rather limited, evidence in the public domain,
which is primarily available through business press coverage of career moves of well-
known fund managers. This evidence suggests that NCCs have been used in the
mutual fund industry for a long time. Below we provide a list of examples to il-
lustrate the type of coverage that NCCs have received in the press. One of the
earliest examples was the case of Jack Bogle, former CEO of Vanguard Group and a
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highly influential figure in the mutual fund industry. He was subject to a NCC with
the Wellington Management Company after leaving in 1974 to found the Vanguard
Group. The outstanding NCC restricted Bogle from entering the active fund man-
agement business, but it did not apply to passive management, which allowed Bogle
to introduce the first index fund [Regan (2016)]. In a much later example we are
told that Ryan Caldwell, a portfolio manager for Waddell & Reed, “resigned from
Waddell & Reed in June 2014, and as soon as his non-compete agreement elapsed,
he launched the Chiron Capital Allocation Fund” [Dornbrook (2017)]. Among all
the NCC examples covered by the press, one stood out as the most restrictive. It
involved Michael Price, a well-known fund manager. When he left Franklin Mutual
Fund Advisors in 2001, it was disclosed that a NCC forbade him from working in
the mutual fund business for another 10 years [Wiser (2001)].
Upon review of such articles, we identified a number of investment companies
that at one point had a pending NCC with at least one departing fund manager.1
These NCCs typically ranged from one to three years and in some cases were accom-
panied by non-solicitation agreements barring fund managers from doing business
with their former firms’ clients. In the process of reviewing these articles, we also
came across additional evidence on the use of NCCs from coverage of lawsuits filed by
investment firms against their former fund managers for breach of their NCCs. Asset
management companies that brought lawsuits against their former fund managers
that we were able to identify from the business press include Wellington Capital
Management, Boston Partners Asset Management, Pilgrim, Baxter & Associates,
State Street, Bridgewater Associates, and Citadel Investment Group.2
Finally, besides information on NCCs revealed in the business press, textual
analysis of SEC filings by mutual fund companies (e.g., Prospectus or Statement
of Additional Information) identified a couple of mutual funds self-reporting that
1The list includes AIM Fund Management, Boston Company, Boston Partners Asset Man-
agement, Bridgewater Associates, Citadel Investment Group, Fidelity Management & Research,
Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Pilgrim, Baxter & Associates, Putnam Investments, State
Street, Waddell & Reed, Wedge Capital Management, and Wellington Management Company.
2Lawsuits by these companies are respectively mentioned by Sakelaris (1998), Healy (2001),
Franecki (1999), Capon (2012), Goldstein and Stevenson (2016), and Herbst-Bayliss (2009). It is
likely that some other unreported disputes were settled earlier on out of court and never became
public knowledge.
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their portfolio managers were restricted by NCCs. For example, a 2014 filing by
Natixis Funds states that “[t]he non-competition and non-solicitation undertakings
will expire the later of one year from the termination of employment, or one year after
the period during which severance payments are made pursuant to the agreement.”3
However, the information from these filings was very scant.
3See Natixis filing https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1406305/
000119312514271200/d755211d485apos.htm.
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Implied Cost of Capital Models
This appendix provides a brief description of the models underlying the implied cost
of capital used throughout the analysis. For each firm, an average of eight commonly
used metrics, ICCLNS13, ICCGG97, ICCGLS01, ICCCT01, ICCOJ05, ICCMPEG,
ICCPEG, and ICCPE, is calculated.
If not obtained differently by means explicit to one model, proxies for expected
earnings of firm i one, two, three, four, and five years ahead, conditional on the
information set at time t, Ψt, E(Ei,t+τ |Ψt) := Et(Ei,t+τ ) ∀ τ ∈ {1, ..., 5}, are obtained
following Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013). The approach necessitates an estimate
for long-term earnings growth, gi,t. For expected earnings proxies based on analysts,
this value is potentially reported; if not and for mechanical earnings forecasts, it is
computed as the ratio of the farthest consecutive non-negative earnings forecasts,
Êi,t+τ , minus one, i.e., gi,t = Êi,t+5/Êi,t+4−1|Êi,t+5∧ Êi,t+4 > 0, . . . , Êi,t+2/Êi,t+1−
1|Êi,t+2 ∧ Êi,t+1 > 0.
If the respective one-year-ahead earnings forecast is not smaller zero, Et(Ei,t+1)
is set equal to this value. Else, if past earnings, Ei,t, are positive and the estimate
for earnings two years ahead is larger zero, Et(Ei,t+1) obtains assuming geometric
growth, i.e., Et(Ei,t+1) = Ei,t ·
√
Êi,t+2/Ei,t. Finally, given only two-year-ahead
forecasts being non-negative, they are scaled down by long-term growth, such that
Et(Ei,t+1) = Êi,t+2/(1 + gi,t).
A proxy for expected earnings in two years, Et(Ei,t+2), obtains in a similar man-
ner. Provided a non-negative two-year-ahead earnings forecast, Et(Ei,t+2) is set equal
to this value. Else, in cases of both positive past earnings and forecast of earnings
one year ahead, the latter is assumed to grow by the rate implied through growth
from past earnings to next year’s forecast, i.e., Et(Ei,t+2) = Êi,t+1 · (Êi,t+1/Ei,t). Fi-
nally, if only the earnings forecast one year ahead is positive, it is assumed to grow
by the long-term growth rate, such that Et(Ei,t+2) = Êi,t+1 · (1 + gi,t).
Proxies for expected earnings three, four, and five years ahead obtain as the
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respective forecasts in cases they are positive and alternatively by assuming growth
of last period’s expected earnings proxy by the long-term growth rate.
A proxy for expected plowback rates of earnings, Et(bi,t+1), if not stated other-
wise, following literature, is obtained as one minus the ratio of most recent dividends,
Di,t, over earnings, Et(bi,t+1) = 1−Di,t/Ei,t, if past year’s earnings were larger zero.
Else, a surrogate obtains using the ratio of past year’s dividends over 6% of total
assets, which proxies for normal earnings levels based on the long-run return on
total assets in the U.S., Et(bi,t+1) = 1−Di,t/(0.06 ·ATi,t). Et(bi,t+1) is winsorized to
lie between zero and one.
The first two ICC-models belong to the realm of dividend discount models
(DDMs). To begin with, ICCs according the model used by Pástor, Sinha, and









ri,t · (1 + ri,t)15
, (A4.1)
where Pi,t denotes the market value of equity of firm i at time t and ri,t the implied
cost of equity, are calculated. The model is partitioned into three phases; in phase
one, for the first two expected earnings, the authors consider the respective explicit
model forecasts, which imply a certain growth rate, gi,t+2 = Et(Ei,t+2)/Et(Ei,t+1)−
1.1 Thereafter, in phase two, earnings are expected to grow at rate gi,t+τ . For all
firms, this rate is assumed to exponentially converge towards a long-term growth
rate, gt, dictated by the historical mean growth rate of nominal GDP.
2 This in turn
governs the plowback rate in the terminal value phase, bi,t (since sustainable growth
in general obtains as the product of return on equity and plowback rate), such that
bi,t = gGDP,t/ri,t; the initial plowback rate is assumed to linearly converge to this
1Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013) winsorize gi,t+2 to lie between 2% and 100%.
2Data on GDP is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, https://www.bea.gov/
data/gdp/gross-domestic-product.
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long-term value in phase three. Taken together, the respective quantities obtain by
Et(Ei,t+τ ) = Et[Ei,t+τ−1 · (1 + gi,t+τ )] | τ ∈ {3, ..., 16}, (A4.2)









| τ ∈ {3, ..., 16}, (A4.3)






| τ ∈ {2, ..., 16}. (A4.4)
The second DDM is the finite horizon growth model by Gordon and Gordon (1997).
The name alludes to the fact that the authors consider the first five estimates for
expected earnings explicitly, allowing for growth. Thereafter, earnings are assumed
to be fully distributed (such that necessarily no growth is possible, leaving the









ri,t · (1 + ri,t)4
. (A4.5)
Next, two models based on the residual income model (RIM) are considered.3
All models rely on the clean surplus relation (CSR) to hold, according to which
all profits and expenses are recognized in the income statement, such that future
book value of equity, Bi,t+1, obtains as current book value plus retained earnings,
Bi,t+Ei,t+1·bi,t+1. Residual income is defined as income above capital requirements of
equity holders, i.e., just earnings superseding ICC in monetary units, Ei,t−ri,t·Bi,t−1,
which can be rephrased, using roei,t := Ei,t/Bi,t−1, as (roei,t − ri,t) ·Bi,t−1.
The first RIM is based on the three-phase model by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swami-
nathan (2001). For the first three periods, they use explicit earnings forecasts.
During the second phase, lasting until the twelfth year, return on equity is assumed
to linearly converge to historical median return on equity in industry j4 firm i be-
3Occasionally, the model is referred to as the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson valuation equation, confer
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) and references therein, in particular Preinreich (1938),
Edwards and Bell (1961), Peasnell (1982), and Ohlson (1995) for theoretical treatments, Feltham
and Ohlson (1995, 1996) for implementations of this formula, and Lee (1999) for a survey of the
literature on accounting-based valuation with focus on the RIM.
4Following Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), I use the same 48 industry classification
as in Fama and French (1997).
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longs to, roej,t, calculated based on a rolling window of ten years. Finally, for the
terminal value phase, return on equity is assumed to stay constant at this rate.
Hence, ICCGLS01 obtains as ri,t in following equation,
Pi,t = Bi,t +
11∑
τ=1
Et[(roei,t+τ − ri,t) ·Bi,t+τ−1]
(1 + ri,t)τ
+
Et[(roej,t − ri,t) ·Bi,t+11]
ri,t · (1 + ri,t)11
. (A4.6)
The two-phase model by Claus and Thomas (2001) takes an even more “aggres-
sive” stand on the terminal value phase; the authors do not only assume residual
income to stay constant, but to even grow at an estimate for the inflation rate,
gCT01,t, calculated as the maximum of the difference between the current yield of




Et[(roei,t+τ − ri,t) ·Bi,t+τ−1]
(1 + ri,t)τ
+
Et[(roei,t+5 − ri,t) ·Bi,t+11 · (1 + gCT01,t)]
(ri,t − gCT01,t) · (1 + ri,t)5
.
(A4.7)
The last four models can (but do not necessarily have to) be subsumed under
the umbrella of abnormal earnings growth models (AEGMs).6 Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005) model the dynamics of abnormal growth in earnings, i.e., growth
in earnings above compounded retained earnings, Ei,t+1 − Ei,t − ri,t · (Ei,t − Di,t).
In particular, they assume that short-term growth of abnormal growth in earnings
asymptotically converges towards a long-term value, denoted as (γ − 1), resulting





Et[Ei,t+2 − Ei,t+1 − ri,t · (Ei,t+1 −Di,t+1)]
ri,t · [ri,t − (γ − 1)]
, (A4.8)
such that ICCOJ05 obtains as
ri,t = Ai +
√
A2i + Et{(Ei,t+1/Pi,t) · [gi,t+2 − (γ − 1)]}, (A4.9)
5Data on the term structure of interest rate is obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/.
6Confer Easton (2004) for a detailed discussion.
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where
Ai = 0.5 · [(γ − 1) + Et(Di,t+1/Pi,t)], (A4.10)
Et(gi,t+2) = Et[(Ei,t+2 − Ei,t+1)/Ei,t+1]. (A4.11)
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) set (γ − 1) equal to the maximum of the dif-
ference between the current yield of a ten-year government bond and 3% and zero,
analogously to the empirical implementation of long-term growth of residual income
by Claus and Thomas (2001).
As illustrated by Easton (2004), assuming zero long-term growth, i.e., (γ−1) = 0,
leads to the modified price earnings growth (MPEG) model,
Pi,t =
Et(Ei,t+2 − Ei,t+1 + ri,t ·Di,t+1)
r2i,t
, (A4.12)
such that ICCMPEG obtains as
ri,t = Et(Di,t+1)/(2·Pi,t)+
√
[Et(Di,t+1)/2 · Pi,t]2 + Et(Ei,t+2 − Ei,t+1)/Pi,t. (A4.13)






which ICCPEG solves as
ri,t =
√
Et(Ei,t+2 − Ei,t+1)/Pi,t. (A4.15)





such that ICCPE obtains solely from the inverse forwarded price earnings (PE)
ratio,
ri,t = Et(Ei,t+1)/Pi,t. (A4.17)
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Following literature, ICCs smaller zero are set missing; further, ICCs are win-
sorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Mechanical Earnings Forecast Models
The first model is the earnings persistence (EP) model by Li and Mohanram (2014),
specified as
Ei,t+τ = α0 + α1 · Ei,t + α2 ·NegEi,t + α3 · Ei,t ·NegEi,t + ηi,t+τ . (A4.18)
Ei,t denotes earnings of firm i in period t. NegEi,t is an indicator variable equal to
one, if earnings of firm i in period t are negative, and zero else.7
As a second model, I employ the residual income model (abbreviated RI to allow
for distinction towards ICC-models, abbreviated RIM), which takes the following
form,
Ei,t+τ = λ0 + λ1 ·Bi,t + λ2 · Ei,t + λ3 ·NegEi,t + λ4 · Ei,t ·NegEi,t
+ λ5 · TACCi,t + ωi,t+τ .
(A4.19)
Bi,t denotes book value of equity and TACCi,t total accruals following Richardson,
Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005), defined as the sum of the change in non-cash
working capital, net non-current operating assets, and net financial assets.8
The third, most comprehensive model was introduced by Hou, van Dijk, and
Zhang (2012) (HvDZ),
Ei,t+τ = κ0 + κ1 · Ai,t + κ2 ·Di,t + κ3 ·DDi,t + κ4 · Ei,t + κ5 ·NegEi,t
+ κ6 · ACi,t + %i,t+τ .
(A4.20)
The authors add dividend payments, Di,t, and a related indicator variable, DDi,t,
7Hence, the EP model resembles an autoregressive model, allowing for differences in persistence
depending on whether a firm accrued losses in the τ periods lagged fiscal year, based on economic
reasoning and empirical evidence for losses being less persistent, confer, e.g., Elliott and Shaw
(1988), Elgers and Lo (1994), and Fama and French (2000).
8The inclusion of accruals owes to evidence for lower persistence in the accrual part of earnings
as opposed to the fraction related to cash flow, confer, e.g., Sloan (1996) and Fama and French
(2006).
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equal to one, if firm i paid a dividend in t, and zero else.9 Accruals, ACi,t, are
calculated using the balance-sheet method prior to 1988, as the change in non-cash
current assets less the change in current liabilities, excluding the change in short-
term debt and the change in taxes payable, minus depreciation and amortization
expenses, and using the cash flow statement method, as the difference between
earnings and cash flows from operations, thereafter.
ηi,t+τ , ωi,t+τ , and %i,t+τ are the respective error terms. For each point in time
t, explicit earnings forecasts for up to five periods ahead are calculated, i.e., τ ∈
{1, ..., 5}. Following literature, level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile.
9Firms paying dividends have been documented to be more profitable and striving for persis-
tence and smoothness in dividend payments, confer, e.g., Fama and French (2001). Further, Fama
and French (2000) argue that dividends contain information about expected earnings because of
firms targeting dividends to the permanent component of earnings [Miller and Modigliani (1961)].
142 Appendix to Chapter 4
Bibliography
Addison, John T., Liwen Chen, and Orgul D. Ozturk (2018), Occupational Match
Quality and Gender over Two Cohorts, Industrial and Labor Relations Review
(forthcoming).
Agarwal, Vikas, Gerald D. Gay, and Leng Ling (2014), Window Dressing in Mutual
Funds, The Review of Financial Studies, 27(11), 3133–3170.
Agarwal, Vikas, Kevin A. Mullally, Yuehua Tang, and Baozhong Yang (2015),
Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure, Stock Liquidity, and Mutual Fund Performance,
The Journal of Finance, 70(6), 2733–2776.
Agarwal, Vikas, Rahul Vashishtha, and Mohan Venkatachalam (2018), Mutual Fund
Transparency and Corporate Myopia, The Review of Financial Studies, 31(5),
1966–2003.
Ali, Ashiq, Ningzhong Li, and Weining Zhang (2019), Restrictions on Managers’
Outside Employment Opportunities and Asymmetric Disclosure of Bad versus
Good News, The Accounting Review, 94(5), 1–25.
Amir, On and Orly Lobel (2013), Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Non-
compete Law, Stanford Technology Law Review, 16(3), 833–874.
Anand, Smriti, Iftekhar Hasan, Priyanka Sharma, and Haizhi Wang (2018), State
enforceability of noncompete agreements: Regulations that stifle productivity!,
Human Resource Management, 57(1), 341–354.
Andersson, Fredrik (2002), Career Concerns, Contracts, and Effort Distortions,
Journal of Labor Economics, 20(1), 42–58.
Andreu, Laura and Alexander Puetz (2017), Choosing two business degrees ver-
sus choosing one: What does it tell about mutual fund managers’ investment
behavior?, Journal of Business Research, 75, 138–146.
143
144 Bibliography
Angrist, Joshua David and Jörn-Steffen Pischke (2009), Mostly harmless economet-
rics: An empiricist’s companion. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New
Jersey.
Antonovics, Kate and Limor Golan (2012), Experimentation and Job Choice, Jour-
nal of Labor Economics, 30(2), 333–366.
Aobdia, Daniel (2018), Employee mobility, noncompete agreements, product-market
competition, and company disclosure, Review of Accounting Studies, 23(1), 296–
346.
Asthana, Sharad, Steven Balsam, and Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy (2004), Differ-
ential Response of Small versus Large Investors to 10-K Filings on EDGAR, The
Accounting Review, 79(3), 571–589.
Atkinson, Stanley M., Samantha Boyce Baird, and Melissa B. Frye (2003), Do
Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently?, Journal of Financial Re-
search, 26(1), 1–18.
Avery, Christopher N. and Judith A. Chevalier (1999), Herding over the career,
Economics Letters, 63(3), 327–333.
Bai, John, Linlin Ma, Kevin A. Mullally, and David H. Solomon (2019), What
a difference a (birth) month makes: The relative age effect and fund manager
performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 132(1), 200–221.
Balasubramanian, Natarajan, Jin Woo Chang, Mariko Sakakibara, and Evan P.
Starr (2020), Locked in? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and
the Careers of High-Tech Workers, Journal of Human Resources (forthcoming).
Ball, Ray and Philip Brown (1968), An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income
Numbers, Journal of Accounting Research, 6(2), 159–178.
Balsam, Steven, Eli Bartov, and Carol Marquardt (2002), Accruals Management, In-
vestor Sophistication, and Equity Valuation: Evidence from 10-Q Filings, Journal
of Accounting Research, 40(4), 987–1012.
Bär, M., A. Kempf, and S. Ruenzi (2011), Is a Team Different from the Sum of its
Parts? Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers, Review of Finance, 15(2), 359–
396.
Bibliography 145
Barber, Brad M., Xing Huang, and Terrance Odean (2016), Which Factors Matter to
Investors? Evidence from Mutual Fund Flows, The Review of Financial Studies,
29(10), 2600–2642.
Barber, Brad M., Anna Scherbina, and Bernd Schlusche (2018), Performance Isn’t
Everything: Personal Characteristics and Career Outcomes of Mutual Fund Man-
agers, SSRN Electronic Journal.
Barillas, Francisco and J. A.Y. Shanken (2018), Comparing Asset Pricing Models,
The Journal of Finance, 73(2), 715–754.
Barnett, Jonathan and Ted M. Sichelman (2016), Revisiting Labor Mobility in In-
novation Markets, SSRN Electronic Journal.
Barras, Laurent, Olivier Scaillet, and Russ Wermers (2010), False Discoveries in
Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas, The Journal
of Finance, 65(1), 179–216.
Beckmann, Daniela and Lukas Menkhoff (2008), Will Women Be Women? Analyzing
the Gender Difference among Financial Experts, Kyklos, 61(3), 364–384.
Berk, Jonathan B. and Jules H. van Binsbergen (2015), Measuring skill in the mutual
fund industry, Journal of Financial Economics, 118(1), 1–20.
— (2016), Assessing asset pricing models using revealed preference, Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics, 119(1), 1–23.
Berk, Jonathan B., Jules H. van Binsbergen, and Binying Liu (2017), Matching
Capital and Labor, The Journal of Finance, 72(6), 2467–2504.
Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan (2003), Enjoying the Quiet Life? Cor-
porate Governance and Managerial Preferences, Journal of Political Economy,
111(5), 1043–1075.
Bielstein, Patrick and Matthias X. Hanauer (2019), Mean-variance optimization
using forward-looking return estimates, Review of Quantitative Finance and Ac-
counting, 52(3), 815–840.
Bishara, Norman D. (2011), Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforce-
ment of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mo-
bility Policy, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, 13(3), 751–
795.
146 Bibliography
Bishara, Norman D., Kenneth J. Martin, and Randall S. Thomas (2015), An Empir-
ical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment
Covenants, Vanderbilt Law Review, 68(1), 1–51.
Bishara, Norman D. and David Orozco (2012), Using the Resource-Based Theory to
Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, Indiana Law Journal, 87(3),
979–1031.
Bishara, Norman D. and Evan Starr (2016), The Incomplete Noncompete Picture,
Lewis & Clark Law Review, 20(2), 497–546.
Bonner, Sarah E., Beverly R. Walther, and Susan M. Young (2003), Sophistication-
Related Differences in Investors’ Models of the Relative Accuracy of Analysts’
Forecast Revisions, The Accounting Review, 78(3), 679–706.
Botosan, Christine A. and Marlene A. Plumlee (2005), Assessing Alternative Proxies
for the Expected Risk Premium, The Accounting Review, 80(1), 21–53.
Botosan, Christine A., Marlene A. Plumlee, and H. E. Wen (2011), The Relation
between Expected Returns, Realized Returns, and Firm Risk Characteristics,
Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(4), 1085–1122.
Bradshaw, Mark T., Michael S. Drake, James N. Myers, and Linda A. Myers (2012),
A re-examination of analysts’ superiority over time-series forecasts of annual
earnings, Review of Accounting Studies, 17(4), 944–968.
Brown, Keith C., W. V. Harlow, and Laura T. Starks (1996), Of Tournaments and
Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry,
The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 85–110.
Brown, Lawrence D., Gordon D. Richardson, and Steven J. Schwager (1987), An
Information Interpretation of Financial Analyst Superiority in Forecasting Earn-
ings, Journal of Accounting Research, 25(1), 49–67.
Brown, Stephen J., Juan Sotes-Paladino, Jiaguo Wang, and Yaqiong Yao (2017),
Starting on the wrong foot: Seasonality in mutual fund performance, Journal of
Banking & Finance, 82, 133–150.
Capon, Andrew (2012), The cost of constraint, Institutional Investor Magazine.
Carhart, Mark M. (1997), On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, The Journal
of Finance, 52(1), 57–82.
Bibliography 147
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(2018), The Investment Value of Fund Managers’ Experience outside the Finan-
cial Sector, The Review of Financial Studies, 31(10), 3821–3853.
148 Bibliography
Cici, Gjergji, Mario Hendriock, and Alexander Kempf (2020a), Finding your calling:
Skill matching in the mutual fund industry, Working Paper.
— (2020b), The Impact of Labor Mobility Restrictions on Managerial Actions: Ev-
idence from the Mutual Fund Industry, SSRN Electronic Journal.
Claus, James and Jacob Thomas (2001), Equity Premia as Low as Three Per-
cent? Evidence from Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts for Domestic and International
Stock Markets, The Journal of Finance, 56(5), 1629–1666.
Conti, Raffaele (2014), Do non-competition agreements lead firms to pursue risky
R&D projects?, Strategic Management Journal, 35(8), 1230–1248.
Costa, Bruce A. and Gary E. Porter (2003), Mutual fund managers: Does longevity
imply expertise?, Journal of Economics and Finance, 27(2), 224–235.
Cox, D. R. (1972), Regression Models and Life-Tables, Journal of the Royal Statis-
tical Society. Series B (Methodological), 34(2), 187–220.
Cremers, K. J. Martijn and Antti Petajisto (2009), How Active Is Your Fund Man-
ager? A New Measure That Predicts Performance, The Review of Financial Stud-
ies, 22(9), 3329–3365.
Cremers, Martijn, Antti Petajisto, and Eric Zitzewitz (2013), Should Benchmark In-
dices Have Alpha? Revisiting Performance Evaluation, Critical Finance Review,
2(1), 1–48.
Daniel, Kent, Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, and Russ Wermers (1997), Mea-
suring Mutual Fund Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks, The
Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1035–1058.
Daniel, Kent and Sheridan Titman (1997), Evidence on the Characteristics of Cross
Sectional Variation in Stock Returns, The Journal of Finance, 52(1), 1–33.
Dechow, Patricia M., A. P.M.Y. Hutton, and Richard G. Sloan (2000), The Relation
between Analysts’ Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price
Performance Following Equity Offerings*, Contemporary Accounting Research,
17(1), 1–32.
Diamond, Peter A. (1981), Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency,
Journal of Political Economy, 89(4), 798–812.
Bibliography 149
Doellman, Thomas, Fariz Huseynov, Tareque Nasser, and Sabuhi Sardarli (2020),
Corporate tax avoidance and mutual fund ownership, Accounting and Business
Research, 1, 1–28.
Dornbrook, James (2017), Leawood money manager takes just 18 months to top
$1B in AUM, Kansas City Business Journal.
Dougherty, Conor (2017), How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, New
York Times.
Easton, Peter D. (2004), PE Ratios, PEG Ratios, and Estimating the Implied Ex-
pected Rate of Return on Equity Capital, The Accounting Review, 79(1), 73–
95.
— (2007), Estimating the Cost of Capital Implied by Market Prices and Accounting
Data, Foundations and Trendsr in Accounting, 2(4), 241–364.
Easton, Peter D., Martin Kapons, Peter Kelly, and Andreas Neuhierl (2020), Infer-
ences About Properties of Earnings With Disappearing Data, SSRN Electronic
Journal.
Ecker, Jacob (2015), At the Breaking Point: Adapting Louisiana Employment Non-
compete Law to the Information Age, Louisiana Law Review, 75(4), 1317–1362.
Edwards, Edgar Owen and Philip Wilkes Bell (1961), The theory and measurement
of business income. University of California Press: Berkeley, California.
Elgers, Pieter T. and May H. Lo (1994), Reductions in Analysts’ Annual Earn-
ings Forecast Errors Using Information in Prior Earnings and Security Returns,
Journal of Accounting Research, 32(2), 290–303.
Elliott, John A. and Wayne H. Shaw (1988), Write-Offs As Accounting Procedures
to Manage Perceptions, Journal of Accounting Research, 26, 91–119.
Elton, Edwin J. and Martin J. Gruber (2011), Mutual Funds, SSRN Electronic
Journal.
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber, and Christopher R. Blake (2003), Incentive Fees
and Mutual Funds, The Journal of Finance, 58(2), 779–804.
Eriksson, Tor and Jaime Ortega (2006), The Adoption of Job Rotation: Testing the
Theories, ILR Review, 59(4), 653–666.
150 Bibliography
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Pástor, Ľuboš, Robert F. Stambaugh, and Lucian A. Taylor (2015), Scale and skill
in active management, Journal of Financial Economics, 116(1), 23–45.
Patel, Saurin and Sergei Sarkissian (2017), To Group or Not to Group? Evidence
from Mutual Fund Databases, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
52(5), 1989–2021.
Peasnell, K. V. (1982), Some Formal Connections Between Economic Values and
Yields and Accounting Numbers, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,
9(3), 361–381.
Petajisto, Antti (2013), Active Share and Mutual Fund Performance, Financial An-
alysts Journal, 69(4), 73–93.
Petersen, Mitchell A. (2009), Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data
Sets: Comparing Approaches, The Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435–480.
Pinnuck, Matt (2003), An Examination of the Performance of the Trades and Stock
Holdings of Fund Managers: Further Evidence, The Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 38(4), 811–828.
Preinreich, Gabriel A. D. (1938), Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory
of Depreciation, Econometrica, 6(3), 219–241.
Prescott, J. J., Norma D. Bishara, and Evan Starr (2016), Understanding Noncom-
petition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project, Michigan State Law
Review, 2016(2), 369–469.
160 Bibliography
Rakowski, David and Xiaoxin Wang (2009), The dynamics of short-term mutual
fund flows and returns: A time-series and cross-sectional investigation, Journal
of Banking & Finance, 33(11), 2102–2109.
Regan, Michael (2016), Q&A With Jack Bogle: ‘We’re in the Middle of a Revolution’,
Bloomberg.
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Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and stock prices, Journal of Accounting
and Economics, 39(3), 437–485.
Rosen, Sherwin (1982), Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings, The
Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 311–323.
— (1986), Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments, American Economic
Review, 76(4), 701–715.
Russell, Kinnel (2010), How Expense Ratios and Star Ratings Predict Success,
Morningstar Advisor.
Sakelaris, Linda (1998), And the battle continues . . . Russell, Utah sue Wellington
over noncompete clause, Pensions & Investments.
Samila, Sampsa and Olav Sorenson (2011), Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to
Innovate or Impediments to Growth, Management Science, 57(3), 425–438.
Sattinger, Michael (1975), Comparative Advantage and the Distributions of Earn-
ings and Abilities, Econometrica, 43(3), 455–468.
— (1993), Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings, Journal of Economic
Literature, 31(2), 831–880.
Scharfstein, David S. and Jeremy C. Stein (1990), Herd Behavior and Investment,
American Economic Review, 80(3), 465–479.
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